

Lecture I

Nietzsche: Beyond Good and Evil, October 6, 1971

Strauss: Now we must say a few words as to why we should study Nietzsche. Let me say in a very general way that it is the most profound and comprehensive question at least in the last six generations. He reminds us of Socrates, even if and precisely if he questions Socrates. Before I try to explain that, let me first consider the surface, while never forgetting that it is only the surface. Now the surface is the politics, the political situation in which Nietzsche lived. The great watershed was the French Revolution, and the French Revolution led to the formation of two parties in all of Europe, the conservatives and the liberals. You can easily distinguish, or at least you could easily distinguish, the two. The conservatives stood for throne and order, and the liberals stood for democracy, or something similar to democracy, and religion as a strictly private affair. But liberalism was already outflanked by the extreme revolutionaries, socialists, communists, anarchists, and atheists. There was a position which we may call political atheism.

Now Nietzsche opposed both the moderate and the extreme left, but he saw that conservatism had no future, that its fighting was a real garbage, and its conservatism was being eroded evermore. The consequence of this was that Nietzsche pointed to something which we may call the revolutionary right, an atheism of the right. Nietzsche is then the antagonist of Marx, whom he did not know at all as far as I know. Nietzsche produced the climate in which Fascism and Hitlerism could emerge. One must not be squeamish about admitting this dubious paternity. One must emphasize it. Every fool can see and has seen that Nietzsche (inaudible) for which Hitler in a sense stood and to which he owed his success.

Some liberals have gone so far as to claim Nietzsche for a liberal. Was Nietzsche not the intellectual ancestor of that great liberal, Sigmund Freud? This partial truth must not be permitted to obscure the more massive and the more superficial fact which I have tried to point out.

Now the difficulty, if I have not pointed to difficulties by this remark, can be stated more simply as follows. Nietzsche's final judgment on slavery, and I quote: "Plato is boring." Nietzsche is never boring. He is always interesting, exciting, thrilling, breathtaking. He possesses a kind of brilliance and tempo which I believe was unknown in former times. I seem to discern it in writers as different in rank and quality as (inaudible), Macaulay, and (inaudible). What one could call with a sort of nasty remark, 'high class journalism.' Nietzsche certainly bewildered them by the wealth of his thoughts and visions. He also so to speak never said anything which he did not also contradict. There is a book written on Nietzsche by a very famous man in which it is shown that it is impossible to speak of any Nietzschean teaching because Nietzsche has contradicted everything.

Nietzsche's thought is deliberately unsystematic. Where shall we begin? Now a primary orientation is supplied by the well-attested fact that there are three stages or periods in Nietzsche's thought and writing.

First, Nietzsche was by training and education a classical scholar. Classical scholarship was at that time in Germany and in other countries the core of higher education. Higher education was understood as the formation of character and mind through the classics. Therefore, the classical scholars were supposed to be the educated. Accepting this view, Nietzsche opposed the spirit of the times. In one of his earlier writings, he calls thought (inaudible).

But Nietzsche observed that that spirit of the times which he opposed was accepted precisely within classical scholarship itself. Classical scholarship was undergoing a transformation as the study of classical culture into a branch of anthropology. The model was being transformed into a mere object of exciting research.

Now Nietzsche's opposition to the spirit of the times was based not only on the classics, and this is the first difficulty; it was inspired also by the philosopher Schopenhauer and the musician Wagner. Nietzsche's admiration of these men was from the very beginning accompanied by considerable modification and mental reservation. But this combination of classicism and Schopenhauer-Wagner was a very shaky one and Nietzsche broke from that. He broke from all "romanticism," and that characterizes the second stage of Nietzsche's work. The first document to that is Human All-Too Human, which is characteristically dedicated to Voltaire.

It is sufficient to say about this second stage the following thing. Nietzsche is a psychologist, but not an experimental psychologist. He himself compared himself to a mole working underground, without any light as such. But finally the light came. The great light in his direction, and that means the beginning of the third stage. (Inaudible . . .) were followed by writings which were meant to prepare for the understanding of the (inaudible), among which there is first of all Beyond Good and Evil, The Genealogy of Morals, and a series of pamphlets.

Beyond Good and Evil is in my opinion his most beautiful work. But according to Nietzsche, the Zarathustra is only the (inaudible . . .) which he never wrote, which he surely never finished, and which is accessible in a way in the posthumously edited work, The Will to Power.

I have spoken of Nietzsche's question -- what is the core of this question? The preoccupation of his contemporaries was epistemological. Epistemology is the science which answers or tries to answer the question, what is science? Nietzsche was also

concerned with this question, but much more with the question, why science? The question why science had always been answered by philosophers and men of science, in different ways, but always to the effect that there is a satisfactory answer, that science has a sufficient (inaudible), simply that science is good. It is true that there have always been people who question the goodness of science, above all some radical theologians, in the first place the author of the second chapter of Genesis.

Through all this century there raged a conflict between knowledge and faith. Knowledge in the wider sense, including skepticism; faith in the widest sense including also rational faith. Nietzsche questioned both knowledge and faith. We must see what it is that he opposes to both knowledge and faith.

Knowledge and faith both assert each in its way that the truth, known or believed, will make us free, will make us good, will make us truly alive. Nietzsche denies this. The truth is deadly. I read to you a passage from Nietzsche's second consideration (inaudible) on the use or abuse of history. I quote:

"If the doctrine of sovereign becoming of the fluidity of all concepts, type and species, of the lack of any cardinal difference between man and beast, doctrines which I regard as true but deadly. If these doctrines will be broadcast among the people, for one more generation, with the fanaticism of conversion which is now custom, then one ought not to be surprised if the people perisheth from the egoistically small miserable, from ostentation and selfishness. In the first place, (inaudible) and ceasing to be the people, the people will then perhaps be replaced by systems of individual egoism, by fraternization for the purpose of fratricious exploitation of the non-(inaudible) and similar creations of utilitarian vulgarity."

These doctrines to which he refers are doctrines of sovereign becoming, of the sovereignty of becoming. That is of the subordination of the being to becoming. They deny that there are stable, unshakeable differences between the species, and in particular between man and the brutes. They have a ruinous effect; yet they are true. They have that ruinous effect through becoming vulgar and popular. Nietzsche does not consider the possibility that the ruinous effect might be prevented by keeping secret the doctrines in question. Obviously that is an obvious impossibility.

What then shall be done? Repression of the deadly truth -- impossible. One can answer in a most general way and provisionally as follows. One must transform these deadly truths into life-living truths, into truths which make possible the highest life that ever was and which ever will be. Now how Nietzsche believes he will achieve that we must see by studying him and (inaudible).

Now I would like to illustrate Nietzsche's point by reading a few selected passages. But is there any point with which you would like to take issue?

Well, then let us turn to this. Nietzsche has found a striking formula for the deadly truth, and that is "God is dead." What does that mean? If you will look at the translation, p. 198, second paragraph, -- in this edition page 191, paragraph two. The very end of the first part.

Reader: "Dead are all gods. Now we want the overman to live."

Strauss: So the deadly truth leads to the life-giving -- what this translator calls the overman. No one can blame him of course for not translating it by superman, after all because of the superman in the comic strips. But it is nevertheless important that in Germany it is Überman, superman. The noun superman is very rare. I know only a passage in Goethe's Faust where it occurs prior to Nietzsche, but the adjective is quite common. Übermenschlich -- superhuman.

Now the overman is a super human being who is still a human being. What that means cannot be said easily. We understand it better by following Nietzsche himself who tried to explain Übermenschlich, and therefore explain to the people the alternative to the Übermenschlich. That is in page 128.

Reader: "When (inaudible) had spoken these words, he told the people of (inaudible), there they stand, there they laugh. They do not understand me. I am not the mouth for these ears. Must not one snatch their ears before they learn to listen with their eyes? Must one clatter like kettle drums and creatures of repentance, (inaudible . . .). They have something of which they are proud. What do they call that which is to them so proud? Education they call it."

Strauss: The present-day translation would be culture.

Reader: "Culture they call it."

Strauss: No, no, culture is the literal translation of the German.

Reader: "That is why they do not like to hear the words applied to them. Let me then address their pride. Let me speak to them of what is most contemptible. But that is the last man. And thus spoke (inaudible) to the people. The time has come for man to set himself a goal. The time has come for man to plant the seed of his highest hopes, (inaudible . . .), but one day this soil will be poor and domesticated, and no tall trees will be able to grow here. Alas, the time is coming when man will no longer shoot the arrows (inaudible) beyond man. The spring of his bow will have forgotten how to work. I say that to you one must still have chaos in oneself to be able to give birth to a dancing star. I say unto you you still have chaos in your soul. Alas, the time is coming when man will no longer give birth to a star. Alas, the time of the most despicable man is coming, he that is no longer able to respond to himself. Behold, I show you

the last man. What is love? What is creation? What is longing? What is a star? Thus asks the last man. You have become small, and (inaudible) the last man who makes everything small. (Inaudible . . .) ineradicable as the flea beetle. The last man lives longest. We have invented happiness, say the last man, and they blink. They have left the region where it is hard to live for one which is warm. One still loves one's neighbours, and rubs against them for one needs warmth. (Inaudible . . .). A little poison now and then that makes for agreeable (inaudible). And much poison in the end for an agreeable death. One still works, for work is a form of entertainment, but one is careful lest he entertaineth (inaudible)."

"One no longer becomes poor or rich. Both require too much exertion. (Inaudible . . .). Both require too much exertion. No shepherds and one herd. Everybody wants the same. Everybody is the same. Whoever feels different goes voluntarily into a madhouse. Formerly all the world was mad, say the most (inaudible), and they blink. One is clever and knows everything that has ever happened, for there is no need of (inaudible). One still quarrels, but one is soon reconciled, else it might spoil the digestion."

"One has one's little pleasures for the day and one's little pleasures for the night. But one has a regard for health. We have invented happiness, say the last men, and they blink."

Strauss: Let us stop here. In retrospect, I believe we can recognize certain contemporary phenomena in what Nietzsche says. But in some respects Nietzsche was sanguine. For example, when he says that anyone who feels differently goes voluntarily into a lunatic asylum. Now he doesn't -- he goes only to psychoanalysis. And some other differences.

The last man as described here or indicated here -- that is the alternative to the superman. One can begin to understand what Nietzsche means by this superman by contrasting that with the last man. Why is the last man the alternative. Because all other possibilities have disappeared with the death of God. But it might be helpful to see how Nietzsche looks at the immediate possibility which he did no longer regard as a possibility. That is an interesting point, and that is on page 170.

Reader: "Zarathustra saw many lands and many people and he discovered the good and evil of many people, and Zarathustra found no greater power on earth than good and evil. No people submit without first a (inaudible), but if they want to convert themselves, then they must (inaudible . . .). Much that looks good to one people is scorned and is infamous to another. (Inaudible . . .). Never did one neighbour understand the other and ever was the (inaudible) amazed at the neighbour's belief in

wickedness. A tablet of the good hangs over every people. Behold, it is the tablet of their overcoming. Behold, it is the voice of their will to power. Praiseworthy is whatever seems difficult to a people. Whatever seems indispensable and difficult is called good, and whatever liberates, even out of the deepest needs, the rarest and the most difficult, that they call holy. (Inaudible . . .) to the awe and envy of their neighbours, that is to them the (inaudible . . .), the meaning of all things."

"Verily my brother, once you have recognized the (inaudible . . .), you may also guess the law of their overcoming, and why they have climbed to their fullest in this life. You shall always be the first and excel all others, (inaudible . . .)."

"To speak the truth and to handle bow and arrow well that seems both dear and difficult to the people (inaudible). To honour father and mother and to follow their will to the root of one's soul, this was the tablet of overcoming that another people hung up over themselves and became powerful and eternal thereby. To practice loyalty and for the sake of honour, to risk honour and blood, even for evil and dangerous things. With this another people conquer themselves, and through this self-conquest they became (inaudible) and heavy with great hope. Verily, men gave themselves all to their good and evil. Verily, they did not find it nor did it come to them as a voice from heaven. (Inaudible . . .). Therefore he calls himself man. He is human."

"To be human is to create. (Inaudible . . .). Whoever must be a creator always annihilates. People create, and only in later times individuals. The individuals themselves are still the most recent creations. Once people hung a tablet of the good over themselves, good rule and love have together created such tablets. To delight in the first is more (inaudible) than to delight in (inaudible . . .). And as long as the good conscience is identified with the (inaudible), only the bad conscience says aye. (Inaudible . . .). (Inaudible) have always been created by lovers."

"Zarathustra saw many lands and many people. No greater power did Zarathustra find out first than the work of the lovers. Good and evil are their names. (Inaudible . . .). A thousand goals have there been so far for there have been a thousand people. Only the yoke for the thousand left is still lacking. One goal is lacking. Humanity has no goal. But tell me, my brothers, if humanity still lacks for goals, is humanity itself not still lacking, too. Thus spoke Zarathustra."

Strauss: I believe you have no difficulty in recognizing the people to whom he alludes. He mentions only one by name. Well, he mentioned the Greeks, the Persians, the (inaudible), and the Germans. And every culture is national. Nations are the fundamental (inaudible). Individuals are a very late (inaudible). But perhaps it is the very fact that the individual as individual has come into being, that it is no longer possible to leave it at a national culture. One must think universally.

Goals for mankind. But were there not goals for mankind prior to Nietzsche, prior to Zarathustra? Why does he deny that, and therefore deny that there is already a mankind?

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: But what about the human race. Do you know of any universal goal which is not the goal of Nietzsche and Zarathustra?

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: Sure, and also on a lower level, the (inaudible). But this is particularly excluded by Nietzsche. So when Nietzsche uses the word 'value' here and in many of his other writings, he makes the term popular so that it is now used by such exact scientists as sociologists, psychologists, political scientists who have deepened the understanding and (inaudible . . .). But the term was not coined by Nietzsche, (inaudible . . .), and it probably was due because people needed a term covering the good, the truth, and the (inaudible), so morality would be under the good, and all things which are beyond the world of 'fact'. Through Nietzsche that term conquered the world.

Now let me use a more old-fashioned term, 'ideal'. Now what are ideals? The key word which occurs here and throughout Zarathustra is creation, although this term is of course much older than Nietzsche. (Inaudible . . .). Ideas are creations, but what would the creating do? (Inaudible . . .). Nietzsche uses the word 'will'. Ideas are creations of will. And what we here consider is this. I have said before that Nietzsche opposes both knowledge and faith. (Inaudible . . .), and one could say with some justice that (inaudible) is will.

There is one passage which we might read which would clarify this. We turn to page 137.

Reader: "Of the free metamorphosis of the spirit I tell you how the spirit becomes a camel, and the camel a lion, and the lion finally a child. There is much that is difficult for the spirit, strong, reverent spirit that would bear much. But the difficult and the most difficult is what (inaudible . . .). What is difficult, asks the spirit, that would bear much and kneels down like a camel wanting to be well-loaded. What is most difficult, asks the spirit that would bear much. That I may take it upon myself and exalt in my strength. Is this not humbling oneself (inaudible . . .), to mock one's wisdom, (inaudible . . .), suffering hunger in one's soul, or is it this, being sick and sending home to be comforted, and making friends with the deaf who never hear what you want, or is it this, stepping into filthy waters when they are the waters of truth, and not repulsing (inaudible . . .). Or is it this, loving those who despise us, and offering a hand to the jokes that would threaten us. All these most difficult things the spirit

that would bear much takes upon itself, like the camel that is burdened (inaudible) into the desert; thus the camel (inaudible) into the desert. In the lonely (inaudible) however, the second metamorphosis occurs. Here the spirit becomes a lion who would talk of his freedom and be (inaudible . . .). Here he seeks out the last master who wants to fight him and his last god; for ultimate victory he wants to fight with the great dragon. Who is the great dragon whom the spirit can no longer call (inaudible). Thou itself is the name of the great dragon, but the spirit of the lion says 'I will'. Thou self lies in his way, sparkling like gold, an animal covered with scales, and on every side (inaudible). Thou is thousands of years old, and thus speaks the mightiest of all dragons. (Inaudible . . .). Thus speaks the dragon."

"My brothers, why is there a need for the spirit of the lion?
(Inaudible . . .)."

(Much of the tape at this point is inaudible.)

Reader: (Continuation at further point in text.) "And I maintain that it was an invert cripple who had too little of everything and too much of one thing. When Zarathustra had spoken of that to the hunchback, and to those whose advocate the hunchback was, he turned to his disciples in profound dismay and said, verily my friends, I walk among men as among the fragments and limbs of men. This is what is terrible for my eyes, that I find man ruined and scattered as over a battlefield or butcherfield, and when they are at (inaudible) from the now to the past, they always find the same, fragments and limbs and dreadful accidents, but no human beings."

"And now on the path on earth, alas my friends, that is what I find most unendurable, that I should not know how to live if I were not also a seer of that which must come, a fearer, a willer, a creator, a future himself, and a bridge to the future, and alas also as it were a cripple to this bridge. All this, said Zarathustra."

"And you too have often asked yourselves, who is Zarathustra to us? What can we call him? And like myself, you reply to yourself with questions. Is he a promiser, or a fulfiller, a conqueror, or an inheritor, an autumn, a plowsharer, a physician, a one who has recovered, a poet or truthful, a liberator or a tamer, good or evil? I walk among men as among the fragments of the future, that future which I am busy, and this is all my creating and stardom, that I create and tie together into one what is fragments, riddles, and dreadful accidents."

"And how could I bear to be a man if man were not also a creator and guesser of riddles and redeemer of accidents."

Strauss: That is accident.

Reader: "To redeem those who live in the past and to recreate all which was into into a 'thus I will be.' That alone should I call redemption. Will -- that is the nature of the liberator and the

joybringer. Thus I talk to my sons. But now learn this too. The will itself is still a prisoner. Willing liberates. But what is it that puts even the liberator himself better? It was -- that is the name of the will (inaudible), the most secret melancholy. Powerless of what has been done, he is an angry spectator of all that is past. The will cannot will back, and it cannot break time, and (inaudible). That is the will's loneliest melancholy."

"Willing liberates. What means does the will devise for himself to get rid of this melancholy? Alas, every prisoner becomes a fool and the imprisoned will redeems himself foolishly. That time does not run backward; that is his wrath."

"Thus the will took to hurting, and on all that can suffer, he wracked revenge for his inability to go backwards. This indeed, this alone, is what revenge is. The will, ill-will against time, and it was, (inaudible . . .), and it has become a curse for everything human that this folly has acquired spirit. The spirit of revenge has so far, my friends, been the best subject of man's reflections, and where there was suffering was always wanted punishment, too. For punishment is what revenge calls itself, and a hypocritical lie creates a good conscience for itself. Because there is suffering in those who will, inasmuch as they cannot will backwards, willing itself and all life were supposed to be a punishment and now cloud upon cloud rolled over the spirit until eventually madness preached everything passes away; therefore, everything deserves to pass away. And this too is justice, this law of time, that it must devour its children. Thus preached madness."

"Things are ordered morally according to justice and punishment. Alas, where is redemption from the flux of things and from the punishment called existence? Thus preached madness. Can there be redemption if there is eternal justice? Alas if so it was, it cannot be moved. All punishment must be eternal, too. Thus preached madness. No deed can be annihilated. How could it be undone by punishment. This, this is what is eternal, in the punishment called existence, that existence must eternally become (inaudible) and guilt again, unless the will should at last redeem itself and willing to become not willing."

"But my brothers, we know the stable of madness. I led you away from these when I taught you the will is the creator, and all it was is a fragment, a riddle, a dreadful chance, and thus the creative will says to it, but thus I will it, and thus I shall will it. But has the will yet spoken thus, and when will that happen. Has the will been unharnessed yet from his own folly? Will the will yet become his own redeemer and joybringer? Has he unlearned the spirit of revenge and (inaudible), and who taught him reconciliation with time, something higher than any reconciliation, for that will, which is the will to power, wills something higher than any reconciliation. But how shall this be

brought about? Who can teach him also to will backwards?"

Strauss: Let us stop here. That is sufficient. I will try to explain that. By the spirit of revenge Nietzsche means a great variety of phenomenon. And to some of them he alludes in his speech. In the other writings, he calls that with a French word, *resentiment*, by which Nietzsche does not merely mean resentment, but rather the reaction of those who are disadvantaged by nature and/or law, against the privileged, and that leads in a deeper stratum to a denial of the superiority of the goodness of the advantaged in question. Denigration of those qualities and the longing for the humiliation of these in this life and in general.

It leads also to what he calls the theology of hangmen. Punitive-ness, expressing itself not only in criminal justice but in the doctrine of divine justice. But as he says in this passage, which we have just read, all these are superficial phenomena of the spirit of revenge. I should also mention this -- it is a revolt against fate, against the past, against time. The spirit of revenge therefore leads to the escape from time, from the perishable and intemperate, to the imperishable and eternal.

And this is linked up with what he says in the passage which we have not read, because it is too long but which you could read, about the spirit of heaviness, the spirit of heaviness that shows itself particularly in science. The need for certainty. The spirit of revenge and the spirit of heaviness together -- that is Nietzsche's interpretation of the core of our philosophic or scientific tradition. Nietzsche questions the quest for the firm and eternal. This, the firm and eternal things, let's say these are deadly. They are deadly.

There is another passage -- we cannot read so much here -- which is in your edition page 233, of immaculate conception, where he confronts sun and moon, creativity and mere contemplation. The immaculate conception in German -- immaculate knowledge. Immaculate knowledge, because it is immaculate, or opposed to life.

What Nietzsche questions here and elsewhere is precisely the traditional notion that there is such a thing as contemplation, *theoria*, and that *theoria* is good and even the best, *theoria* being directed toward the eternal and unchangeable. The eternal and unchangeable, the beingly being unto its own, being in opposition to becoming. But the true and deadly doctrine is that of the sovereignty of becoming. According to a traditional view which Nietzsche accepts, the philosopher of being is (inaudible) and the philosopher of becoming is Heraclitus. Yet Nietzsche also questions Heraclitus, the philosopher of becoming. We have the simple formula for that -- all philosophers, says Nietzsche, lack historical sense, the sense for history.

Let me read you a passage from one of his earlier writings, from Human All-Too Human, here in the first aphorism, where he opposes

to the metaphysical philosopher the historical philosopher, which in his opinion cannot be separated from natural science. In the beginning of the second aphorism, he says "the congenital error of the philosophers, all philosophers, has the common error that they begin from present-day men and believe that they can reach their goal through an analysis of present-day man." That seems almost taken over from Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin of Inequality. The philosophers who have examined the foundation of society have all of them termed it a necessity to go back to the state of nature, but not one of them arrive there. The philosophers spoke of the savage. They painted civil man, the man of society, present-day man.

So Nietzsche's concern with history is by no means peculiar to him. In the 18th and 19th century philosophy has become aware of history in a way in which it was not aware of it before. The very term 'philosophy of history' was coined in 1750, rather late. This novel alliance of philosophy and history reached its peak in Hegel, but Hegel's philosophy, while fully aware of the creative acts, the acts of the will which make man what he is, Hegel's philosophy is in spite of that contemplative. It, as it were, registers or systematizes those creative acts. It is not in itself creative; it doesn't wish to be. In the words of Marx, in Hegel the philosopher enters after the present, after the whole play is over.

Now Nietzsche had opposition to this. Philosophy must prepare the creative acts; nay, it must be itself the creative act par excellence. In other words, after the emergence of the historical sense, philosophy can retain its contemplative character only if history is completed, if there is no future, and that is what Hegel fundamentally assumes. But as common sense says, and as Nietzsche says with common sense, history is unfinished, unfinishable. Moreover, it is all comprehensive. There are no coasts to which one can escape from the ocean. History is all comprehensive. Nothing is transhistorical. There are no eternal truths of any kind as Hegel says, and of course Marx and also many others. So this in a way of very general introduction.

We should now turn to the book we plan to read. But again I would like to find out whether there are any points which should be raised.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: That is not only modern science. The two things belong together. When you say eternal things, you indicate aspects of the same phenomenon.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: That is complicated. He also says that Christianity is Platonism for the people which would be just the opposite.

Perhaps we can begin with the very beginning of Beyond Good and Evil, and that is of course the title -- Beyond Good and Evil. What does that mean? Nietzsche has called himself in other writings an immoralist. Beyond does not necessarily mean immoral, transmoral, but what Nietzsche was compelled to make clear is that Beyond Good and Evil doesn't mean beyond common decency. What is the state of common decency? How fast can common decency guide us? Does common decency entitle us to distinguish responsibly between decent and indecent wars? People say usually there are moral or immoral wars, but people can hardly use that pretentious term. Or when you think of the problem raised by Dostoyevsky's Raskolnikov? Is Raskolnikov a decent man? He is surely up to his murder beyond good and evil, but is he indecent? On the other hand, it makes sense and I suppose we all use this expression from time to time, here's a fellow whom I would not touch with a ten foot pole, an intelligible expression, and that is what Nietzsche meant, by common decency. There is another word for that, a high word and a pedestrian word. The high word is purity, and the pedestrian word is cleanliness. These were for Nietzsche indispensable conditions, but Nietzsche also knew that some people whom one would not touch with a ten foot pole sometimes can make discoveries, especially on the seamy side of the human soul, which one must gratefully accept. What was his example? A French writer? Gallian. Gallian.

Now the next point is, after we have seen the title, to look at the subtitle. The subtitle is "A Prelude to A Philosophy of the Future." Richard Wagner had spoken of the music of the future. Nietzsche speaks of a philosophy of the future. The future is not implied in many passages which we have read today in the Zarathustra. In the passage when he says, does mankind already have a goal, where it is implied that it is for the sake of the future to find such goal.

Now the next is of course a table of contents, and you will see that the term 'philosopher' occurs only in the heading of the first section and nowhere else, but that is deceptive. The whole book is the philosopher.

And then we come of course to the Preface, and perhaps we begin with that. Let me translate the very beginning.

"Assuming that truth is a woman" . . . a strange beginning. What is the justification? Well, it is not very clear in English but it is clear in other languages, that the word "wahrheit" is of feminine gender. But there is more to that than this grammatical reason.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: There is a well-known woman who represented the truth in ancient mythology. Think of Oedipus' women. So the assumption

that truth is a woman is not entirely unfounded. There is also the remark of Machiavelli that fortuna is a woman, but I don't believe that Nietzsche thought that. Now let us read the whole sentence.

Reader: "Supposing that Truth is a woman--what then? Is there not ground for suspecting that all philosophes, in so far as they have been dogmatists, have failed to understand women?"

Strauss: One should translate females, because the word "Weibe" has a slightly derogatory meaning.

Reader: "--that the terrible seriousness and clumsy importunity with which they have usually paid their addresses to Truth, have been unskilled and unseemly methods for winning a woman?"

Strauss: Nietzsche describes here what he calls elsewhere the 'spirit of heaviness', the dogmatists, men like elephants, into china shops, and that was a very elusive woman and you can imagine what happened to her.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: But Socrates was not a dogmatist, as Nietzsche understands it.

Reader: "Certainly she has never allowed herself to be won; and at present every kind of dogma stands with sad and discouraged mien, if, indeed, it stands at all! For there are scoffers who maintain that it has fallen, that all dogma lies on the ground--nay more, that it is dead and dying. Speaking seriously, there are good grounds for hoping that all dogmatizing in philosophy, whatever solemn, whatever conclusive and decided airs it has assumed, may have been only a noble puerilism and tyronism; and probably the time is at hand when it will be once and again understood what has actually sufficed for the basis of such imposing and absolute philosophical edifices as the dogmatists have hitherto reared."

Strauss: Let us stop here. That was of course in no way striking in 1887 or when Nietzsche published this work. Philosophical dogmatism was already prevalent; it was prevalent since the time of Kant especially. But from Nietzsche's point of view, Kant is also a dogmatic philosopher, and this shows itself, according to Nietzsche, in what he says about morality, where he accepts dogmatism quite easily, the moral consciousness. So Nietzsche understands dogmatism in a much broader sense than Kant understood it.

Dogmatism as Nietzsche means it implies that one possesses the truth, or at least the most important or the most valuable truth. Yet the truth is elusive like that woman of whom he spoke at the very beginning. Elsewhere he says, we are the first generation

which no longer believes that it possesses the truth. That is what we mean by the end of dogmatism.

And then he develops that theme further, tracing dogmatism to its classic originator, Plato, but we have to postpone this for next week.

Next time we will begin to read the first chapter and see how far we go.

Lecture II

Nietzsche: Beyond Good and Evil, October 20, 1971

There is one outstanding work on Nietzsche, and that is the first volume of Heidegger's work entitled Nietzsche. And Heidegger's (inaudible . . .) are eminently (inaudible) if one wants to penetrate more deeply Nietzsche's thought.

Now let us return to the very beginning to the subtitles -- "Prelude to A Philosophy of the Future." In a way the title reminds us of the title of a famous Kantian work -- "Prolegomena to Every Future Metaphysics," which can present itself as a science. Nietzsche does not say to every future, but a philosophy of the future. What that means will become clear while we go. It is clear it will be a philosophy of the future. The philosophy of the past is finished, as quite a few people have said in the 19th century. Some have drawn the conclusion that philosophy is finished, especially Marx -- concern for the future, but surely no longer a philosophy of the future, whatever it is that takes the place of philosophy in Marx's thought.

Now we began to read last time the preface, which begins with that statement that I think is flattering to the female sex, comparing truth to a woman, and we have discussed that. Nietzsche goes on to say that all philosophic dogmatic or dogmatic philosophic teaching has lost its credibility. Well, in a way that has been said by Kant of course, but from Nietzsche's point of view Kant is also a dogmatic philosopher. Dogmatism, as Nietzsche understands it, implies that one possesses the truth, however limited that truth may be. Yet the truth is elusive, like a woman.

Now we may continue after that in the preface where he refers to the Vedanta teaching in Asia and Platonism in Europe. Do you have that?

Reader: "Let us not be ungrateful to it, although it must certainly be confessed that the worst, the most tiresome, and the most dangerous of errors hitherto has been a dogmatist error--namely, Plato's invention of Pure Spirit and the Good in Itself."

Strauss: Nietzsche here identifies the most important of the men he opposes, Plato, and what he questions is the core of Plato's teaching, the pure mind and the good in itself. The good in itself is a simple formulation which includes all the ideas or in the language of Nietzsche, all absolute or eternal values. Now what Nietzsche will put in its place, or why this Platonic view is such a fundamental error, that he will explain in the first chapter.

Reader: "But now when it has been surmounted, when Europe, rid of this nightmare, can again draw breath freely and at least enjoy a healthier--sleep, we, whose duty is wakefulness itself, are the heirs of all the strength which the struggle against this error has fostered. It amounted to the very inversion of truth, and the

denial of the perspective--the fundamental condition--of life, to speak of Spirit and the Good as Plato spoke of them . . . "

Strauss: Perspectivik would be a more literal translation. Life is as such perspec_____ and thinking is perspectiv_____. Not "absolute" as it would be from Plato's point of view.

Reader: "Indeed one might ask, as a physician: "How did such a malady attack that finest product of antiquity, Plato? Had the wicked Socrates really corrupted him? Was Socrates after all a corruptor of youths, and deserved his hemlock?" But the struggle against Plato, or--to speak plainer, and for the "people"--the struggle against the ecclesiastical oppression of millenniums of Christianity (for Christianity is Platonism for the "people"), produced in Europe a magnificent tension of soul, such as had not existed anywhere previously; with such a tensely-strained bow one can now aim at the furthest goals."

Strauss: This statement which is set here in parentheses is naturally crucial. Christianity is Platonism for the "people." Christianity does not offer a problem different from that of Plato. It is a modification of Plato's. Therefore, Nietzsche can in this work at any rate regard Platonism as the position which he attacks.

Reader: "As a matter of fact, the European feels this tension as a state of distress, and twice attempts have been made in grand style to unbend the bow; once by means of Jesuitism, and the second time by means of democratic enlightenment--which, with the aid of liberty of the press and newspaper-reading, might, in fact, bring it about that the spirit would not so easily find itself in "distress"! (The Germans invented gunpowder--all credit to them! but they again made things square--they invented printing.) But we, who are neither Jesuits, nor democrats, nor even sufficiently Germans, we good Europeans, and free, very free spirits--we have it still, all the distress of spirit and all the tension of its bow! And perhaps also the arrow, the duty, and, who knows? the goal to aim at . . ."

Strauss: This little joke about the powder, the Germans have invented the powder, in German one who can set the Thames on fire, he has not invented powder. But he refers to two great events which in modern times were made to prevent a radical deepening of human thought. Jesuitism in the 17th century and democratic enlightenment in the 18th and 19th. But there are two men, in each case one man, who oppose these reactions. In the case of Jesuitism, it was Pascal; in the case of democratic enlightenment, it is Nietzsche. Pascal and Nietzsche belong somehow together, according to Nietzsche's own opinion. This seems to contradict what he said about Christianity before. But we have to get used to quite a few contradictions which means getting used to more careful thinking.

So I would like to make only one general remark on the basis of the preface which we read. You see already the basis on which

Nietzsche proceeds at least in this writing. There are strong radical assertions, but they are surrounded and qualified all the time by "perhaps" and "it seems". Plato is the antagonist, the most powerful irritant, and yet Nietzsche more than any other modern philosopher, reminds of Plato or Socrates; the distinction is very hard to make, questioning and awakening rather than teaching a certainty, a certainty in Beyond Good and Evil, and especially in the first chapter to which we will turn now, Nietzsche writes with as much art and artfulness as Plato. This is somewhat conceived by the fact that he speaks in all of his writings, with the exception of the Zarathustra, in his own name, which Plato never does except in the Letters. There is one obvious difference regarding artfulness. Plato is always concerned with the preservation of the respectable opinion of respectable men, while Nietzsche is not at all concerned with that. Perhaps he had to shout from the rooftops, because only in this way could this serious and profound thinker find a hearing in his time.

So we leave it at these remarks about the preface, and we turn now to the first chapter with the title of "The Prejudices of the Philosopher." The prejudices of the men who claim to be free from prejudices, who claim to be the enemies of prejudice. Let us read slowly the first part.

Reader: "The Will to Truth, which is to tempt us to many a hazardous enterprise, the famous Truthfulness of which all philosophers have hitherto spoken with respect, what questions has this Will to Truth not laid before us! What strange, perplexing, questionable questions!"

Strauss: So Nietzsche himself is motivated by that will to truth.

Reader: "It is already a long story; yet it seems as if it were hardly commenced. Is it any wonder if we at last grow distrustful, lose patience, and turn impatiently away?"

Strauss: No, turn around.

Reader: "And turn around impatiently."

* Strauss: He turns the will to truth around, turns it against itself. What does this mean?

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: Yes, but let us look at Nietzsche's thought.

Reader: "That this Sphinx teaches us at last to ask questions ourselves? Who is it really that puts questions to us here? What really is this "Will to Truth" in us? In fact we made a long halt at the question as to the origin of this Will--until at last we came to an absolute standstill before a yet more fundamental question. We inquired about the value of this Will. Granted that we want the truth: why not rather untruth? And uncertainty? Even ignorance? The problem of the value of truth presented itself

before us--or was it we who presented ourselves before the problem? Which of us is the Oedipus here? Which the Sphinx? It would seem to be a rendezvous of questions and notes of interrogation. And could it be believed that it at last seems to us as if the problem had never been propounded before, as if we were the first to discern it, get a sight of it, and risk raising it. For there is risk in raising it, perhaps there is no greater risk."

* Strauss: So the novel questions which Nietzsche raises, or claims to raise, concerns the cause regarding the will to truth, and more radically the value of truth itself. There is another question implied -- are we posing that question, or is that question posed, imposed, on us?

X Nietzsche claims that this question isn't entirely a novel question. This cannot be literally true. If you remember Plato, the will to truth is inseparable from the passionate longing for happiness or bliss, for a lasting possession of it. And the simply lasting can be found only in the truth, the unchangeable, eternal truth. Now Nietzsche's novel questions presupposes the rejection of the Platonic answer and is only for this reason novel. There is another point when we think of Plato. The Platonic answer implies the eternal ideas, the perishable things. It implies the opposition of the imperishable and the perishable. And that explains the subject of the second aphorism.

Reader: "How could anything originate out of its opposite? For example, truth out of error? or the Will to Truth out of the will to deception? or the generous deed out of selfishness? or the pure sun-bright vision of the wise man out of covetousness? Such genesis is impossible; whoever dreams of it is a fool, nay, worse than a fool; things of the highest value must have a different origin, an origin of their own--in this transitory, seductive, illusory, paltry world, in this turmoil of delusion and cupidity, they cannot have their source. But rather in the lap of Being, in the intransitory, in the concealed God, in the 'Thing-in-itself'--there must be their source, and nowhere else!"

"This mode of reasoning discloses the typical prejudice by which meta-physicians of all times can be recognised, this mode of valuation is at the back of all their logical procedure; through this "belief" of theirs, they exert themselves for their "knowledge," for something that is in the end solemnly christened "the Truth." The fundamental belief ^{of} metaphysicians is the belief (in anti-theses of values.)"

Strauss: In the oppositeness of values.

Reader: "It never occurred even to the wariest of them to doubt here on the very threshold (where doubt, however, was most necessary); though they had made a solemn vow, "de omnibus dubitandum."

Strauss: Do you know what that is in English?

Reader: I would doubt everything.

Strauss: (Inaudible.)

Reader: "For it may be doubted, firstly, whether antitheses exist at all; and secondly, whether the popular valuations and antitheses of value upon which metaphysicians have set their seal, are not perhaps merely superficial estimates, merely provisional perspectives, besides being probably made from some corner, perhaps from below--"frog perspectives," as it were, to borrow an expression current among painters. In spite of all the value which may belong to the true, the positive, and the unselfish, it might be possible that a higher and more fundamental value for life generally should be assigned to pretence, to the will to delusion, to selfishness, and cupidity. It might even be possible that what constitutes the value of those good and respected things, consists precisely in their being insidiously related, knotted, and crocheted to these evil and apparently opposed things--perhaps even in being essentially identical with them. Perhaps! For that investigation one must await the advent of a new order of philosophers, such as will have other tastes and inclinations, the reverse of those hitherto prevalent--philosophers of the dangerous "Perhaps" in every sense of the term. And to speak in all seriousness, I see such new philosophers beginning to appear."

Strauss: So why Nietzsche turns to the opposition of values from the preceding paragraph is clear. Plato is the arch-metaphysician. Metaphysics is not knowledge as it claims to be. But faith, belief, and the basic faith of the metaphysician is that in the opposition of values. And the opposition for instance of truth and selflessness as values and appearance and theorism as worthless and bad. But are not appearance, delusion, and egoism perhaps of higher value to life than their opposites?

Furthermore, do not the reputedly high things, ^{truth, selflessness and egoism} owe their value to their essential identity with the reputedly low ^{things}? Perhaps, Nietzsche says. Now what is your reaction?

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: It has obviously a connection as you see from the end of this paragraph. He calls philosophers of the future, philosophers of dangerous perhaps's. That does not mean that they are skeptics. Skeptics in the sense that they simply say, I know that we cannot know -- this simplistic view of skepticism. But they surely no longer make assertions in the way in which philosophers traditionally make assertions. I do not know whether that answers your question.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: Somehow philosophy in the traditional sense has lost its credibility. That was not the work of Nietzsche. But there was

this thing which still exists, more in our time perhaps than in Nietzsche's time, which is now called science, which had acquired all the respectability and authority which philosophy enjoyed in the past. The opposition to metaphysics was very common in Nietzsche's time. And to dogmatic philosophy surely very common.

* { Nietzsche believes he must take this much more seriously than the common enemies of metaphysics and dogmatists, too. They are all still concerned with the truth. They regard truth as valuable and an illusion as valueless or bad. (This they share with Plato. X But is this a premise which is self-evident, that truth is more valuable than illusion. This is a question which he raises here.)

Student: It seems that illusion may have a greater value for life than truth, but maybe the first question that a Socratic would ask would be what kind of life. Nietzsche seems to without qualification give a primary place to life.

Strauss: Yes, that could seem so. But I think when we go on, you will see what is made of this distinction. But even the highest life is still life, human life. And something which is destructive of life, debilitating life as life, is questionable.

Student: Would Nietzsche be saying that the illusion is more valuable even for the highest kind of life.

Strauss: In a way, yes, but there is another point which is very obvious and therefore despised by many people as unworthy of such consideration, but I believe we should have mentioned it. When Nietzsche says there is an essential identity of truth and illusion, then he says this is the truth. (We ordinarily speak of truth here, and illusion there. Now Nietzsche says these two seeming opposites are essentially identical. That is the truth, and does he not get into some troubles?)

Student: I think so. I think that anyone would get into some trouble. *Because he attributes "truth" to the common life or truth and illusion.*

Strauss: So we must see whether Nietzsche took care of the difficulty.

Another Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: Socrates says that this is dying, but he also says that this is the life, and that if you take this so simply, that this dying is the way to the true life -- Socrates is not so much concerned with life as Nietzsche. That's the point. But the relation of life and truth, that is the question.

* Perhaps I can help you when I quote a statement of Nietzsche from another writer, that it was his intention always to look at science from the point of view of art, and that art from the point of view of life.

That is to say, not to take science and art as absolutes, as things given and not to be questioned, and they ought to be questioned with a view to life. What does science or truth or art do for life? Life is the ultimate consideration. The Socratic question by the way is how to live. "what is the best life?"

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: Well, Nietzsche doesn't decide the question -- he raises the question. But he says that we now having considered these maybe, one cannot claim to have settled the issue. That one cannot do under any circumstances.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: We can always be trapped; Plato also speaks of the trap into which we may fall. So that is not the greatest danger, but one must be cautious. What is required is to be very bold, as Nietzsche is, and at the same time, as he also is, very cautious. There is no other recipe for that. But Nietzsche has only opened up the question and we must see to what he leads. These seemingly separate aphorisms, as they are called, are linked with one another although the link is not that explicit.

Perhaps the next aphorism will be of some help.

Reader: "Having kept a sharp eye on philosophers, and having read between their lines long enough, I now say to myself that the greater part of conscious thinking must be counted amongst the instinctive functions, and it is so even in the case of philosophical thinking; one has here to learn anew, as one learned anew about heredity and "innateness." As little as the act of birth comes into consideration in the whole process and procedure of heredity, just as little is "being-conscious" opposed to the instinctive in any decisive sense; the greater part of the conscious thinking of a philosopher is secretly influenced by his instincts, and forced into definite channels. And behind all logic and its seeming sovereignty of movement, there are valuations, or to speak more plainly, physiological demands, for the maintenance of a definite mode of life."

Strauss: Specific kind of life.

Reader: "For example, that the certain is worth more than the uncertain, that illusion is less valuable than "truth": such valuations, in spite of their regulative importance for us, might notwithstanding be only superficial valuations, special kinds of *niaiserie*, such as may be necessary for the maintenance of beings such as ourselves. Supposing, in effect, that man is not just the "measure of things" . . .

Strauss: Now previously Nietzsche had only questioned or stated paradoxes. Now he begins with proofs, or at least people sense the result of his observations, as you see from the beginning of this paragraph.

(But first regarding the cause of the will to truth or of thinking, that cause is largely instinctive.) Physiological postulates. Required for the preservation of a certain kind of life. And second, regarding the value of the will to truth, which is already implied in the first point, "truth" may be of subordinate value to man's preservation. We need some determinedness, fixity and so on, however dubious that may be in the life of deep observation. That truth would be of higher value only, through the fixity, only if one dogmatically assumes that man is the measure of all things. Perhaps man is the measure of all things, but not in the way indicated. So if man is the measure of all things, the way in which things appear to normal human beings is the truth. But otherwise it is merely relative to one species of animals and therefore not the truth. This view you must have heard quite often.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: In the first place Nietzsche uses fear, truth in quotation marks, toward the end of this paragraph. But apart from that, for example if you assume that man cannot live without assuming (inaudible) space, then this (inaudible) space is absolutely necessary for human life. But this doesn't make it the true space. For example, a god would not understand things in Euclidean terms.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: That would be one example.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: In other words, he does not mean physiology in the narrower sense of the term.

Another Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: Yes, but is it not very important to raise . . . and by the way was it not raised before Nietzsche, the question, are the things insofar as they appear to us as normal human beings, are these these things or is this a distortion due to the human physiology. Is it not necessary to face this question.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: Yes, but what can you do? By what can you replace this view of things? And would this not in this way be in danger of being called for by physiological requirements.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: A certain species of life. Say the human species.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: There could be. I think here it is more natural to think of the human species, as appears from the rest of that paragraph.

Another Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: That was a very prominent view of that time, and it is no longer (inaudible) as an instinct of self-preservation. People can be driven by such instincts without being aware of it. Instinct is here used in opposition to consciousness, conscious thinking, and the main point which Nietzsche makes is this: the philosophers who claim to be free of such despicable things as instinct, at least to the extent to which they think, they are the worst sinners, because in their apparent freedom from instinctive promptings, they are guided by them. Let us go on . . .

Reader: "The falseness of an opinion is not for us any objection to it; it is here, perhaps, that our new language sounds most strangely. The question is, how far an opinion is life-furthering, life-preserving, species-preserving, perhaps species-rearing; and we are fundamentally inclined to maintain that the falsest opinions (to which the synthetic judgments a priori belong), are the most indispensable to us; that without a recognition of logical fictions, without a comparison of reality with the purely imagined world of the absolute and immutable, without a constant counterfeiting of the world by means of numbers, man could not live--that the renunciation of false opinions would be a renunciation of life, a negation of life. To recognise untruth as a condition of life: that is certainly to impugn the traditional ideas of value in a dangerous manner, and a philosophy which ventures to do so, has thereby alone placed itself beyond good and evil."

Strauss: We have already heard from another writing of Nietzsche that truth is deadly, and therefore to abandon a false, kind of fundamental premises is deadly. Here is no proof yet, only an assertion. Untruth may be a condition of life. Truth is deadly. What claims to be the will to uncover the truth, absolute truth, the truth not in the service of the preservation of the species, is in fact in the service of life. It is an instinctive desire for proving what is believed in advance.

Reader: "That which causes philosophers to be regarded half-distrustfully and half-mockingly, is not the oft-repeated discovery how innocent they are -- how often and easily they make mistakes and lose their way, in short, how childish and childlike they are, -- but that there is not enough honest dealing with them, whereas they all raise a loud and virtuous outcry when the problem of truthfulness is even hinted at in the remotest manner. They all pose as though their real opinions had been discovered and attained through the self-evolving of a cold, pure, divinely indifferent dialectic (in contrast to all sorts of mystics, who, fairer and foolisher, talk of "inspiration"); whereas, in fact, a prejudiced proposition, abstracted and refined, is defended by them with arguments sought out after the event.

They are all advocates who do not wish to be regarded as such, generally astute defenders, also, of their prejudices, which they dub "truths," -- and very far from having the conscience which bravely admits this to itself; very far from having the good taste of the courage which goes so far as to let this be understood, perhaps to warn friend or foe, or in cheerful confidence and self-ridicule. The spectacle of the Tartuffery of old Kant, equally stiff and decent, with which he entices us into the "dialectic by-ways that lead (more correctly mislead) to his categorical imperative" -- makes us fastidious ones smile, we who find no small amusement in spying out the subtle tricks of old moralists and ethical preachers. Or still more so, the hocus-pocus" . . . (the remaining portion is unrecorded.).

What does this mean?
 Strauss: The most important point which we have to emphasize in reading is at the very beginning he speaks here in this paragraph of all philosophers. Now he turns it around. All philosophers have the will to truth, a claim to be guided by the will to truth. Guided by something else, that is to say they are not intellectually honest, and Nietzsche's new philosophy, philosophy of the future, claims to be more intellectually honest than the philosophy of the past. (Here occur for the first time names of famous philosophers in the text of "Beyond Good and Evil" -- Kant and Spinoza, who have at that time the greatest names in continental Europe. Very different people, but guilty of the same lack of intellectual property.)

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: Perhaps the consciousness makes the difference. Perhaps one cannot get out of it. In other words, if I may use almost an obscene expression, which is now in quite common use, if all philosophy is personal, and the philosophers of the past deny that, and do say that philosophy is impersonal, and if this is so, then a man like Nietzsche whose philosophy is avowedly personal, is by this very fact more honest and more truthful. Does it not make sense? Whether this is possible, a personal philosophy or not, that is an entirely different question, but we must first try to find out what Nietzsche can possibly mean with these strong, powerfully expressed, beautifully expressed, but yet enigmatic sentiments.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: Well, then perhaps you read the last aphorism of Beyond Good and Evil -- read it now.

(Reader: "Alas! what are you, after all, my written and painted thoughts! Not long ago you were so variegated, young and malicious, so full of thorns and secret spices, that you made me sneeze and laugh--and now? You have already doffed your novelty, and some of you, I fear, are ready to become truths.")

Strauss: This without quotation marks.

Reader: "... so immortal do they look, so pathetically honest, so tedious! And was it ever otherwise? What then do we write and paint, we mandarins with Chinese brush, we immortalisers of things which lend themselves to writing, what are we alone capable of painting? Alas, only that which is just about to fade and begins to lose its odour! Alas, only exhausted and departing storms and belated yellow sentiments! Alas, only birds strayed and fatigued by flight, which now let themselves be captured with the hand--with our hand! We immortalise what cannot live and fly much longer, things only which are exhausted and mellow! And it is only for your afternoon, you, my written and painted thoughts, for which alone I have colours, many colours, perhaps, many variegated softening, and fifty yellows and browns and greens and reds; - but nobody will divine thereby how ye looked in your morning, you sudden sparks and marvels of my solitude, you, my old, beloved--evil thoughts!"

Strauss: So they are Nietzsche's thoughts. To use again this overworked 'personal,' the thoughts of Nietzsche himself. How this can be of any interest to any other human being, that is the question. Again as Nietzsche put it when he speaks of the influence of his long illness on his thoughts and of his recovery, an objection of the reader, of what concern is it to us that Mr. Nietzsche recovered, and then you can say of the same right, of what concern is it that Mr. Nietzsche had this or that thought? But this is shown not only by the impact Nietzsche had and has, but I believe you all will see when we go on that it does concern us, and how this is compatible with that emphatically Nietzschean (inaudible) of Nietzsche's thought.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: But innocent they are.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: But he says in German unschuldig. Oh, I see, that he doesn't go honestly enough. Yes, but on the other hand I must say, there is a certain -- I understand that -- what in Germany is called intellect, (inaudible), intellectual property. That would be expressed in idiomatic British English by candor. I have sometimes found references to the intellectual properties of English philosophers and what was meant, say in the language of Hume, candor. That is not such a grave (inaudible). One should translate it correctly, by all means. But it is not misleading.

Now in the next paragraph he speaks again of all philosophers or of every great philosophy.

Reader: "It has gradually become clear to me what every great philosophy up till now has consisted of--namely, the confession of its originator, and a species of involuntary and unconscious auto-biography; and moreover that the moral (or immoral) purpose in

every philosophy has constituted the true vital germ out of which the entire plant has always grown. Indeed, to understand how the abstrusest metaphysical assertions of a philosopher have been arrived at, it is always well (and wise) to first ask oneself: "What morality do they (or does he) aim at?"

Strauss: It is only fair to say that this canon of interpretation must be applied to Nietzsche himself. Go on.

Reader: "Accordingly, I do not believe that an "impulse to knowledge" is the father of philosophy; but that another impulse, here as elsewhere, has only made use of knowledge (and mistaken knowledge!) as an instrument. But whoever considers the fundamental impulses of man with a view to determining how far they may have here acted as inspiring genii (or as demons and cobolds), will find that they have all practised philosophy at one time or another, and that each one of them would have been only too glad to look upon itself as the ultimate end of existence and the legitimate lord over all the other impulses. For every impulse is imperious, and as such, attempts to philosophise."

Strauss: As such, as in its desire to be (inaudible).

Reader: "To be sure, in the case of scholars, in the case of really scientific men, it may be otherwise--"better," if you will; there may really be such a thing as an "impulse to knowledge," some kind of small, independent clock-work, which when well wound up, works away industriously to that end, without the rest of the scholarly impulses taking any material part therein. The actual "interests" of the scholar, therefore, are generally in quite another direction--in the family, perhaps, or in money-making, or in politics; it is, in fact, almost indifferent at what point of research his little machine is placed, and whether the hopeful young worker becomes a good philologist, a mushroom specialist, or a chemist; he is not characterised by becoming this or that. In the philosopher, on the contrary, there is absolutely nothing impersonal; and above all, his morality furnishes a decided and decisive testimony as to who he is, -- that is to say, in what order the deepest impulses of his nature stand to each other."

Strauss: You see at the beginning he spoke of every great philosophy in order to exclude all philosophy, or as the people who are called on the British Isles, the people who do philosophy. Because they would belong to that kind of men who discuss toward the end, the scientist or scholar. The German term, (inaudible), like the French (inaudible), includes both scholars and scientists, so the translation therefore would be difficult. But say specialists. These people who do philosophy are as much specialists, say the students of fungi or whatever he mentions here, that is not philosophy, and so whatever may be the case true of them, that does not affect the philosopher, and therefore this distinction.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: No, no, he proves this to some extent. No. 7.

Reader: "How malicious philosophers can be! I know of nothing more stinging than the joke Epicurus took the liberty of making on Plato and the Platonists; he called them Dionysiokolakes. In its original sense, and on the face of it, the word signifies "Flatterers of Dionysius" -- consequently, tyrants' accessories and lick-spittles; besides this, however, it is as much as to say, "They are all actors, there is nothing genuine about them" (for Dionysiokolax was a popular name for an actor)."

Strauss: And Flatterer of Dionysius, and not of Dionysius, as in Sicily. Yes?

Reader: "And the latter is really the malignant reproach that Epicurus cast upon Plato: he was annoyed by the grandiose manner, the mise en scene style of which Plato and his scholars were masters--of which Epicurus was not a master! He, the old school-teacher of Samos, who sat concealed in his little garden at Athens, and wrote three hundred books, perhaps out of rage and ambitious envy of Plato, who knows! Greece took a hundred years to find out who the garden-god Epicurus really was. Did she ever find out?"

Strauss: So these are then the first ancient philosophers who are mentioned, Plato and Epicurus, the anti-poets. Plato, the master of mise en scene, the great artist, and Epicurus, who lacked that gift completely, but he is as much a man who produces himself, if not with that glamour of Plato. Is this not what he means? Question marks regarding Epicurus? Is Plato's debunker Epicurus better than Plato? Do they not all deserve to be debunked? Or, and that has been done in the meantime by innumerable writers -- but Nietzsche is not concerned with the debunking as such, but with the consequence to be drawn from it. Must not philosophy be radically redefined? And now he gives a simple statement of this view of philosophy.

Reader: "There is a point in every philosophy at which the "conviction" of the philosopher . . ."

Strauss: Conviction in quotation marks.

Reader: "appears on the scene; or, to put it in the words of an ancient mystery:

Adventavit asinus,
Pulcher et fortissimus."

Strauss: (Inaudible) that is beautiful and very strong, that is conviction. But the joke requires some understanding of German, or obviously of the German interpretation (inaudible). In German one hears the donkey bray hee-haw and that is almost ja, the German word for yes. So in every philosophy there is a

very powerful affirmation, affirmation which is as reasonable as the beautiful and very strong donkey. We cannot have anything better except that we can do it knowingly. Perhaps that is all the difference in the world.

Reader: "You desire to live "according to Nature"? Oh, you noble Stoics, what fraud of words!"

Strauss: So he had spoken first of Plato and Epicurus, and he turns now to the other famous school, the Stoics. Aristotle is not mentioned. I don't believe that this is in any way intentional, but Aristotle doesn't exist for Nietzsche.

Reader: "Imagine to yourselves a being like Nature, boundlessly extravagant, boundlessly indifferent, without purpose or consideration, without pity or justice, at once fruitful and barren and uncertain: imagine to yourselves indifference as a power-- how could you live in accordance with such indifference? To live-- is not that just endeavouring to be otherwise than this Nature? Is not living valuing, preferring, being unjust, being limited, endeavouring to be different? And granted that your imperative, "living according to Nature," means actually the same as "living according to life"-- how could you do differently? Why should you make a principle, out of what you yourselves are, and must be? In reality, however, it is quite otherwise with you: while you pretend to read with rapture the canon of your law in Nature, you want something quite the contrary, you extraordinary stage-players and self-deluders! In your pride you wish to dictate your morals and ideals to Nature, to Nature herself, and to incorporate them therein."

Strauss: More precisely, and I believe it is of some importance to be precise at this point, your pride wishes to prescribe to nature, even to nature, your morality and your ideal. Prescribe is the key word.

Reader: "You insist that it shall be Nature "according to the Stoa," and would like everything to be made after your own image, as a vast, eternal glorification and generalism of Stoicism! With all your love for truth, you have forced yourselves so long, so persistently, and with such hypnotic rigidity to see Nature falsely, that is to say, Stoically, that you are no longer able to see it otherwise--and to crown all, some unfathomable superciliousness gives you the Bedlamite hope that because you are able to tyrannise over yourselves--Stoicism is self-tyranny-- Nature will also allow herself to be tyrannised over: is not the Stoic a part of Nature? . . . But this is an old and everlasting story: what happened in old times with the Stoics still happens today, as soon as ever a philosophy begins to believe in itself. It always creates a world in its own image; it cannot do otherwise; philosophy is this tyrannical impulse itself, the most spiritual will to Power, the will to "creation of the world," the will to the causa prima."

Strauss: The most spiritual will to power. Will to power is a key term for Nietzsche. We will find this later on. And that is that the will to power determined all philosophy in a variation.

The most spiritual. Now in German that is geistig, which is between the English spiritual and intellectual. If we say spiritual, we cannot forget that it does not have to be more than intellectual. That is effective in this most spiritual power. The question is of course what distinguishes this most spiritual will to power from the common forms. The Stoics prescribed to nature an idea. There was someone prior to Nietzsche who said that the human understanding prescribes to nature its laws. You surely have heard of that. That was Kant and Nietzsche presupposes that. He radicalizes that. All philosophy is prescribing, but prescribing not merely laws to nature, but prescribing ideas, and only on the basis of prescribing can everything else take place. Therefore, if this is so, if the ideas are prescribed, and that is the most important and the most fundamental phenomenon, then of course one cannot speak here truths. The highest would then not be the will to truth but will to establish an ideal act of the will to power. The will to truth would have only an subordinate function.

Generally one can say about Nietzsche's discussion about the will to truth, here and elsewhere, there was formerly the notion which Nietzsche knows of course and of which Nietzsche makes use, according to which truth is the (inaudible) of the intellect to the thing. The view of knowledge which was called then by its opponents the understanding, of knowing as copying. He produces what is already there. Over against that, Nietzsche has another notion -- creation, creative. And there is a connection between that notion of the creative truth with the Kantian philosophy.

Now this is all Nietzsche has to say in the first chapter on ancient philosophy, Plato, Epicurus, and the Stoics, and then in aphorism 10 he turns to modern philosophy until the end of this chapter. Is there any point?

Student: He asks here the question, is not the Stoic a piece of nature? I get the feeling that such question is very fundamental. If the Stoic were asked that question, he might either say no or he would say if I answered yes I would be more deceptive than telling what I believe. It seems that the ancient understanding of man is somehow going to separate him from nature because he has certain faculties which aren't found in nature.

Strauss: The word which Nietzsche underlines here is peace, peace of the mind. Part of nature.

Student: So the answer would have to be in a certain sense yes and in a certain sense no.

Strauss: Yes, but if nature is what Nietzsche said it is, namely something terrible and uncertain and so on, as he said at the beginning of this paragraph, then this would also be true of the (inaudible), would it not? And hence the Stoic philosophers.

Student: I don't understand. Nature is characterized as indifference itself. How could the Stoic be indifferent to nature when he is the one who is not indifferent -- he's very much . . .

Strauss: But does he not say one should live according to nature? And must not one look at this demand without necessarily accepting the Stoic interpretation? Nietzsche wants to show that this is an absurd demand. You cannot live according to nature, and he says if you mean according to life, it is impossible. That is empty because you do that anyway.

Student: But nature is understood the way the Stoic would have us understand nature, then for the Stoic to say that he wants to live according to nature would place his life in a very sort of shallow (inaudible).

Strauss: At any rate, there is one point which we should consider. At the very beginning when he speaks of the difference between nature and life, and at the beginning of paragraph nine, then nature and life are two very different things, but they have one thing in common. Perhaps you read this again.

Reader: "Imagine a being like Nature, boundlessly extravagant, boundlessly indifferent, without purpose or consideration, without pity or justice, at once fruitful and barren and uncertain."

Strauss: No more. I do not know. In my German text it is terrible, not fertile. Has anyone another German edition?

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: Yes, that would be better. Thank you. Yes?

Reader: "Imagine to yourselves indifference as a power--how could you live in accordance with such indifference?"

Strauss: In other words, one cannot live as nature or according to nature.

Reader: "To live, is not that just endeavouring to be otherwise than this Nature? Is not living valuing, preferring, being unjust, being limited, endeavouring to be different?"

Strauss: So nature and life are two very different things. But they have one thing in common which is not emphasized here, but . . .

Student: Wastefulness?

Strauss: No, he doesn't say that. There is only one thing which is common to both.

Student: Life is part of nature.

Strauss: That is not discussed here. Both are unjust. And that is the refutation of Stoicism, because they want to live according to nature and this means for them to live justly. The distinction between nature and life which is here made by Nietzsche is entirely provisional and must not be pressed and serves only the purpose for bringing out this injustice.

I think it is not practical to begin the next aphorism which deals with philosophy contemporary with nature. Now do you have any point you would like to raise?

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: That is a great difficulty and that goes in a way throughout the whole work, but mainly through the first chapter. To anticipate what we are going to do next time -- the fundamental phenomenon according to Nietzsche is what he calls the will to power. Now the will to power is according to him a fact. But he also says, the doctrine of the will to power is an interpretation of facts which is not more true than other interpretations, but superior from other points of view. So interpretation of fact, that is the difficulty with which Nietzsche confronts you. Can you ever go beyond interpretation? Can you ever go beyond that?

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: There are various possibilities. There are some interpretations of life which are unbearable for fastidious people, while they are perfectly bearable for non-fastidious people. And the fastidious ones are more credible to him, and perhaps also to us, than the non-fastidious ones. There is no refutation of the others, and in addition, if there were, Nietzsche would despise them. He presents it, and says as a clear reason, if you have ears and if you understand, then live differently than you lived before. That's all he would do. There is no claim to lead people, in the way in which Socrates leads.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: But the question is whether truth always has the same meaning. Nietzsche does not understand truth, sometimes with quotation marks, whether he uses the quotation marks or not, and then he means by truth what everyone traditionally understands by truth or sometimes he means truth in a different sense.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: It has to do surely with the relation to life. What I called the fastidious people, that is only one aspect of the people superior from the point of view of life. Only one aspect of that, but a non-negligible one.

We meet again next time.

Lecture III

Nietzsche: Beyond Good and Evil, October 27, 1971

Strauss: I read to you a passage out of Nietzsche's Second Meditation in which he spoke of deadly truth, meaning by that especially the sovereignty of becoming and the non-fixity of the species. Deadly truth -- that is a key word for Nietzsche. The strongest expression, the most comprehensive expression, which he found for this thought is the well-known sentence, "God is dead." One can also state it less shockingly perhaps -- life is wholly meaningless.

* Now what Nietzsche has been trying to do through his work is to accept these deadly truths and transform them by the very fact of acceptance into life-giving truth. Now we must see how this works out in detail.

Here in the preface he has said that according to Plato the pure mind perceives the good in itself, or to rephrase it in language coming somewhat closer to Nietzsche's own, the pure mind perceives the eternal values. Nietzsche opposes to this the following view: the impure mind creates perishable values. Impure does not mean

lewd but means instinct-dominated as we have seen last time. So this opposition meets us right at the beginning of this work. But Nietzsche speaks here rather of truth than of values. It is only another way of saying it that when Nietzsche speaks of values he does not understand values in contradistinction to facts, as is now very common in social science and I believe also in logic. As far as I know, this distinction, value and fact, is post-Nietzsche. It owes its existence to an attempt to make Nietzsche academically more bearable. I have never studied this very closely, but someone who did and who was in a position to know, Arnold Brecht, and who knew the discussions in Germany around 1900, traced the distinction between fact and value to a German professor of philosophy called Georg Simmel who was one of the first German professors of philosophy who had been affected by Nietzsche. So Nietzsche, to repeat, does not make this distinction. He speaks of the truth.

Now both Plato's and Nietzsche's statements which I beg to repeat: Plato -- the pure mind perceives the eternal idea; Nietzsche -- the impure mind creates perishable values. Both Plato's and Nietzsche's statements claim to be true in the same sense of truth. Namely, both claim to state what they perceive. What they perceive to be as it is. Both reproduce in their speech, in their thinking, what is. Both copy what is. But they differ radically as to what the truth is. This is obviously not sufficient, for if it were, Nietzsche would claim, which he does not, that his pure mind perceives "that the impure mind creates perishable values." And that there cannot be eternal life. How Nietzsche knows these things or perceives them -- that is a long question, but surely not by virtue of a pure mind whose existence he denies.

Now Nietzsche raises the question of the cause of the will to truth and of the value of the will to truth. But he asserts that untruth

is more valuable than truth, namely more valuable for life, since truth is deadly. Yet he claims that this assertion: "untruth is more valuable than truth", is true. This truth, the most fundamental truth, is obviously useful to life, not deadly. So it seems that Nietzsche cannot escape from the clutches of Plato. In the language of another philosopher, Hegel, philosophy must guard itself against the wish to be edifying. What Hegel implies is that philosophy is necessarily edifying itself. That is also what Plato and in his way even Nietzsche mean.

Now we have read last time up to aphorism nine. In aphorisms 7 and 9 he discussed ancient philosophers, Plato, Epicurus, Stoics, which has the characteristic omission of Aristotle, and then in the next aphorism, number 10, he turns to modern philosophy. He will not return to ancient philosophers, at least not in the first chapter. But first is there any thing you would like to discuss regarding these very general things?

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: In vulgar language, constructive. It is only a different Latin verb. Edify means building up a home. But you know also the common meaning of edifying, comfortable. Certain sacrifices would have to be drawn, and considerable sacrifices in order to come into the enjoyment of the edification given by philosophers. But in the last resort this happens.

Another Student: Can the assertion that truth is deadly be adequately understood by a non-creative person?

Strauss: Yes, sure, cannot everyone understand what it means? Especially if he is guided by a few pages of Nietzsche? That God is dead? This proposition seems to be intelligible. Many people use it today and many people regard it as true. Many people would say 'thank God' that God is dead. (But what Nietzsche tries to show is that it is a terrible truth, a deadly truth. And yet with this deadly truth, the creative people would be those who do not become or who do not suffer a kind of paralysis from seeing that truth. The ordinary people are paralyzed, but but those whom Nietzsche calls the creative ones would be led to a much greater effort than they would have been capable of without that deadly truth. First of all, to see the truth of the deadly truth, and second, to see their deadliness, does not require a creative act. That leads to simple nihilism. That is also a Nietzschean expression. But to get out of that nihilism requires a creative act.)
But even this getting out is but a seductive myth -- a life giving myth.
 So then we turn to aphorism 10.

Reader: "The eagerness and subtlety, I should even say craftiness, with which the problem of "the real and the apparent world" is dealt with at present throughout Europe, furnishes food for thought and attention; and he who hears only a "Will to Truth" in the background, and nothing else, cannot certainly boast of the sharpest ears. In rare and isolated cases, it may really have

happened that such a Will to Truth--a certain extravagant and adventurous pluck, a metaphysician's ambition of the forlorn hope--has participated therein; that which in the end always prefers a handful of "certainty" to a whole cartload of beautiful possibilities; there may even be puritanical fanatics of conscience, who prefer to put their last trust in a sure nothing, rather than in an uncertain something."

Strauss: The connection with this is clear. The connection between the real and apparent world is only another form for the question of the true world or the world of illusion. Truth and untruth. And the point which Nietzsche makes here and which he will make throughout this chapter that these are apparently purely theoretical, logical, epistemological discussions, are as much prompted by urges, by needs, by passions, as any other assertions.

Reader: "But that is Nihilism, and the sign of a despairing, mortally wearied soul, notwithstanding the courageous bearing such a virtue may display. It seems, however, to be otherwise with stronger and livelier thinkers who are still eager for life. In that they side against appearance, and speak superciliously of "perspective". . . ."

Strauss: The word perspectivik.

Reader: ". . . in that they rank the credibility of their own bodies about as low as the credibility of the ocular evidence that "the earth stands still," and thus, apparently, allowing with complacency their secure possession to escape (for what does one at present believe in more firmly than in one's body?),--who knows if they are not really trying to win back something which was formerly an even securer possession, something of the old domain of the faith of former times"

Strauss: Domain, ancient, one could almost say landed estate. It is a deliberate allusion to the great social change which was taking place in Europe.

Reader: "Perhaps the "immortal soul," perhaps "the old God," in short, ideas by which they could live, better, that is to say, more vigorously and more joyously, than by "modern ideas"? There is distrust of these modern ideas in this mode of looking at things, a disbelief in all that has been constructed yesterday and to-day; there is perhaps some slight admixture of satiety and scorn, which can no longer endure the bric-a-brac of ideas of the most varied origin, such as so-called Positivism at present throws on themarket; a disgust of the more refined taste at the village-fair motley and patchiness of all these reality-philosophasters, in whom there is nothing either new or true, except this motley. Therein it seems to me that we should agree with those sceptical anti-realists and knowledge-microscopists of the present day; their instinct, which repels them from modern reality, is unrefuted . . . what do their retrograde by-paths concern us! The main thing about them is not that they wish to go "back," but that they wish to get away therefrom. A little more strength, swing, courage, and artistic

power, and they would be off-and not back!"

Strauss: I cannot easily identify these philosophers of whom he speaks. Apparently they were very fashionable in Nietzsche's time. This was not the positivism of Kant, but I do not know -- I believe there was also a man called Dühring who was also attacked by Marx who called himself a reality philosopher, but I do not know. Perhaps Kaufman says something to instruct us -- does he say anything? No. Well, it's not terribly important. But the main point which Nietzsche makes is this -- all these things, these people who are the opponents of these now fashionable philosophers, are driven by an instinct and by instinct in Nietzsche's point of view, a sound instinct. Distrust of the "modern ideas." But they are not strong enough; they return too early to the pre-modern ideas which were much more respectable than the modern ideas, ideas like the moral soul, ideas like the old or ancient gods. The way in which Nietzsche describes these respectable men among his contemporaries reminds in a very general way of Kant, and therefore it is not too surprising that he turns in the next paragraph, next aphorism, to Kant.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: You mean like this deadly truth. But still self-satisfaction, congratulating oneself on our progress and not seeing the terrible deadly character of these victorious ideas, that is something to be deplored. Does it not make sense? Nietzsche also does not believe that one can return to the ancient idea. But nevertheless, that someone revolts against the modern ideas reveals a higher instinct than the instinctless satisfaction with the modern ideas.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: What you're driving at, if I quote you directly, here we have a vulgar truth victorious over a noble untruth. Is that the idea? Yes, but the recollection of a noble, once reigning untruth which makes this dissatisfying with the now reigning vulgar truth may lead us perhaps to a future noble truth. The book is called *The First to the Philosophers of the Future*.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: I suggest that we discuss it when we come to that.

Another Student: I think I have an idea about what he might be talking about. (Inaudible . . .) makes me think of (inaudible) and maybe Darwin.

Strauss: But these are very different people.

Student: Well, the way they went about their work . . .

Strauss: The contemporary I believe would be something like the nihilistic philosophers.

Student: You don't think he's referring to those who made man an animal.

Strauss: No, no, not here. He says the men who put under the microscope knowledge, microscopical analysts of knowledge, really that is wrong.

Student: Why does he talk about the passing of (inaudible). Isn't that something that Darwin has always criticized?

Strauss: That is Nietzsche's allusion to the link between this kind of "philosophy" and the barbaric tastes of the second half of the 19th century. You know, neo-Gothic . . .

Another Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: The credibility of what seems to the eye.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: But that is too little. We are now asked to (inaudible) many more certainties of common sense, the credibility of our body altogether, and he will do that in the (inaudible). Do you think that Nietzsche wanted to restore the pre-Copernicus world?

Student: No, (inaudible.)

Strauss: But you know that when he speaks of that and gives a summary analysis of modern times, he has this formula: the man, the earth, runs from this center into X. I think he mentions Copernicus. He knows that this is an indication of the indispensable modern ideas, not an object of congratulation, but rather apprehensive and bold reflection.

So let us turn to aphorism 11 where he goes to the root of this.

Reader: "It seems to me that there is everywhere an attempt at present to divert attention from the actual influence which Kant exercised on German philosophy, and especially to ignore prudently the value which he set upon himself. Kant was first and foremost proud of his Table of Categories; with it in his hand he said: "This is the most difficult thing that could ever be undertaken on behalf of metaphysics." Let us only understand this "could be"! He was proud of having discovered a new faculty in man, the faculty of synthetic judgment a priori. Granting that he deceived himself in this matter; the development and rapid flourishing of German philosophy depended nevertheless on his pride, and on the eager rivalry of the younger generation to discover if possible something--at all events "new faculties"--of which to be still prouder!-- But let us reflect for a moment--it is high time to do so. "How are synthetic judgments a priori possible?" Kant asks himself--and what is really his answer? "By means of a means (faculty)"--but unfortunately not in five words, but so circumstantially, imposingly, and with such display of German profundity and verbal flourishes,

that one altogether loses sight of the comical niaiserie allemande involved in such an answer."

Strauss: It is not certain that this does not represent Nietzsche's understanding of Kant's critique of pure reason. He owes all of his primary knowledge of Kant to Schopenhauer who is not a very profound interpreter of Kant. It is not impossible that this is Nietzsche's serious opinion, but we see that this is burrowed up in applause of affection in the sequel.

Reader: "People were beside themselves with delight over this new faculty, and the jubilation reached its climax when Kant further discovered a moral faculty in man--for at that time Germans were still moral, not yet dabbling in the "Politics of hard fact." Then came the honeymoon of German philosophy. All the young theologians of the Tübingen institution went immediately into the groves--all seeking for "faculties." And what did they not find--in that innocent, rich, and still youthful period of the German spirit, to which Romanticism, the malicious fairy, piped and sang, when one could not yet distinguish between "finding" and "inventing"! Above all a faculty for the "transcendental"; Schelling christened it, intellectual intuition, and thereby gratified the most earnest longings of the naturally pious-inclined Germans. One can do no greater wrong to the whole of this exuberant and eccentric movement (which was really youthfulness, notwithstanding that it disguised itself so boldly in hoary and senile conceptions), than to take it seriously, or even treat it with moral indignation. Enough, however--the world grew older and the dream vanished. A time came when people rubbed their foreheads, and they still rub them to-day. People had been dreaming, and first and foremost--old Kant. "By means of a means (faculty)" -- he had said . . . "

Strauss: In German that is still more (inaudible . . .).

Reader: ". . . or at least meant to say. But, is that--an answer?"

Strauss: You see he retracts the rather inadequate interpretation of Kant he has given in the beginning of this paragraph.

Reader: "An explanation? Or is it not rather merely a repetition of the question? How does opium induce sleep? "By means of a means (faculty)," namely the *virtus dormitiva*, replies the doctor in Moliere,

*Quia est in eo virtus dormitiva,
Cujus est natura sensus assoupire."*

Strauss: "Because (inaudible) has in itself power to make men sleep, whose nature it is to appease the senses." And the latter is not a Latin word at all, but a French word and superficially Latin. I do not know whether you have read Moliere, but it is an attack on the medicine of the Sorbonne and a document of the new scientific spirit.

Reader: "But such replies belong to the realm of comedy, and it is high time to replace the Kantian question, "How are synthetic judgments a priori possible?" by another question, "Why is belief in such judgments necessary?"--in effect, it is high time that we should understand that such judgments must be believed to be true, for the sake of the preservation of creatures like ourselves; though they still might naturally be false judgments! Or, more plainly spoken, and roughly and readily--synthetic judgments a priori should not "be possible" at all; we have no right to them; in our mouths they are nothing but false judgments. Only, of course, the belief in their truth is necessary, as plausible belief and ocular evidence belonging to the perspective view of life. And finally, to call to mind the enormous influence which "German philosophy"--I hope you understand its right to inverted commas (goosefeet)?--has exercised throughout the whole of Europe, there is no doubt that a certain *virtus dormitiva* had a share in it; thanks to German philosophy, it was a delight to the noble idlers, the virtuous, the mystics, the artists, the three-fourths Christians, and the political obscurantists of all nations, to find an antidote to the still overwhelming sensualism which overflowed from the last century into this, in short--"sensus assoupire." . . .

Strauss: Yes, so this is all what Nietzsche has to say about Kant. But we can perhaps say in Moliere's verses and in Nietzsche's use of them Aristotle, who had been disregarded, takes his revenge. So there is an irony beyond Nietzsche's dialogue.

It is also interesting to see that it ends here, the paragraph ends with a certain vindication of sensualism, which superficially contradicts what Nietzsche has said in aphorism 10 where he spoke so disparagingly about the contemporary belief in the body and therefore of course in the senses. So that is a bit more complicated as one sees by putting these two passages together.

Now the connection between these two aphorisms and the next one is this: that Nietzsche continues to question materialism and sensualism, but while having questioned the reactionary way out of the Germans and especially Kant.

Now let us read the next paragraph.

Reader: "As regards materialistic atomism, it is one of the best refuted theories that have been advanced, and in Europe there is now perhaps no one in the learned world so unscholarly as to attach serious signification to it, except for convenient everyday use (as an abbreviation of the means of expression)--thanks clearly to the Pole Boscovich: he and the Pole Copernicus have hitherto been the greatest and most successful opponents of ocular evidence."

"For whilst Copernicus has persuaded us to believe, contrary to all the senses, that the earth does not stand fast, Boscovich has taught us to abjure the belief in the last thing that "stood fast" of the earth--the belief in the "substance," in "matter,"

in the earth-residuum, and particle-atom: it is the greatest triumph over the senses that has hitherto been gained on earth. One must, however, go still further, and also declare war, relentless war to the knife, against the "atomistic requirements" which still lead a dangerous after-life in places where no one suspects them, like the more celebrated "metaphysical requirements": one must also above all give the finishing stroke to that other and more portentous atomism which Christianity has taught best and longest, the soul-atomism. Let it be permitted to designate by this expression the belief which regards the soul as something indestructible, eternal, indivisible, as a monad, as an atomon: this belief ought to be expelled from science! Between ourselves, it is not at all necessary to get rid of "the soul" thereby, and thus renounce one of the oldest and most venerated hypotheses--as happens frequently to the clumsiness of naturalists, who can hardly touch on the soul without immediately losing it. But the way is open for new acceptations and refinements of the soul-hypothesis; and such conceptions as "mortal soul," and "soul of subjective multiplicity," and "soul as social structure of the instincts and passions," want henceforth, to have legitimate rights in science. In that the new psychologist is about to put an end to the superstitions which have hitherto flourished with almost tropical luxuriance around the idea of the soul, he is really, as it were, thrusting himself into a new desert and a new distrust--it is possible that the older psychologists had a merrier and more comfortable time of it; eventually, however, he finds that precisely thereby he is also condemned to invent--and, who knows? perhaps to discover the new."

Strauss: In German that is a pun, erfinden finden. We must keep in mind this distinction between invention, discovery, because later on there will be some big question mark behind that distinction. But the main point is this. On the one hand we have Plato's "pure mind". The traditional opposite to that traditional schema was what was called sensualism or materialism, meaning the truth is perceived by its senses. Only the body and bodily organs--both are rejected by Nietzsche. In the name of what? He indicates this again here as he has done before, when he speaks of the soul as the social structure of urges and affects. The urges and affects--they are the fundamental phenomenon in the light of which one must understand such dubious things as Plato's pure mind or the sense perceptions as understood today by Locke or Hume.

Student: If I remember, in Lucretia when the world was broken down, it was the atoms that helped to do it and it seems here that this man wants to get rid of the atoms too. So it seems that the atoms have a different effect in Lucretius than they do in Nietzsche.

Strauss: Nietzsche didn't mind the atoms.

Student: But he could make his point just as well by speaking (inaudible) and going in the direction in which Lucretius went. If he wants the soul . . .

Strauss: Namely the soul is . . . there are special soul atoms.

Student: Yes, he could use the same thing that he is doing here. He could make the soul a kind of -- He talks about the soul as a kind of social structure of drives . . .

Strauss: (Inaudible . . .), a fundamental reality of atoms, but Nietzsche says no, the fundamental reality of passions and urges. (Inaudible . . .). It has something to do with the urges and passions as the fundamental reality. And this thesis opposes both Plato and Lucretius. And it would be very hard to say whether Nietzsche has some slight or sligher inclinations toward Plato or (inaudible). It is very hard, but I think it is an uninteresting question.

Nietzsche argues from the mentality of the plain. He believes that the whole plain on which Plato and Epicurus fought out their battle has been discredited, or differently stated, that this was based on a common assumption that was wrong, namely that there is a truth in itself.

Student: Well, then I guess the same sort of suspicion would arise with me now that arose with me before -- how does he know that there are no atoms?

Strauss: He referred to Boscovich. You have probably heard of Boscovich. And in the meantime something else has happened to atoms, as you have read in the daily papers. So these atoms that Epicurus thought of are no longer defensible on the basis of science. Nietzsche uses here the word science. (Inaudible . . .). But that is no longer scientifically defensive.

Student: Then Nietzsche knows two things, that the earth does not stand still, and that there are no atoms.

Strauss: But the point is, and you can also say the difference is, Nietzsche can no longer be certain that there is (inaudible). He can no longer be certain that the ultimate reality is false. How is that?

Student: He sounds pretty certain.

Strauss: We know that it happens all the time. He speaks partly in a very esoteric manner and then in a very (inaudible) and we must balance that. Through this bold, cautious speaking, there emerges then suggestion, a suggestion, that Nietzsche believes in (inaudible). That is the question. So we must proceed step by step. So at any rate he cannot take refuge from Plato in Epicurus or Lucretius as little as in Kant.

Now we turn to another possibility which comes somewhat closer to what he is implying to propose, not physics of which he has spoken, but physiology. That is the next part.

Reader: "Psychologists should bethink themselves before putting down the instinct of self-preservation as the cardinal instinct of an organic being. A living thing seeks above all to discharge its strength--life itself is Will to Power."

Strauss: So this is (dash)--life itself is Will to Power--(dash). It is as it were smuggled in. Stated in parentheses. Which can mean it goes without saying, or if you are so simple as to believe it when I say it, (inaudible).

Reader: "Self-preservation is only one of the indirect and most frequent results thereof. In short, here, as everywhere else, let us beware of superfluous teleological principles!--one of which is the instinct of self-preservation (we owe it to Spinoza's inconsistency). It is thus, in effect, that method ordains, which must be essentially economy of principles."

Strauss: What does he mean when he says "here, as everywhere, let us beware of superfluous teleological principles." Are there perhaps teleological principles which are not superfluous? Or is it of the essence of teleological principles? It is hard to decide. As for the assertion, that is the point which I think goes to the root of what Nietzsche is describing, the instinct of self-preservation which had played such a very great role and which was also called in the 19th century the will to life, will to survival. This is for Nietzsche something (inaudible) with this, but lower in rank than the will to power. One can understand the instinct of self-preservation only in the light of the will to power. What are the reasons enabling Nietzsche or entitling Nietzsche to assert that life is will to power are not stated here. We have to try to find out for ourselves why life can be thought of as will to power. Do we have any evidence leading us to an understanding of this strange assertion.

Student: Perhaps in Hobbes. The principle of self-preservation which (inaudible . . .) to form a commonwealth, was not the final end, as far as I remember, in the Leviathan, (inaudible . . .).

Strauss: Surely, but Hobbes was not the first and surely not the Mozart as Nietzsche claims here. He was not the first. That was an old story going back to antiquity. The desire for self-preservation. Why he brings in Spinoza I do not know. Perhaps because Spinoza was so famous because of his attack on teleology, and Spinoza, although he was so reasonable in his general rejection of teleology, should have accepted the desire for self-preservation as the principle, i.e., the teleological principle, as an inconsistency of Spinoza; that could be.

Why is the desire for self-preservation teleological? That is not quite clear.

Student: Possibly to make a break here, with Locke, when he talks about self-preservation as one possible understanding of man, but the other one being (inaudible), which seems to go beyond self-preservation as a principle to declare that the state of nature must be the state of war.

Strauss: Well, there is no state of nature here.

Student: But that's the way he . . .

Strauss: Sure, in a way it is also directed against Locke; that is quite true. Now as to the reasons which Nietzsche could have had for making this suggestion, life itself is will to power, do we have any clue in this book as to why this assertion makes sense?

Student: When he is talking about Epicurus, the idea that these philosophers were (inaudible . . .), . . .

Strauss: But that would at most prove that philosophers are dominated by this will to power, but would not prove that life itself is. But still what he says about the philosophers is very pertinent. He says about philosophy, it is the most spiritual or intellectual form of this will to power.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: If you remember the critique of the Stoa in aphorism 9, when he says that the Stoics prescribe their ideas to nature, and that reminds of a famous formula of Kant, the understanding prescribed to nature and its laws. Now in trying to understand understanding, we come ultimately back to prescribing but without assuming flaws as there are in the case of Kant, which determine this prescribing. Then we come to something like imposing one's stamp on things. Will to power.

* Furthermore one could also think of this. Nietzsche is very much concerned with history as we shall see. A most fashionable doctrine of that time and I believe even today is the idea of history as progressive and that meant on the higher level that in each preceding stage there are defects, contradictions; which force man beyond that stage. Therefore the historical process as a whole is a rational process. But let us assume the historical process is not a rational process, as Nietzsche assumes. He must have an unrational X in man which forces him to go beyond, to overcome, a stage he has reached regardless of whether there were contradictions or not, in the preceding stages. We do not have enough material for answering that question. But we must keep it in mind, precisely because Nietzsche leaves it here only as an assertion.

Life itself is will to power -- what does this mean? All life of course, not only human life. We must see how we can find that, and what about the body?, which is not a will, and he takes up this question of physics as distinguished from physiology.

14. Reader: "It is perhaps just dawning on five or six minds that natural philosophy is only a world-exposition and world-arrangement (according to us, if I may say so!) and not a world-explanation; but in so far as it is based on belief in the senses, it is regarded as more, and for a long time to come must be regarded as more-- namely, as an explanation. It has eyes and fingers of its own, it has ocular evidence and palpableness of its own: this operates

fascinatingly, persuasively, and convincingly upon an age with fundamentally plebeian tastes--in fact, it follows instinctively the canon of truth of eternal popular sensualism. What is clear, what is "explained"? Only that which can be seen and felt--one must pursue every problem thus far. Obversely, however, the charm of the Platonic mode of thought, which was an aristocratic mode, consisted precisely in resistance to obvious sense-evidence--perhaps among men who enjoyed even stronger and more fastidious senses than our contemporaries, but who knew how to find a higher triumph in remaining masters of them: and this by means of pale, cold, grey conceptional networks which they threw over the motley whirl of the senses--the mob of the senses, as Plato said. In this overcoming of the world, and interpreting of the world in the manner of Plato, there was an enjoyment different from that which the physicists of to-day offer us--and likewise the Darwinists and antiteleologists among the physiological workers, . . . "

Strauss: In other words, they are just cogs in the big machine.

Reader: "With their principle of the "smallest possible effort," and the greatest possible blunder. "Where there is nothing more to see or to gasp, there is also nothing more for men to do"--that is certainly an imperative different from the Platonic one, but it may notwithstanding be the right imperative for a hardy, laborious race of machinists and bridge-builders of the future, who have nothing but rough work to perform."

Strauss: So physics is only one interpretation of the world among many. In the meantime that has become quite popular without shaking the authority of physics nevertheless. Nietzsche's point is the objectivity of physics is based on a fundamental subjectivity. A fundamental preference, or what he calls the plebeian preference. A plebeian imperative, just as there was a patrician imperative, behind Plato. And the general assertion of course of Nietzsche is that behind all world views, philosophies or sciences, there are imperatives which determine them. This is another way of saying that the will to power expresses itself and is a driving thing behind the theoretical structures.

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The word which he uses here -- that was a 'noble' way of thinking, we come to that later. The key word for Nietzsche in German is (inaudible), and he will devote the last chapter to the question, what is (inaudible). In English I don't believe it can be translated because in English two German words, (inaudible . . .) are both translated by noble. In German there is a great difference. (Inaudible) has much more of the social origin than (inaudible). A noble action is possible, so to speak, for every human being. We will come to that when we have come to chapter 9.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: People were ready for it, and Nietzsche in a way accepted it. I mean not in the way in which (inaudible), a man who has

learned very much from Nietzsche, who said at the time of the first World War, make this an unqualified imperative, technology and war and administration, these are the only respectable things which still remain, and only unserious people will devote themselves to things like art and so on. No, Nietzsche did not regard this as sufficient. He said it might very well be the right imperative for this age, but this age is not the last age.

Another Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: That will come very soon. You get it straight from Nietzsche's mouth and I do not have to explain it.

Another Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: No, I think he meant this. No, Bosovich was a man of the 18th century and he speaks of the 19th century. Nietzsche had a certain knowledge of the theoretical discussions of the sciences. Someone made a count, in the very small library which he had, and there were I believe fifty popular sciences in books and thirty classics. So great was his interest in them. But he was of course not trained in them. But this enabled him to see further.

So we shall try with Nietzsche's help to answer your question in the next aphorism.

Reader: "To study physiology with a clear conscience, one must insist on the fact that the sense-organs are not phenomena in the sense of the idealistic philosophy."

Strauss: That means of course either Burke or Kant; it has nothing to do with Plato.

Reader: "As such they certainly could not be causes! Sensualism, therefore, at least as regularive hypothesis, if not as heuristic principle. What? And others say even that the external world is the work of our organs? But then our body, as a part of this external world, would be the work of our organs! But then our organs themselves would be the work of our organs! It seems to me that this is a complete reductio ad absurdum, if the conception causa sui is something fundamentally absurd. Consequently, the external world is not the work of our organs--?"

Strauss: The external world is not the work of our organs. The beginning reads like a rehabilitation of the senses. There is a world without us which is at any rate not the work of our sense organs. But of what?, if it must be understood as the work of something. I believe the answer can be anticipated. --Of the will to power. But what is that will? What is will? How do we know it? How do we know phenomena? Phenomena like will, phenomena usually called mental phenomena. This is the subject to which he turns in the next aphorism. Now do you get a notion now of Nietzsche's answer to your question?

Reader: "There are still harmless self-observers who believe that there are "immediate certainties," for instance, "I think," or as the superstition of Schopenhauer puts it, "I will"; as though cognition here got hold of its object purely and simply as "the thing in itself," without any falsification taking place either on the part of the subject or the object. I would repeat it, however, a hundred times, that "immediate certainty," as well as "absolute knowledge" and the "thing in itself," involve a contradictio in adjecto; we really ought to free ourselves from the misleading significance of words! The people on their part may think that cognition is knowing all about things, but the philosopher must say to himself: "When I analyse the process that is expressed in the sentence, 'I think,' I find a whole series of daring assertions, the argumentative proof of which would be difficult, perhaps impossible: for instance, that it is I who think, that there must necessarily be something that thinks, that thinking is an activity and operation on the part of a being who is thought of as a cause, that there is an 'ego,' and finally that it is already determined what is to be designated by thinking--that I know what thinking is. For if I had not already decided within myself what it is, by what standard could I determine whether that which is just happening is not perhaps 'willing' or 'feeling;' In short, the assertion 'I think' assumes that I compare my state at the present moment with other states of myself which I know, in order to determine what it is; on account of this retrospective connection with further 'knowledge,' it has at any rate no immediate certainty for me." --In place of the "immediate certainty" in which the people may believe in the special case, the philosopher thus finds a series of metaphysical questions presented to him."

Strauss: Truly conscious questions.

Reader: ". . . veritable conscience questions of the intellect, to wit: "From whence did I get the notion of 'thinking'? Why do I believe in cause and effect? What gives me the right to speak of an 'ego,' and even of an 'ego' as cause, and finally of an 'ego' as cause of thought?" He who ventures to answer these metaphysical questions at once by an appeal to a sort of intuitive perception, like the person who says, "I think, and know that this, at least, is true, actual, and certain" --will encounter a smile and two notes of interrogation in a philosopher nowadays."

Strauss: There are very few philosophers of this kind in Nietzsche's day who have this reaction. That was a compliment, an undeserved compliment to his contemporaries.

Reader: "Sir," the philosopher will perhaps give him to understand, "it is improbable that you are not mistaken, but why should it be the truth?"

Strauss: So that is another attack on the simplistic quest for truth. That Nietzsche speaks here of metaphysics, metaphysical

questions, in a non-perjorative sense. So we have to go back to metaphysics, but of course in Nietzsche's view not to any traditional metaphysics.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: Oh, think of Descartes.

Student: But who was alive in Nietzsche's time who specifically would deserve this compliment?

Strauss: He mentioned Schopenhauer, who said that the will is the most well known thing of the world. I think that many of his contemporaries, professors of philosophy, are completely forgotten. But I am not a student of the history of philosophy so I am not prepared to answer that. Perhaps someone else knows.

But the key point is that there is no immediate certainty. All knowledge is mediated (inaudible) prior to Nietzsche. There are no pure sensations; there are no pure perceptions; knowledge never ceases to be object pure and (inaudible). And since this is meant by the common understanding of truth, that the knowledge of the truth ceases (inaudible) pure and naked, thus Nietzsche can speak of the quest for truth only in an ironical manner.

All knowledge, what we call knowledge, presupposes answers to metaphysical questions, meaning questions which are not physical or physiological. Somehow Nietzsche will guide metaphysics in a new and promising way by his suggestion that . . .

(The tape for this lecture stops at this point.)

Lecture IV

Nietzsche: Beyond Good and Evil, November 3, 1971

Strauss: . . . Nietzsche's two enigmatic statements, truth is deadly, and truth is human creation. The difficulty is this -- truth is deadly, and this is itself true. Is this truth also not deadly -- is it rather life-giving? Because it emancipates us from the power of the deadly truth. Second, truth is a human creation, and this proposition is in itself a truth. But is this truth also a human creation? But apart from that, how does Nietzsche know that the truth is deadly and that it is a human creation.

We can perhaps say that he had learned from Kant that it is the human understanding which prescribes nature its laws. That the order of the world originates in the human understanding. What is given is only the chaos of sensation. But for Kant it was certain that there is the order established by the human understanding. Say the order revealed by Newtonian physics. For Nietzsche, however, that physics, any physics, is only one interpretation out of indefinitely many. But given the word in itself, the thing itself, nature, is wholly chaotic and meaningless. The world in itself is wholly meaningless. Hence the truth is deadly. The world for us is meaningful by virtue of our creation. Truth is human creation.

The difficulty here, above all others, is this. There are indefinitely many or infinitely many interpretations of the world, infinitely many world views. How to distinguish among them? How to distinguish superior ones from inferior ones? Are there any objective criteria, that is to say criteria not dependent on human creation. We have not yet seen any answer to this question.

Now in Chapter 1 with which we are still concerned, Nietzsche suggests his view as I have tried to summarize it through an induction, from philosophy and science, that is to say from the pursuits which claim to be concerned solely with the truth. Now he finds that all philosophers (and the same is true with science) assert more than they know. Where does that more come from? Where could it come from? Now here the way was paved for Nietzsche by Descartes, perhaps more by Descartes than by anyone else. In his chapter on error, Descartes exclaims that all error stems from the fact that we assert more than we know, and this is due to the fact that our will extends further than our understanding. So the more, which philosophers and so on assert, in all cases assert, stems from the will.

Nietzsche accepts that with an important addition, that this will is will to power. And he describes it very drastically by comparing the conviction, will-determined conviction, as a beautiful and very strong donkey. An animal notorious, wrongly probably, for its lack of intelligence, and at the same time extremely stubborn. That is effective in all philosophy and in all science, as far as the foundations are concerned.

This much to remind you of what we discussed last time.

Now is there any point you would like to take up? Well, why are you smiling?

Student: There isn't any reason for my smiling.

Strauss: I thought your smile meant there were so infinitely many things to take up that you didn't know where.

Then we will continue. Nietzsche had turned a little bit earlier after he had spoken of physics and physiology to what we can call psychology and had spoken of the fallacies which philosophers commit in this respect. He continues it in aphorism 17.

Reader: "With regard to the superstitions of logicians, I shall never tire of emphasising a small, terse fact, which is unwillingly recognised by these credulous minds"

Strauss: The logicians.

Reader: "--namely, that a thought comes when "it" wishes, and not when "I" wish; so that it is a perversion of the facts of the case to say that the subject "I" is the condition of the predicate "think." One thinks; but that this "one" is precisely the famous old "ego," is, to put it mildly, only a supposition, an assertion, and assuredly not an "immediate certainty."

Strauss: You know that distinction between the id and the ego which has in the meantime conquered the globe, but as far as I can see, it stems from here, and there is something much deeper, than the ego, than the consciousness. And that is what Nietzsche means by the will to power or by that stubborn beast in us which he compared to the donkey.

Reader: "After all, one has even gone too far with this "one thinks"--even the "one" contains an interpretation of the process, and does not belong to the process itself."

Strauss: So the process of events itself is one thing and the interpretation is another. It seems that wherever we turn, we do not come beyond interpretation and yet it is necessary to make a distinction between the interpretation and the event itself, the thing itself. What the basis for that distinction is is not immediately clear. However Nietzsche may have arrived at that distinction and assuming that the distinction is not itself an interpretation, what does this imply? Perhaps this will become clearer while we go on.

Reader: "One infers here according to the usual grammatical formula--"To think is an activity; every activity requires an agency that is active; consequently" . . . It was pretty much on the same lines that the older atomism sought, besides the operating "power," the material particle wherein it resides and out of which it operates--the atom. More rigorous minds, however, learnt at last to get along without this "earth-residuum," and perhaps some day we

shall accustom ourselves, even from the logician's point of view, to get along without the little "one" (to which the worthy old "ego" has refined itself)."

Strauss: Is there anything which can take the place of that id or is what we arrive at something which we must assert but which can in no way be grasped, which can in no way be said, that's still dark.

Student: I'm just wondering whether (inaudible) that's doing the act is still making the same mistake that Nietzsche (inaudible).

Strauss: In other words, whether the very distinction between the happenings itself and the interpretation is justified. Whether one must not admit that everything we think or say is interpretation? Is this what you mean?

Student: No, I thought you were implying that to find out the problem in the deeper sense, what was performing an action. That is, what was behind an action. I understand that we were told not to do that.

Strauss: Yes, sure. Nietzsche goes further than that I believe. He will take this up later and say that any notion of cause and effect is mere interpretation. And hitherto we are in no way to fear how Nietzsche is getting out of the difficulty.

Another Student: (Inaudible . . .) the consequence of the understanding of the fact that when men see, they merely interpret, would lead to wonder whether there really is such a thing. How could it be deadly if there is no such thing.

Strauss: But in one way or another he would have to speak of truth.

Student: But then he must not be saying what he thinks, here in 17.

* Strauss: What he is doing all the time although never alone is to show the untenable character of what philosophy has been (asserting hitherto. Therefore he argues from their premise.

Student: Would that be "truth" in quotation marks is deadly?

Strauss: You could say that. But on the other hand, you are confronted with the fact that by saying what he did say about nature in aphorism 9 that it is wholly chaotic, and that is reality and all order, all beauty, all value, is merely our addition to it. Merely our addition to it -- that merely is a decisive point. What is a convenient way out of Nietzsche's predicament? Is it merely one into which he came because of some strange inclination? Toward paradoxes? Toward extremes? Or is there not something there which is absolutely necessary. Think of a more general point

which I referred to -- the understanding prescribes nature its laws. That is all right, but if the understanding is not the understanding, if the place of understanding is taken by understandings, say according to a difference of cultures, to take a convenient expression, what then? Say if there is a Hindu truth, a Chinese truth, a Western truth and so on and so on, what will you do? Will you say well of course these are all caves in Platonic language. We must get out of them and come to the light of the sun. That was of course Plato, but does not that require something like the pure mind, with the pure mind not affected by cultural differences.

Student: On that level what you're saying can be understood, but it gets more difficult when we're posed with this problem of mathematical figures, particularly the problem of (inaudible) as opposed to Euclid.

Strauss: Nietzsche was not a student, surely not a profound student of these things. And he gave his answer already -- this is the one interpretation among many. And even if you take all possible geometries, then he would raise the question regarding all possible geometries.

Student: But this is somewhat wrong because if a youngest other geometry came along, that now the study of geometry would become empirical.

Strauss: But doesn't empirical study also presuppose assumptions? Which are not empirical?

Student: But it would not allow man to prescribe to nature its laws. One would only be able to make those assumptions, so the Kantian position would be changed.

Strauss: Yes, but I do not think that defects fundamental things, because you have now, you speak now instead of assumptions, laws or hypotheses, and by assumptions and hypotheses you point to what is not assumptions, not hypotheses, and leave this open and think you don't have to worry about it. But Nietzsche worries about it. So perhaps we continue because what he said here about thinking * is only preparatory to what he is going to say about the will, and that is after all his main subject.

Reader: "It is certainly not the least charm of a theory that it is refutable; it is precisely thereby that it attracts the more subtle minds. It seems that the hundred-times-refuted theory of the "free will" owes its persistence to this charm alone; someone is always appearing who feels himself strong enough to refute it."

Strauss: What does this seemingly frivolous remark mean? Theories are attractive (inaudible) refutable. They unprove.

Student: It is hard to tell in this if that is true.

Strauss: But I think that is what Nietzsche means. But this refutable dogma provides the pleasure, and say the dubious pleasure, of attracting our will to truth. Of attracting our will, and therefore as he says at the end, someone feels he is strong enough, to refute it. That is the condition to the problem of the will.

Now we come to the section explicitly devoted to the will, 19, and go on.

Reader: "Philosophers are accustomed to speak of the will as though it were the best-known thing in the world; indeed, Schopenhauer has given us to understand that the will alone is really known to us, absolutely and completely known, without deduction or addition. But it again and again seems to me that in this case Schopenhauer also only did what philosophers are in the habit of doing--he seems to have adopted a popular prejudice and exaggerated it. Willing--seemsto me to be above all some thing complicated, something that is a unity only in name--and it is precisely in a name that popular prejudice lurks, which has got the mastery over the inadequate precautions of philosophers in all ages. So let us for once be more cautious, let us be "unphilosophical";"

Strauss: That is very important. Philosophers are not cautious. They all assert more than they know. So Nietzsche does not want to assert more than he knows and so to that extent he is concerned with truth in the old-fashioned sense of the word. How this jives with the view that truth is human creation; we do not yet have the slightest suggestion.

Reader: "Let us say that in all willing there is firstly a plurality of sensations, namely, the sensation of the condition "away from which we go," the sensation of the condition "towards which we go," the sensation of this "from" and "towards" itself, and then besides, an accompanying muscular sensation, which, even without our putting in motion "arms and legs," commences its action by force of habit, directly we "will" anything. Therefore, just as sensations"

Strauss: No, no, feelings.

Reader: "(and indeed many kinds of feelings) are to be recognised as ingredients of the will, so, in the second place, thinking is also to be recognised; in every act of the will there is a ruling thought; --and let us not imagine it possible to sever this thought from the "willing," as if the will would then remain over! In the third place, the will is not only a complex of sensation and thinking"

Strauss: No, no, feelings.

Reader: "but it is above all an emotion, and, in fact the emotion of the command. That which is termed "freedom of the will" is

essentially the emotion of supremacy in respect to him who must obey; "I am free, 'he' must obey"--this consciousness is inherent in every will; and equally so the straining of the attention, the straight look which fixes itself exclusively on one thing, the unconditional judgment that "this and nothing else is necessary now," the inward certainty that obedience will be rendered -- and whatever else pertains to the position of the commander. A man who wills commands something within himself which renders obedience, or which he believes renders obedience. But now let us notice what is the strangest thing about the will,--this affair so extremely complex, for which the people have only one name. Inasmuch as in the given circumstances we are at the same time the commanding and the obeying parties, and as the obeying party we know the sensations of constraint, impulsion, pressure, resistance, and motion, which usually commence immediately after the act of will; inasmuch as, on the other hand, we are accustomed to disregard this duality, and to deceive ourselves about it by means of the synthetic term "I": a whole series of erroneous conclusions, and consequently of false judgments about the will itself, has become attached to the act of willing--to such a degree that he who wills believes firmly that willing suffices for action."

"Since in the majority of cases there has only been exercise of will when the effect of the command--consequently obedience, and therefore action--was to be expected, the appearance has translated itself into the sentiment, as if there were a necessity of effect; in a word, he who wills believes with a fair amount of certainty that will and action are somehow one; he ascribes the success, the carrying out of the willing, to the will itself, and thereby enjoys an increase of the sensation of power which accompanies all success."

"Freedom of Will"--that is the expression for the complex state of delight of the person exercising volition, who commands and at the same time identifies himself with the executor of the order--who, as such, enjoys also the triumph over obstacles, but thinks within himself that it was really his own will that overcame them. In this way the person exercising volition adds the feelings of delight of his successful executive instruments, the useful "under-wills" or under-souls--indeed, our body is but a social structure composed of many souls--to his feelings of delight as commander."

"L'effet c'est moi: what happens here is what happens in every well-constructed and happy commonwealth, namely, that the governing class identifies itself with the successes of the commonwealth. In all willing it is absolutely a question of commanding and obeying, on the basis, as already said, of a social structure composed of many "souls": on which account a philosopher should claim the right to include willing-as-such within the sphere of morals--regarded as the doctrine of the relations of supremacy under which the phenomenon of "life" manifests itself."

Strauss: So that is the first statement and I believe the only dramatic statement about the will which occurs in this work.

Now we have already heard before that life is the will to power. More generally, life is will, in aphorism 13. But the will of which he speaks here is obviously the human will. And we would have to understand how the relation of the human will to other wills has to be conceived. One can safely say that he means that all non-human or sub-human life is defective life. Only in the human life and in the human will becomes will into its own.

Now how can life be will to power? To some extent that is explained here. Only if the body too is will, that is to say, soul. A hierarchy of souls, as Nietzsche suggests here. The final conclusion is that life as a whole must be considered from a moral point of view. A moral point of view does not mean from the point of good and evil. The whole consideration is, as the title says, beyond good and evil. There must be a morality different from that of good and evil. Nietzsche calls it when he speaks of it elsewhere good and bad, to distinguish from good and evil. Good and evil is a particularly moralistic interpretation of morality, if that makes sense. Good and bad -- this distinction must be made also from a non-moral status, non-moral point of view. Think of health, when you speak of a healthy body or a diseased body and the same would apply to the soul.

So in this it is important. The overall consideration is moral in the sense, in the only sense in which Nietzsche can mean morality.

Now there must be many many things in this paragraph which call for comment.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: I did not mention that but did I not imply that in what I said? Because what you and what Nietzsche calls language is interpretation. And we are all under the spell of interpretations, and as Nietzsche implies, particularly unintelligent interpretations going back to our remote ancestors.

The other side, which one must also emphasize, the doctrine of the will, the will to power, is not a serious interpretation. That is a fact. Whether one can maintain that is another matter. To this difficulty we must return.

Another Student: It seems to me that in the fourth paragraph, the last two sentences, . . .

Strauss: What do you mean by that? Which aphorism?

Student: Nineteen. The last two sentences in what is in this book the fourth paragraph, there's an argument that's given and I'm not sure I understand the argument. Here is how it reads. "Since in the great majority of cases, there has been exercise of the will only when the effect of the command, that is obedience,

that is the action was to be expected. The appearance has con-
cretized itself into a feeling. If you want to understand that
(inaudible), you have to know who expected it. That is, is it
the expectation of the person who is doing the willing, or is it
the expectation . . .

Strauss: No, no, the willing.

Student: The one who is doing the willing. Could you state that
argument very simply so I could follow the steps of it?

Strauss: What does it mean in the context? The will is a compli-
cated thing consisting of feeling, thinking, and an affect, the
affect of command. But then he adds, one thing is not an ingredient
of the will, namely the action.

Student: But he says here that he who wills believes with a fair
amount of certainty that will and action are somehow one.

Strauss: Yes, he believes erroneously.

Student: But who believes?

Strauss: We do.

Student: Do we? Do we think that our will and our actions are
the . . .

Strauss: Yes.

Student: But doesn't it sometimes happen that our will goes one
way and our action goes another way?

Strauss: Yes, but this is perhaps not so important, and was not
so important for many philosophers, the fact that the will does not
determine the action. What Nietzsche is driving at is this, what
you need for will issuing an action is not the character of the
commanding will, but of the sub wills.

Student: A good nature.

Strauss: Here the body.

Student: But that would be in Platonic terms a good nature.

Strauss: You can say that, yes, but it would not be Nietzsche's
expression. Because from Nietzsche's point of view that would all
be nature.

Student: But still the argument is very hard to follow because
certainly Nietzsche understands that there is a possibility of a
weakness there, and that their weakness might even be to some
extent in their will and not in their body.

Strauss: Sure, but then it's clear and that is a relatively simple case. He speaks later on of people of strong wills and weak wills. He makes this distinction.

Student: But doesn't that mean that there would have to be some kind of freedom that the will would have to strengthen itself?

Strauss: In some sense perhaps, but the question is to whom does the will owe that freedom?

Student: The strength in itself.

Strauss: But to what does it owe that strength in itself?

Student: If it can strengthen itself, then the strength that it gains in that way it would owe only to itself.

Strauss: We'll take up this question later on under the heading, can there be a *causa sua*, can there be a cause of itself?

Student: Would you agree then that this argument is inconclusive?

Strauss: I grant that of all arguments. You can say they are all suggestive, meant to be suggestive, and some are very persuasive. There is no demonstration here and there is not meant to be a demonstration. That belongs according to Nietzsche to the philosophy of the future. That it is not demonstrative in any sense. That is the point.

Another Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: Does a distinction between feeling and thought make sense? The thought is determinative and dictates as it were. The feeling is from here to there, but then something comes down like a thunderbolt and says it must be. It is not further developed. It is not explained whether this is in any way having the character of reason; that's not stated. And this is of course as you can see directed against Schopenhauer, and in Schopenhauer the will is thoughtless, and against Schopenhauer, Nietzsche says, thought is essential to the will.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: An ingredient of will. He doesn't say thinking is the fundamental phenomenon. The will to power. The will to power.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: But what is willed? If you take the complete phenomenon. What is willed is thought, although thought alone would not count for everything. Because there must also be feeling and there must also be affect.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: But the main point I believe is that you cannot separate this thought from will, and there would still be will if you disregarded the thought. The thought is an essential ingredient of the will. And it is of course deplorable, you can say, that Nietzsche did not analyze what he meant by thought.

Student: (Inaudible.)

(The rest of this lecture is unrecorded. Professor Strauss continues on through Aphorism 23 in Beyond Good and Evil.)

Lecture V

Nietzsche: Beyond Good and Evil, November 10, 1971

Strauss: I would like to say a word about the plan of Beyond Good and Evil, which we can probably understand somewhat better now after we have read the first chapter. The first chapter, as you will recall entitled "The Prejudices of the Philosophers", is a chapter directed against the philosophers. Just one example -- he says in a passage which we have read -- "let us be cautious, let us be unphilosophical." But it goes without saying that this chapter is not unqualifiably anti-philosophic, as you have seen from reading the chapter. Still it is remarkable that at the end of that chapter he calls it psychology and not philosophy. The mistress of the sciences. It is clear that what Nietzsche understands by psychology is philosophy. That is a kind of disguise. But still we must take it seriously that he prefers here the term psychology. And he says now that psychology will again become the mistress of the sciences, and the most simple explanation of that is of course, psychology and not logic or physics, of which he had spoken before in that chapter.

Now the second chapter, "The Free Mind," is in fact the statement for philosophers, for the philosophers of the future.

Then comes a third chapter, which I do not know how the man translates it, but the German is (inaudible), and that is I believe directed against a very famous thought and book, The Essence of Religion. Nietzsche claims there is no essence of religion, but there is something which one can call the religious goings-on, the religious doings. It is not that easy to translate.

Then comes an interlude, Chapter 4, "Sayings and Interludes", one could say. There are maxims reminding us of (inaudible). But by the position of Chapter 4 it is quite clear that Chapter 1 to 3 form a unit and in contradistinction to chapters 5 through 9. The first unit deals then with philosophy and religion. One could say eternally friendly enemies or eternally nimal friends. The formula of atheism does not exhaust Nietzsche's posture toward religion. (Chapters 5-9 as I think you see from the headings are more popular themes, where Nietzsche descends to the preoccupations of most of us.)

So this much about the plan.

Now as for Chapter 2 in general I would like to make this point. In this chapter Nietzsche delineates the character of the philosopher of the future, of the philosopher who is free from the prejudices of the philosophers. We can also say and we must say that he delineates the character of the true philosopher. This true philosopher has not existed before. The experience on which this delineation is based is Nietzsche's own experience, his experience of himself. In other words, without saying so Nietzsche describes himself, as the true philosopher.

One cannot help contrasting him and we are entitled to do so -- by his remark in the Preface -- one cannot help contrasting it with Plato who presents Socrates and not himself as the true philosopher.

Nietzsche had no Socrates. The only man that he quotes with approval in Chapter II is Stendhal as you will see very soon.

But naturally some footnotes are needed, no footnotes, in regard to this contrastation of Plato and Nietzsche. First one can raise the question, is Socrates the philosopher for Plato? It is the most obvious point one could make, an Asiatic stranger and a (inaudible) in the corresponding dialogues. And secondly, Nietzsche has in a way Socrates -- Zarathustra, but the relation of Nietzsche and Zarathustra is also very complicated. As a first approximation one might say that Plato never speaks in his own name and Nietzsche always speaks in his own name, subject to the qualifications I have mentioned.

So would you like to take up any of these points I have made? All right, then we turn to the first Aphorism 24.

Reader: "O sancta simplicitas! In what strange simplification and falsification man lives! One can never cease wondering when once one has got eyes for beholding this marvel! How we have made everything around us clear and free and easy and simple! how we have been able to give our senses a passport to everything superficial, our thoughts, agod-like desire for wanton pranks and wrong inferences!--how from the beginning, we have contrived to retain our ignorance in order to enjoy an almost inconceivable freedom, thoughtlessness, imprudence, heartiness, and gaiety--in order to enjoy life! And only on this solidified, granite-like foundation of ignorance could knowledge rise so far."

Strauss: Science.

Reader: "the will to science on the . . ."

Strauss: No, the will to knowledge.

Reader: "the will to knowledge on the foundation of a far more powerful will, the will to ignorance, to the uncertain, to the untrue! Not as its opposite, but--as its refinement! It is to be hoped, indeed, that language, here as elsewhere, will not get over its awkwardness, and that it will continue to talk of opposites where there are only degrees and many refinements of gradation; it is equally to be hoped that the incarnated Tartuffery of morals, which now belongs to our unconquerable "flesh and blood," will turn the words round in the mouths of us discerning ones. Here and there we understand it, and laugh at the way in which precisely the best knowledge seeks most to retain us in this simplified, thoroughly artificial, suitably imagined and suitably falsified world: at the way in which, whether it will or not, it loves error, because, as living itself, it loves life!"

Strauss: Being alive meaning science. So the truth we have heard is deadly, but science which is supposed to (inaudible) the truth is not deadly. For science does not aim at the truth. Science in German and for Nietzsche has a much broader meaning than in English. It means only not even primarily the natural sciences but also scholarship would be included. In other words there is a perfect harmony between science and life. We may also say between philosophy and life. (Inaudible . . .), and this question is answered in the next aphorism. Perhaps we should read this first before we discuss this.

Reader: "After such a cheerful commencement, a serious word would fain be heard; it appeals to the most serious minds. Take care, ye philosophers and friends of knowledge, and beware of martyrdoms! Of suffering "for the truth's sake"! even in your own defence! It spoils all the innocence and fine neutrality of your conscience; it makes you headstrong against objections and red rags; it stupefies, animalises, and brutalises, when in the struggle with danger, slander, suspicion, expulsion, and even worse consequences of enmity, ye have at last to play your last card as protectors of truth upon earth-- as though "the Truth" were such an innocent and incompetent creature as to require protectors! and you of all people, ye knights of the sorrowful countenance, Messrs Loafers and Cobweb-spinners of the spirit! Finally, ye know sufficiently well that it cannot be of any consequence if ye just carry your point; ye know that hitherto no philosopher has carried his point, and that there might be a more laudable truthfulness in every little interrogative mark which you place after your special words and favourite doctrines (and occasionally after yourselves) than in all the solemn pantomime and trumping games before accusers and lawcourts! Rather go out of the way! Flee into concealment! And have your masks and your ruses, that ye may be mistaken for what you are, or somewhat feared! And pray, don't forget the garden, the garden with golden trellis-work. And have people around you who are as a garden--or as music on the waters at eventide, when already the day becomes a memory."

"Choose the good solitude, the free, wnaton, lightsome solitude, which also gives you the right still to remain good in any sense whatsoever! How poisonous, how crafty, how bad, does every long war make one, which cannot be waged openly by means of force! How personal does a long fear make one, a long watching of enemies, of possible enemies! These pariahs of society, these long-pursued, badly-persecuted ones--also the compulsory recluses, the Spinozas or Giordano Brunos--always become in the end, even under the most intellectual masquerade, and perhaps without being themselves aware of it, refined vengeance-seekers and poison-brewers (just lay bare the foundation of Spinoza's ethics and theology!), not to speak of the stupidity of moral indignation, which is the unfailing sign in a philosopher that the sense of philosophical humour has left him.

"The martyrdom of the philosopher, his "sacrifice for the sake of truth," forces into the light whatever of the agitator and actor lurks in him; and if one has hitherto contemplated him only with artistic curiosity, with regard to many a philosopher it is easy to understand the dangerous desire to see him also in his deterioration (deteriorated into a "martyr," into a stage-and-tribune-bawler.) Only, that it is necessary with such a desire to be clear what spectacle one will see in any case--merely a satyric play, merely an epilogue farce, merely the continued proof that the long, real tragedy is at an end, supposing that every philosophy has been a long tragedy in its origin."

Strauss: We have seen in the preceding paragraph that there is or seems to be a perfect harmony between philosophy and life. Now Nietzsche takes up the objection. There is no harmony between philosophy and social life. There is no harmony between philosophy and society. Solitude and living in cognito for the sake of (inaudible) intellectual freedom. And he mentions here in this connection the greatest danger of persecution because it endangers the inner freedom of the persecutors. Inner freedom requires some goodness. It is beyond good and evil. Some goodness -- that goodness which is meant here is freedom from resentment.

In order to illustrate his point, Nietzsche refers to the examples of Giordano Bruno and Spinoza. As for the example of Spinoza of which I know more than the example of Giordano Bruno, Nietzsche does not even attempt to prove his psychology of Spinoza. About a generation after Nietzsche's death, Hermann (inaudible), the founder of the neo-Kantian school, attempted to prove fundamentally this point, this corruption of (inaudible). I think the reason is this. And that is both true of Nietzsche and Hermann (inaudible), however different they were. Spinoza was I think a cool, not to say cold man. This posture toward religion is a simple contempt for the confused ideas underlying the (inaudible) religion, nonsense. His posture I believe is rather that of the cocksure unbelieving scientist than that of any man of an inner tragic. He was less concerned with the truth of the principles one can say than with what one can do with the principles., in order to get a clear and distinct account of everything.

I would like to stress one point -- a certain goodness is indispensable for freedom of mind, so however valuable hatred and envy and the things which Nietzsche mentioned occasionally before in Chapter 1 are for life in general, they are very bad for the most spiritual will to power.

Now is there any point you would like to bring up?

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: When we hear of a garden, we think of course of Epicurus but whether Epicurus' garden had such golden trellises, I do not know.

Whether he thinks of something here that he has seen and enjoyed, that I couldn't say. Music on the waters, that is of course Venice.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: In opposition to the imposed solitude of which he speaks later, of the imposed solitude which makes men bitter. The freely chosen solitude.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: That is a very good point which you made now. Nietzsche will take it up at once but not exactly in that form which you suggest now. If you look at the headings of the chapters, one is called "Of Peoples and Fatherlands", a political theme which is very much concerned with the unity of Europe which is now a matter of everyday political concern. So surely Nietzsche was concerned with politics, but that will come in a later chapter.

So in other words there is again a solution. There is indeed a conflict between philosophy and social life but that is solved by voluntary solitude.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: If science is based on error, and this error is required for life, then science necessarily (inaudible) of life. And that is due to Nietzsche's linking it up with another fact, that science itself is a phenomenon of life. Science is something living, and therefore it is natural for life.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: Because it was to have the truth, even the truth which is deadly. Therefore there is a certain ambiguity in that life.

Student: (Inaudible.)

"Descartes"

Strauss: Let us assume that science is based, even the most sophisticated science, is based on common sense knowledge, and this common sense knowledge is relative to man and therefore absolutely speaking untrue because of its relevance to man. If science is based on such common sense knowledge, then it is bound to man's world, to a world of man which science has not created in any way. It cannot say yes to itself as science without saying yes to life. It is at the same time rebellious to life because of its concern with the truth which is not relative to life, and that is true and Nietzsche knows it very well. We know this from the first chapter, but this does not do away with that fundamental dependence and that fundamental love. Love is voluntary or involuntary, and as he says an involuntary voluntary.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: But he cannot possibly consider all species of animals. If you have a lion and a lamb, the lion cannot conceal his desire for killing or eating the lamb. It is open.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: You can apply it also to human beings -- lion like and lamb like.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: All right, but then you would have to say beyond good and evil (inaudible) in a different sense. Good and evil as used in the title means in the moral sense, in that which is usually understood. But there is another way of explaining good and its opposite which is implied in what he says now.

Student: What do you think about it?

Strauss: That's a very long question. The whole question of morality, and I hesitate to take this up in the presence of (inaudible), who believes that it is a simple thing -- at least he almost says that. Complicated -- but you only have to think of such simple everyday occurrences as war. (Inaudible) just or unjust answers or as some people say, ethical and unethical. Only the line is terribly difficult to draw. There are extremely crude cases where (inaudible . . .). But there are other more complicated ones. Think of the British Empire and Gandhi's position. Was Gandhi's position unqualifiably moral and superior to that of decent Britishmen?

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: Yes, Nietzsche was (inaudible . . .).

Student: Better to fight it out than to have it brewing inside.

Strauss: This can be defended, can it not? I mean dishonest and concealed enemies -- is there not more hatred than an open enemy?

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: But it is also hard to say without some footnotes that war is good. Did you read the first book of Plato's Laws? Where the Athenian stranger makes some point against Cretan or Spartan people that war is good? Because if war is good between cities, then war must also be good between individuals. Also war between the parts of the individuals. Some place must be found for peace and rest, otherwise no life is possible. And so people who are in favor of war only mean by that war between nations. And not civil war.

But the main point important in the whole context is this: Nietzsche makes it a point that good in some sense is indispensable.

Indispensable namely for intellectual freedom, because hatred and such things narrow it and that is incompatible for its being open.

But we must not forget the overall context, and the context is solitude as a solution to the difficulties stemming between philosophy and life. But then you leave it at the solitude, and one of you said returning to the cave, and Nietzsche's answer in the next aphorism is that he must return to the cave, but not for the reasons given in Plato's Republic.

Reader: "Every select man strives instinctively for a citadel and a privacy, where he is free from the crowd, the many, the majority."

Strauss: (Inaudible) is too weak, wherehe is redeemed, and the word is underlined, so the emphasis is altogether on the word redeemed.

Reader: "wherehe may forget "men who are the rule," as their exception;--exclusive only of the case in which he is pushed straight to such men by a still stronger . . . "

Strauss: To that rule, to the rule.

Reader: "by a still stronger instinct, as a discernor in the great and exceptional sense. Whoever, in intercourse with men does not occasionally glisten in all the green and grey colours of distress, owing to disgust, satiety, sympathy, gloominess and solitariness, is assuredly not a man of elevated tastes; supposing, however, that he does not voluntarily take all this burden and disgust upon himself, that he persistently avoids it, and remains, as I said, quietly and proudly hidden in his citadel, one thing is then certain: he was not made, he was not predestined for knowledge. For as such, he would one day have to say to himself: "The devil take my good taste! but 'the rule' is more interesting than the exception--than myself, the exception!" And he would go down, and above all, he would go "inside."

"The long and serious study of the average man--and consequently much disguise, self-overcoming, familiarity, and bad intercourse (all intercourse is bad intercourse except with one's equals)."

Strauss: No, company.

Reader: "that constitutes a necessary part of the life-history of every philosopher; perhaps the most disagreeable, odious, and disappointing part. If he is fortunate, however, as a favourite child of knowledge should be, he will meet with suitable auxiliaries who will shorten and lighten his task; I mean so-called cynics, those who simply recognise the animal, the common-place and "the rule" in themselves, and at the same time have so much spirituality and ticklishness as to make them talk of themselves and their like before witnesses--sometimes they wallow, even in books, as on their own dung-hill. Cynicism is the only form in which base souls approach what is called honesty; and the higher man must open his ears to all the coarser or finer cynicism, and congratulate himself when the clown becomes shameless right before him, or the scientific satyr

speaks out. There are even cases where enchantment mixes with the disgust--namely, where by a freak of nature, genius is bound to some such indiscreet billy-goat and ape, as in the case of the Abbe Galiani, the profoundest, acutest, and perhaps also filthiest man of his century--he was far profounder than Voltaire, and consequently also, a good deal more silent. It happens more frequently, as has been hinted, that a scientific head is placed on an ape's body, a fine exceptional understanding in a base soul, an occurrence by no means rare, especially amongst doctors and moral physiologists. And whenever anyone speaks without bitterness, or rather quite innocently of man, as a belly with two requirements, and a head with one; whenever any one sees, seeks and wants to see only hunger, sexual instinct, and vanity as the real and only motives of human actions; in short, when any one speaks "badly"--and not even "ill"-- of man, then ought the lover of knowledge to hearken attentively and diligently; he ought, in general to have an open ear wherever there is talk without indignation. For the indignant man, and he who perpetually tears and lacerates himself with his own teeth (or, in place of himself, the world, God, or society), may indeed, morally speaking, stand higher than the laughing and self-satisfied satyr, but in every other sense he is the more ordinary, more indifferent, and less instructive case. And no one is such a liar as the indignant man."

Strauss: So there is something like a return to the cave, but not in order to save the cave-dwellers, or those who can be saved, but in order to understand the cave-dwellers.

Here Nietzsche speaks at some length of the immense usefulness of sinners. He refers here to the obvious inadequacy of the understanding of man in terms of hunger, sex, and vanity. That is a negative compliment to what Nietzsche says about the will to power. The will to power is a possible key to man, whereas hunger, sex, and vanity could never be. The most elementary urges, elementary in quotation marks, are not the key to man. In this respect Nietzsche agrees of course with the so-called idealists, but he says we must find an urge which is truly elementary, and covers all phenomena of life and he sees none which fill that bill, except the will to power.

One may also wonder whether any of the earlier philosophers, in particular Plato, would ever have suffered so terribly from people inferior to him and being together with them, as Nietzsche does. Nietzsche was of an extreme tenderness. We will find more trends of that.

So does this answer your question regarding the cave?

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: Because very few people have this desire for knowledge in this comprehensive sense. I mean most people who are devoted to

knowledge are devoted to specialties, and here what Nietzsche is concerned with as he calls it occasionally, the whole fact of man, and a man who is concerned with that must go down to the cave.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: Yes, obviously, but there are some abbreviations so he doesn't have to study each individual case, but namely what the cynics tell him and then what he can test.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: The qualification of these people is unjustified when you speak about adjectives. Nietzsche did not like any adjectives, any.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: They could be an interesting phenomenon, but they surely wouldn't be philosophers.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: Yes, but he says how difficult it is not to suffer all kinds of misery if one is together with the wrong kind of people. But that is necessary nevertheless. Doctors also don't like what they see in human bodies, but they have to if they want to help.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: Then it is wrong. Then it leads to that narrowing of which Nietzsche talks. Lack of intellectual freedom.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: I think you are not patient. I mean Nietzsche's thought is very broad, and if you try to establish a link between a sentence here and a sentence here, you will leave without having considered another point more complicated.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: Yes?

Another Student: Does the philosopher have to keep bad company in order to gain an understanding of the bad company, or (inaudible)?

Strauss: Why should this one exclude the other?

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: Perhaps it is impossible to know man without having empathy.

Another Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: We have read an aphorism last time in which he says people might make the objection is the will to power doctrine. Not also interpretation, and then he says well, all the better. With this enigmatic explanation mark does he conclude this. That is dark -- it is an interpretation and it is a fact. And how the two things go together has not yet been cleared up. Whether it has ever been cleared up by Nietzsche is a question. We will take up this question today in the central paragraph of this chapter, aphorism 34, the only place in this chapter where he speaks of this. So we must be patient, and Nietzsche's thesis now is something which can appease our impatience.

He begins now to speak of how he writes and why he writes, the way he does, and I suggest that we read the next paragraph.

Reader: "It is difficult to be understood, especially when one thinks and lives gangasrotogati among those only who think and live otherwise--namely, kurmagati, or at best "froglike," mandeikagati (I do everything to be "difficultly understood" myself!)--and one should be heartily grateful for the good will to some refinement of interpretation. As regards "the good friends," however, who are always too easy-going, and think that as friends they have a right to ease, one does well at the very first to grant them a play-ground and romping-place for misunderstanding--one can thus laugh still; or get rid of them altogether, these good friends--and laugh then also!"

Strauss: The main point I believe is this here. Nietzsche does everything in order . . . these words which he uses are Sanskrit, a language of which I know nothing. One means obviously like going like the river Ganges, and the last is the way of going like the frog.

But Nietzsche does everything in order to be understood with difficulty. He makes it deliberately difficult. There is a remark of his about his famous contemporary, John Stuart Mill, which is to this effect: John Stuart Mill, or the insulting clarity. Nietzsche is never insultingly clear. A sentence may be insultingly clear, but never the context. His obscurity is intentioned. Are there no unintentionations of obscurity in Nietzsche, that does not follow. Does Nietzsche point out his unintentioned obscurities? To the extent to which he is aware of them? To some extent I believe he does. This remark about the will to power shows that.

Now let us turn to the next paragraph.

Reader: "What is most difficult to render from one language into another is the tempo of its style, which has its basis in the character of the race . . ."

Strauss: Tempo or the way of walking.

Reader: "or to speak more physiologically, in the average tempo of the assimilation of its nutriment. There are honestly meant

translations, which, as involuntary vulgarisations, are almost falsifications of the original, merely because its lively and merry tempo (which overleaps and obviates all dangers in word and expression) could not also be rendered. A German is almost incapacitated for presto in his language; consequently also, as may be reasonably inferred, for many of the most delightful and daring nuances of free, free-spirited thought. And just as the buffoon and satyr are foreign to him in body and conscience, so Aristophanes and Petronius are untranslatable for him. Everything ponderous, viscous, and pompously clumsy, all long-winded and wearying species of style, are developed in profuse variety among Germans--pardon me for stating the fact that even Goethe's prose, in its mixture of stiffness and elegance, is no exception, as a reflection of the "good old time" to which it belongs, and as an expression of German taste at a time when there was still a German taste, which was a rococo-taste in moribus et artibus."

Strauss: This is a strange expression. Nietzsche says forgive him the facts. Should he not have asked that he be forgiven the mention of the facts? And Nietzsche could never make such a flip. That is intentional. The fact that Goethe's style becomes a fact through Nietzsche, prior to Nietzsche, at least among Germans, this limit of Goethe's style couldn't be seen. It wasn't there at the limit. It became a limit, through Nietzsche's seeing it. Fact and interpretation are the same.

Reader: "Lessing is an exception, owing to his histrionic nature, which understood much, and was versed in many things; he who was not the translator of Bayle to no purpose, who took refuge willingly in the shadow of Diderot and Voltaire, and still more willingly among the Roman comedy-writers--Lessing loved also free-spiritism in the tempo, and flight out of Germany. But how could the German language, even in the prose of Lessing, imitate the tempo of Machiavelli, who in his "Principe" makes us breathe the dry, fine air of Florence, and cannot help presenting the most serious events in a boisterous allegrissimo, perhaps not without a malicious artistic sense of the contrast he ventures to present--long, heavy, difficult, dangerous thoughts, and a tempo of the gallop, and of the best, wantonest humour? Finally, who would venture on a German translation of Petronius, who, more than any great musician hitherto, was a master of presto in invention, ideas, and words? What matter in the end about the swamps of the sick, evil world, or of the "ancient world," when like him, one has the feet of a wind, which makes everything healthy, by making everything run!"

"And with regard to Aristophanes--that transfiguring, complementary genius, for whose sake one pardons all Hellenism for having existed, provided one has understood in its full profundity all that there requires pardon and transfiguration; there is nothing that has caused me to meditate more on Plato's secrecy and sphinx-like nature, than the happily preserved petit fait that under the pillow of his death-bed there was found no "Bible," nor anything Egyptian, Pythagorean, or Platonic--but a book of Aristophanes. How could even Plato have endured life--a Greek life which he repudiated--without an Aristophanes!"

Strauss: That's very beautifully said, but we must not fall victim to the beauty. This much is clear, that the difficulty which Nietzsche calls to his reader and deliberately calls to his reader, has nothing to do with happiness. Why does he say in the case of Machiavelli that he had perhaps a malicious artists' feelings about the contradiction he dares to make? I think he underestimates Machiavelli. Machiavelli knew this very well, when he speaks for example in a single sentence so to speak about the complete absence of virtue in an abominable political criminal and at the same time of the presence of virtue, the admirable presence of virtue, and the use of the word 'virtue' in two opposite meanings. It was obviously intended.

Plato and Aristophanes -- I think that makes very much sense -- it would not be too difficult to show. But the reason which Nietzsche gives, that Plato needed Aristophanes as it were in order to bear the Greek life which he repudiated. I believe that is not a Platonic reason. The attraction of Aristophanes was not mediated by suffering as it would have been in the case of Nietzsche.

Now let's see -- the next one.

Reader: "It is the business of the very few to be independent; it is a privilege of the strong. And whoever attempts it, even with the best right, but without being obliged to do so, proves that he is probably not only strong, but also daring beyond measure. He enters into a labyrinth, he multiplies a thousandfold the dangers which life in itself already brings with it; not the least of which is that no one can see how and where he loses his way, becomes isolated, and is torn piece-meal by some minotaur of conscience. Supposing such a one comes to grief, it is so far from the comprehension of men that they neither feel it, nor sympathize with it. And he cannot any longer go back! He cannot even go back again to the sympathy of men!"

Strauss: Now this is again a corrective as it were of the preceding aphorism, where he spoke of the gay and daring character of the free mind. Nietzsche adds, "and is torn piece-meal by some minotaur of conscience." By conscience I think we have to understand the intellectual conscience. The intellectual conscience, the intellectual probity, which is a key word in Nietzsche, and that is not the same as love of truth. To take a superficial example, if someone is honest to himself about what he believes and does not believe, as distinguished from a man who wishes to believe and regards this and believesthen that he believes this therefore. This is intellectual honesty, but can one leave it at that? This kind of probity? Must one not raise the question as to whether one believes sincerely and honestly that it is sound. That would be the love of truth, as distinguished from intellectual probity. Intellectual probity can very well be easily satisfied, which the love of truth cannot so easily be.

I would like to make this point clear. Intellectual probity is understood by Nietzsche frequently and also by others I suppose as the willingness to admit the ugly truth, and love of truth

seems to imply that the truth is attractive. But why is the truth, the truth about the whole, attractive? Why is philosophy necessarily edifying? To use another expression for the same effect. And I think the simple answer which one can give to this question is this. The phenomenon which we have become familiar most easily, is the attractiveness of virtue, if I may use this old-fashioned term. But whatever may be true of the whole, it is sure that the whole renders possible virtue. Therefore it is more beautiful, more noble, than virtue. It is perhaps no accident that Nietzsche turns to the beauty of virtue although he doesn't use that expression in the next aphorism. I believe we must keep this in mind, the difference between intellectual probity and a love of truth.

Reader: "Our deepest insights must--and should--appear as follies, and under certain circumstances as crimes, when they come unauthorizedly to the ears of those who are not disposed and predestined for them. The exoteric and the esoteric, as they were formerly distinguished by philosophers--among the Indians, as among the Greeks, Persians, and Mussulmans, in short, wherever people believed in gradations of rank and not in equality and equal rights--are not so much in contradistinction to one another in respect to the exoteric class, standing without, and viewing, estimating, measuring, and judging from the outside, and not from the inside; the more essential distinction is that the class in question views things from below upwards--while the esoteric class views things from above downwards. There are heights of the soul from which tragedy itself no longer appears to operate tragically; and if all the woe in the world were taken together, who would dare to decide whether the sight of it would necessarily seduce and constrain to sympathy, and thus to a doubling of the woe? . . . That which serves the higher class of men for nourishment or refreshment, must be almost poison to an entirely different and lower order of human beings. The virtues of the common man would perhaps mean vice and weakness in a philosopher; it might be possible for a highly developed man, supposing him to degenerate and go to ruin, to acquire qualities thereby alone, for the sake of which he would have to be honoured as a saint in the lower world into which he had sunk."

"There are books which have an inverse value for the soul and the health, according as the inferior soul and the lower vitality, or or the higher and more powerful, make use of them. In the former case they are dangerous, disturbing, unsettling books, in the latter case they are herald-calls which summon the bravest to their bravery."

Strauss: To their bravery.

Reader: "Books for the general reader are always ill-smelling books, the odour of paltry people clings to them. Where the populace eat and drink, and even where they reverence, it is accustomed to stink. One should not go into churches if one wishes to breathe pure air."

Strauss: The main point which he makes here seems to be this. The concept of the philosopher is inseparable from that of order of rank. The philosopher's soul, the higher soul, the higher vitality. It refers us back to the will to power. ~~The will to power itself supplies the standard of higher and lower.~~ But that standard is not a disposal of the lower, for they do not know the higher. These virtues of which he speaks, the virtues of the common man, whether they are identical with what is traditionally called the moral virtues, is a long question, but there is a certain kinship.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: That's very hard to say. Nietzsche's Zarathustra has the title, the book for noone and the book for everyone. For noone perhaps because it is Nietzsche's most personal. That's at least the way in which I understand it. And for everyone -- everyone can get some direction, some edification, through it.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: But one must distinguish. Every book is understood in different ways, whether the author wants it or not. That is clear. That is so to speak the starting point of Plato. Plato writes his book with the intention that they be understood differently, by different kinds of people. That is what we have in mind. The most obvious difference which I see is this. (That Nietzsche has) and refuses to have any "social responsibility" in the ordinary meaning of the term. If the truth is dangerous, that's no reason for Nietzsche not to say it. For Plato it is different, and not only for Plato.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: Nietzsche would say -- he speaks of it later in this chapter. Disguise would come naturally, without any contrivance. And at the same time there is contrivance, as he has said he does everything in order to be understood with difficulty.

Another Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: That the order is misunderstood. If one only has to look at a list of the labours which were put on Nietzsche, from the beginning of his publishing up to the present-day, one sees that there are the disguises, the masks, grow naturally. Without any contrivance -- yet there is contrivance in Nietzsche, and there's no doubt about that.

Student: Would you agree that he's more easily misunderstood, more easily than Plato or anyone else?

Strauss: Yes, one can say that. One can put it on the most simple level, most political level, as follows. Nietzsche attacks

violently the ideas of 1789, liberty, equality, fraternity, and that meant of course liberalism and democracy, socialism, communism and anarchism. This was in itself nothing striking because the conservatives in Germany always thought that liberalism as it were was the progenitor of this terrible brood. I believe in old-fashioned America there must also be such people who believed that it is only a short step from liberalism to communism and anarchism. At any rate in an old-fashioned country like Germany, it was much stronger for the conservative people, but Nietzsche also rejects the conservatives, and this is only a defensive position which, because it is only defensive, is being eroded and has no future. What remained on the political plane? What remained? Supermen. But what is the political meaning of supermen? So whatever one may say about Marx, the way from Marx to practical Marxist politics including Lenin is very simple, but there is no clear way leading from Nietzsche who touches all political hot irons, the greatest gaiety one could almost say. This did not lead anywhere, and it is not surprising, not altogether impossible, that such people like D'Annunzio of Italy and similar people in Germany used him as the progenitor of fascism. That Nietzsche would have been shocked, surely by Hitler and his people, I have not the slightest doubt, and I suppose his culmination as it were also showed the inadequacy of that.

But still can one do that? As a philosopher Nietzsche is compelled to take up the fundamental political questions. But he is necessarily vague, necessarily. There is no way leading from the Zarathustra to politics although (inaudible . . .). There is a passage which we will come across later (inaudible . . .) what the morality is to what the teaching tends. In a later passage he says the moral (political). It's the same because . . .

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: But isn't the core of political theory exactly that? (Inaudible . . .).

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: Yes, but when you speak about a subject and the subject of which you are speaking about affects the subject about which you speak, you have to be considerate.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: Sure, but that is where the vagueness comes in. He understands here of course by the superman a man of the highest spirituality. He has a formula -- Caesar with the soul of Christ. I mean the bodily health and the political power of ruling which Caesar had, . . . but this could not be understood, especially in the writings of a more screaming character, like the Genealogy of Morals, which lends itself very easily to political propaganda.

I think one should grant it, but I would indeed say that Nietzsche's seeming lack of responsibility is only the first sight of his farsightedness. But that he saw these things -- he saw the impossibility of going on, in the way in which Europe had been going on since the 19th century, and the two things are inseparable. Inside the situation and the wide shouts from the outside.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: No, that I didn't say and that would be absolutely opposed to Nietzsche because Nietzsche (inaudible . . .).

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: There is one first interpretation of Beyond Good and Evil. Good and evil in the ordinary sense implies do not hurt or harm and Nietzsche says that's important. He takes an extreme case -- of the conclusion drawn from Albert Schweitzer regarding good and evil in the ordinary sense, a reverence for life, of course you must exclude a tiger who jumps at a child (inaudible . . .) but there is no human life possible according to this view, without harming others. That doesn't mean that a man cannot live without shooting their neighbors, but they harm them.

Student: So we might be able to say then that even if we know one has misunderstood Nietzsche, all the people who have read Nietzsche have understood it perfectly well, but still Nietzsche might be a very harmful man.

Strauss: It depends. If you accept the good and evil morality, then he is a harmful man without any question. And he is the first to admit. Therefore he gave the book the title, Beyond Good and Evil. The example of the lion and the lamb which I used was used by Nietzsche in that sense as an example of what the truly good, and what the true understanding of good and bad is. The lion thinks that lambs' flesh is good (inaudible) and the application to human beings is too unpleasant to commentate on.

Our time has come, and we will next time continue at aphorism 31.

Lecture VI

Nietzsche: Beyond Good and Evil, November 17, 1971

Strauss: We came last time to the second chapter of Beyond Good and Evil, and the theme of that chapter is the character of the true philosopher. And the true philosopher is understood as the philosopher of the future. He is described above all as free of mind and that means he is free of the prejudices of the philosopher. He does not wear the blinders of all earlier philosophers. The earlier philosophers were not or were not sufficiently aware of the fact that no philosopher has ever proved right. That no philosophy has ever proved to be true, finally true in the decisive respect. In every case without their dreaming about it, there were unsuspected, unexpected upheavals, enlargenings of the horizon which rendered questioning of the early philosophy.

* { Now a very important part of the character of the philosopher of the future is his relation to other men, to "society." That relation is characterized by voluntary solitude of the philosopher, voluntarily interrupted by descent to the cave. Now given the solitude of the true philosopher, the most important form in which he communicates his thoughts is writing. He makes it difficult to understand him. And not by the use of technical language, which would only mean by the use of congealed (inaudible), but by making himself intelligible only to attentive readers. To readers who are able and willing to solve riddles. He educates his readers while they read, while they go.

Now we turn to the next aphorism, aphorism 31, or would you like to take up this point I repeated now.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: Now may I try to state it in old-fashioned language. Let us assume that there is a difference between theoretical excellence and moral excellence. Now if the man of theoretical excellence, in the highest case the philosopher, who as such is not intelligible or not easily intelligible to others, becomes intelligible and visible to others by virtue of his moral virtues and may on this account be revered as a saint. I think that this is something like what Nietzsche has in mind. His true excellences are invisible and some lower excellences which he also has become more visible the less his true excellences are actual, the more they recede.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: Yes, because if the highest loses its power, then one can call this a degeneration and a perishable one. It's strong language but not intelligible language.

So then we shall turn to 31.

Reader: "In our youthful years we still venerate and despise without the art of nuance, which is the best gain of life, and we have rightly to do hard penance for having fallen upon men and things

with Yea and Nay. Everything is so arranged that the worst of all tastes, the taste for the unconditional, is cruelly befooled and abused, until a man learns to introduce a little art into his sentiments, and prefers to try conclusions with the artificial, as do the real artists of life."

"The angry and reverent spirit peculiar to youth appears to allow itself no peace, until it has suitably falsified men and things, to be able to vent its passion upon them; youth in itself even, is something falsifying and deceptive. Later on, when the young soul, tortured by continual disillusion, finally turns suspiciously against itself--still ardent and savage even in its suspicion and remorse of conscience; how it upbraids itself, how impatiently it tears itself, how it revenges itself for its long-self-blinding, as though it had been a voluntary blindness! In this transition one punishes oneself by distrust of one's sentiments; one tortures one's enthusiasm with doubt; one feels even the good conscience to be a danger, as if it were the self-concealment and lassitude of a more refined uprightness; and above all, one espouses upon principle the cause against "youth."-- A decade later, and one comprehends that all this was also still--youth!"

Strauss: It is I believe not difficult to see that Nietzsche speaks here of his own experience. His youthful enthusiasm for Wagner and Schopenhauer, this passionate turning against (inaudible), and then finally overcoming this spiritedness, the spiritedness of both levels. (Inaudible . . .) which is characteristic of youth, so he says, and that was surely so in former times.

Now there is a connection I believe to the preceding aphorism. In the previous aphorism Nietzsche has spoken of the incompatibility of philosophy and "people." And now he speaks of the incompatibility of philosophy and youth. But the case of youth is obviously different, because every philosopher has to be young for some time and there is no such necessity of his being part of the people.

Student: Is the implication here that Nietzsche has gotten over being youthful?

Strauss: Yes, I think so.

Student: Well, the anti-Wagner writings at the end of his (inaudible).

Strauss: But the true anti-Wagner writings and thoughts, I believe, were the earlier writings like Human All-Too Human and this type. And these later writings were self-presentations meant to prevent his being mistaken and one sees it as a very unusual character of these writings that it is not (inaudible) indignation against Wagner.

Student: That it is. . .

Strauss: No, ultimately not, but if you think of what he says about the Wagnerian operatic text, I don't think that he could have written that or surely not published it twenty years earlier. I believe that he had no longer to overcome any Wagnerianism in himself in the 1880's when he wrote these.

Student: Well, it would take a long discussion, but it seems to me that he is still absolutely under the spell of Wagner, and wants to fight that.

Strauss: But it is no longer in himself. It rules Germany and in a way Europe.

Student: I don't mean the social aspect, but his own quandary for it (inaudible).

Strauss: Yes, but it is extremely limited. He makes it clear what he regards as great in Wagner's music. And it's precisely not that of Fritz Wagner himself or his most (inaudible).

Student: Doesn't he speculate (inaudible) in Wagner's music and what it is in (inaudible)?

Strauss: Yes, but what he finds greatest in Wagner is in very short passages, here and there.

Another Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: (Inaudible . . .) is the taste for the unconditioned, for the absolute. And after one has overcome that, after one has followed this natural inclination, one must learn to put some art into one's feelings. And rather make an experiment with the artificial as distinguished from or opposed to the natural. And that is what the true artists of life do. They do not follow the natural impulses, but experiment with artificials.

Student: (Inaudible.)

* Strauss: No I think it is here more limited, but is it not generally speaking true. Younger people are more radical, more unqualified, in their yesses and nos, than older people. Is this not true?

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: Is it not necessary in order to fight a vice or a defect to use the opposite extreme? Must not for example such an abominable vice as snobbism -- can this not sometimes have a redeeming function? And perhaps the artists of life are kind of snobs. But who are helpful as counterpoison to the absolute yes and absolute no, of the simply young.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: It seems to be in this connection. It is surely not the last word; it is only one stage.

Another Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: No, that goes too far. I mean there is an enormous difference between Aristotle and Nietzsche regarding moderation, but I think that goes too far. He is speaking here of a limited subject, namely the subject of youth and maturity. And what are the specific infirmities of youth and how they are overcome and there are certain stages of their overcoming. But the final stage is of course that one is no longer young. This is made clear in the last sentence.

Another Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: In a way, yes.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: No, the word which he uses is not in German artificial; but to put some art into one's feelings, and rather to make an experiment with the artificial as the true artists of life.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: But the emphasis put on them, that may be overdone. So shall we go over to the next paragraph?

Reader: "Throughout the longest period of human history -- one calls it the prehistoric period--the value or none-value of an action was inferred from its consequences; the action in itself was not taken into consideration, any more than its origin; but pretty much as in China at present, where the distinction or disgrace of a child redounds to its parents, the retro-operating power of success or failure was what induced men to think well or ill of an action. Let us call this period the pre-moral period of mankind; the imperative, "know thyself!" was then still unknown."

"--In the last ten thousand years, on the other hand, on certain large portions of the earth, one has gradually got so far, that one no longer lets the consequences of an action, but its origin, decide with regard to its worth: a great achievement as a whole, an important refinement of vision and of criterion, the unconscious effect of the supremacy of aristocratic values and of the belief in "origin," the mark of a period which may be designated in the narrower sense as the moral one: the first attempt at self-knowledge is thereby made. Instead of the consequences, the origin--what an inversion of perspective! And assuredly an inversion effected only after long struggle and wavering! To be sure, an ominous new superstition, a peculiar narrowness of interpretation, attained supremacy precisely thereby: the origin of an action was interpreted in the most definite sense possible, as origin out of an intention; people were agreed in the belief that the value of an action lay in the value

of its intention. The intention as the sole origin and antecedent history of an action; under the influence of this prejudice moral praise and blame have been bestowed, and men have judged and even philosophised almost up to the present day.--Is it not possible, however, that the necessity may now have arisen of again making up our minds with regard to the reversing and fundamental shifting of values, owing to a new self-consciousness and acuteness in man."

Strauss: Another deepening of man?

Reader: "Is it not possible that we may be standing on the threshold of a period which to begin with, would be distinguished negatively as ultra-moral; nowadays when, at least amongst us immoralists, the suspicion arises that the decisive value of an action lies precisely in that which is not intentional, and that in all its intentionality, all that is seen, sensible, or "sensed" in it, belongs to its surface or skin--which, like every skin, betrays something, but conceals still more? In short, we believe that the intention is only a sign or symptom, which first requires an explanation--a sign, moreover, which has too many interpretations, and consequently hardly any meaning in itself alone: that morality, in the sense in which it has been understood hitherto, as intention-morality, has been a prejudice, perhaps a prematureness or preliminariness, probably something of the same rank as astrology and alchemy, but in any case something which must be surmounted. The surmounting of morality, in a certain sense even the self-mounting of morality--let that be the name for the long secret labour which has been reserved for the most refined, the most upright, and also the most wicked consciences of to-day, as the living touchstones of the soul."

Strauss: I think there is an obvious connection between this aphorism and the preceding one. In the previous aphorism he had spoken of the three stages in the development of the high-class youth, and now he speaks of three stages in the history of mankind. In regard to morality. There is no parallelism of the three stages. I believe that it is possible that Nietzsche just wanted to let us see that there is no parallel.

The highest stage here is the extra-moral or the trans-moral stage. It is characterized by the overcoming of morality and he adds in a certain sense, self-overcoming of morality. Overcoming of morality through morality. Intellectual probity leading to the turning of morality against itself. Intellectual probity leading to the questioning of morality, and this is what is happening here in this book, as a whole, Beyond Good and Evil.

But there are many more things here which you might like to discuss.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: Yes, but I believe we already have enough material to understand it.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: Yes, it has something to do with that and it can easily be understood in terms of depth psychology, which goes beyond the skin, beyond the conscious intention. But what does Nietzsche mean more precisely by that? I mean without going into any technicalities of this depth psychology. Well, one term used for the second stage of morality is the conscience. Now there are many people who are satisfied with whatever they propose or do if they can say 'my conscience.' You can replace intentions by conscience.

Now Nietzsche says somewhere this simple thing, that the conscience of a man himself is as much (inaudible) as the man himself. So you cannot leave it at the conscience, although that may be the only thing which falls within the purview of the act or speech, but you have to take the whole man. And one must in one's own case be aware of that. That there is always something in what appears to be. What Nietzsche suggests is that intention of morality is almost as superficial as the consequence of morality. If someone does something, which has bad consequences, and he didn't intend these consequences in any way, there is no intrinsic connection between what he intended and the consequences. That's very superficial, but Nietzsche says it is almost as superficial to make the intention the sole consideration, for moral judgment.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: I mean you read everyday in the daily papers or magazines cases of men who are very indignant about pornography and such things. Some people say in many cases that the indignation, which is the intention of these people, is the whole story of what is going on in these indignant people. That there can be a kind of obscene interest in obscenity. Have you heard of that?

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: No, but I read sometimes in columns and so on, and that would be a simple example of the insufficiency of intention.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: If someone fights obscenity, which I would regard as something laudable, he may very well be prompted by prurient interests in himself. So his intention would not be sufficient for understanding his act. And this is true in other cases.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: In a certain sense Nietzsche would say in this sense of the word that the works of art have to be judged in moral terms. Only what he understands by morality is not the morality of good and evil, but another morality, and therefore it is not very helpful by itself. I suggest that we postpone the question of the discussion

discussion of that subject in what is the significance of aesthetic ideas in the Genealogy of Morals, where he questions that Kantian and pre-Kantian view of the beautiful, and he opposes there Stendhal's definition of the beautiful, not what is pleasing to disinterested beholders but what promises happiness. Art as a stimulant rather than a sedative. A parallel example in the Morals is the morality of altruism as opposed to the morality of the right kind of egoism.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: Well, the effects to a certain extent are all right, but that is not the key point. It concerns the principle and the principle is what stems from everything.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: It is not that there are quite a few altruistic actions, of which every sensible man and therefore Nietzsche of course would approve, but he would question his own altruism in it. He would say there is a lot of indifference, there is a lot of convenience, and other things which are not truly love of neighbour.

Now the next aphorism is in a way the most important of this chapter, the central aphorism of it. Now let us read. In this aphorism Nietzsche returns to the overall question of chapter 1 which he seems to have lost sight of, but now he seems to continue the harmonization effected in the first paragraph, of this chapter. Now let us read.

Reader: "At whatever standpoint of philosophy one may place oneself nowadays, seen from every position, the erroneousness of the world in which we think we live is the surest and most certain thing our eyes can light upon: we find proof after proof thereof, which would fain allure us into surmises concerning a deceptive principle in the "essence of things." He, however, who makes thinking itself, and consequently "the spirit," . . . "

Strauss: The mind.

Reader: " . . . responsible for the falseness of the world--an honourable exit, which every conscious or unconscious advocatus dei avails himself of -- he who regards this world, including space, time, form, and movement, as falsely deduced, would have at least good reason in the end to become distrustful also of all thinking; has it not hitherto been playing upon us the worst of scurvy tricks? and what guarantee would it give that it would not continue to do what it has always been doing? In all seriousness, the innocence of thinkers has something touching and respect-inspiring in it, which even nowadays permits them to wait upon consciousness with the request that it will give them honest answers."

Strauss: Honest answers, underlined.

Reader: "For example, whether it be "real" or not, and why it keeps the outer world so resolutely at a distance, and other questions of the same description. The belief in "immediate certainties" is a moral naivete which does honour to us philosophers; but -- we have now to cease being "merely moral" men!"

Strauss: He also underlines moral -- a moral man.

Reader: "Apart from morality, such belief is a folly which does little honour to us! If in middle-class life an ever-ready distrust is regarded as the sign of a "bad character," and consequently as an imprudence, here amongst us, beyond the middle-class world and its Yeas and Nays, what should prevent our being imprudent and saying: the philosopher has at length a right to "bad character," . . . "

Strauss: Eventually. That's not the best translation. After all what has happened? The philosopher has a right to a bad character.

Reader: " . . . as the being who has hitherto been most befooled on earth--he is now under obligation to distrustfulness, to the wickedest squinting out of every abyss of suspicion.--Forgive me the joke of this gloomy grimace and turn of expression; for I myself have long ago learned to think and estimate differently with regard to deceiving and being deceived, and I keep at least a couple of pokes in the ribs ready for the blind rage with which philosophers struggle against being deceived. Why not? It is, nothing more than a moral prejudice that truth is worth more than semblance; it is, in fact, the worst proved supposition in the world. So much must be conceded: there could have been no life at all except upon the basis of perspective estimates and semblances; and if, with the virtuous enthusiasm and stupidity of many philosophers, one wished to do away altogether with the "seeming world"--well, granted that you could do that,--at least nothing of your "truth" would thereby remain! Indeed, what is it that forces us in general to the supposition that there is an essential opposition of "true" and "false"? Is it not enough to suppose degrees of seemingness, and as it were lighter and darker shades and tones of semblance--different valeurs, as the painters say? Why might not the world which concerns us . . . "

Strauss: That concerns us, underlined.

Reader: "--be a fiction? And to any one who suggested: "But to a fiction belongs an originator?"--might it not be bluntly replied: Why? May not this "belong" also belong to the fiction? Is it not at length permitted to be a little ironical towards the subject, just as towards the predicate and object? Might not the philosopher elevate himself above faith in grammar? All respect to governesses, but is it not time that philosopher should renounce governess-faith?"

Strauss: (Inaudible . . .). The oldest form of the idea relatively sensible, simple and persuasive is circumlocution for the sentence "I Plato am the truth." That the true world unattainable for now

but promised for the sane, the pious, the virtuous man ("for the sinner who repents"). Progress of the idea. It becomes more subtle, insidious, incomprehensible. It becomes female. It becomes Christian. The true world unattainable, indemonstrable, unpromisable, but the very thought of it, a consolation, an obligation, an imperative (inaudible . . .) . . . but seeing thro' mist and skepticism the idea has become elusive, pale, Nordic, (inaudible)). The true world unattainable, at any rate unattainable. And being unattained, also unknown. Consequently not consoling, revealing, or obligating. How could something unknown obligate us? (Inaudible -- the earth's dawn of reason.) The true world, an idea which is no longer good for anything, not even obligating, an idea which has become useless and superfluous, and consequently a refuted idea. Let us abolish it. (Inaudible . . . pandemonium of all free spirits.)

The true world we have abolished. What world (inaudible). The apparent one perhaps, but no. With the true world we have also abolished the apparent one. (Noon, moment of the briefest shadow, end of the longest error, high point of humanity, (inaudible) Zarathustra.)

The point which we have to consider is especially at the end. If we have abolished the true world, we have abolished also the apparent world. In other words, the apparent and no other is the true world. There is only one world. The anthropocentric world is the true world. Its relativity to man is no object. There is no behind, no without. The text, as Nietzsche called it in the first chapter, in contradistinction to the interpretation, is wholly unattainable. You can also say perhaps Nietzsche, in the sense in which he used it, on the paragraph on Stoics, is unattainable.

But nature as text is in a way acceptable. Remember what he said about Bosovich, the break, the evidently necessary break with anthropocentric. There's a difference. Now the anthropocentric world is fictitious. Who or what is responsible for that fiction? Nietzsche says apparently the question is badly put. But as the subjunctives and the perhaps there show, the question is (inaudible). Nietzsche's answer, who or what is responsible for the world which is of concern to us, for the anthropocentric world, Nietzsche's answer is as we know the will to power. The will to power is the cause and the world is its effect.

But as Nietzsche says at the end of aphorism 36 as we shall see, the world is the will to power, not the effect of will to power. The world is the producing, the self-producing, and self-reproducing of the will to power. There is here a difficulty of which one may doubt whether it has ever been cleared up. It is this: the true world, that is to say the text in contradistinction to interpretation, a nonanthropocentric world, the world as it is in itself, nature, and on the other hand, the true world, is the anthropocentric world, and it is by virtue of interpretation of human creation.

Too ?
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This underlines the clause, which is of any concern to us. The distinction between the world which is of no concern to us, the world of physics, except in a very (inaudible) way because it leads to technology and so on. The world in which we live is fictitious. But it is the only world.

We have seen that Nietzsche questioned the truth of the true world and in particular of the true world of physics. If I am not mistaken, that is the root of the difficulty. We will come later on across a passage where Nietzsche speaks of nature with some emphasis, and where he uses nature all the time in quotation marks, and only at the end of that paragraph does he use nature without quotation marks. What has happened? I believe this is the fundamental question why Nietzsche needs nature and cannot assert it. And we must see whether we can understand him.

Student: (Inaudible.)

{ Strauss: Yes, that Nietzsche would grant, but everything proceeds from a moral endeavor because everything, at least everything human, is an expression of the will to power. A certain will to power is effective in physics as it is effective in various forms of art, and so this is no difficulty.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: Now that was for me a very long sentence.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: Ultimately yes, but not in immediately. And if you think of the following point which I have referred to at ad nauseam, the Kantian sense, the human understanding which prescribes nature its laws, which can easily be translated under a Nietzschean term, an act of the will to power. But Kant understood here by the natural laws modern physics, as everyone admits. Now as humans, that there are other possibilities of physics, and one does not have to think clearly of post-Newtonian physics -- would not the same apply to them too, that they also are interpretations of the world.

In the moment that this simple and final truth, physics, is questioned, you get a variety of interpretations. Does not the same physics look different if understood by a materialist and as understood by Kant? Are these not obviously different interpretations of the same physics?

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: As long as people generally believe that what has happened in the 17th century was a clear, clean-cut progress of knowledge, that Aristotle himself living in the 17th century would have to swallow the modern physics hook, line and sinker, or in other words,

there is no question of principle. If this is true, fine, but is it true? Were the principles of what is understood by knowledge, of what is understood by raising a question and answering it, has this not been changed? And if that is so, is it not at least permitted to raise the question whether the change from one kind of physics, Aristotelian physics, to modern physics, is not due to a change in, as people call it, weltanschauung. I believe millions of people would say this, and when Nietzsche speaks of morality, he is only somewhat more precise. He may be wrong, but is it more precise to speak of morality than to speak of weltanschauung? I do not know whether I made myself understood.

Student: (Inaudible.)

* Strauss: I believe (inaudible) showed in his study of algebra that this radically new understanding of numbers, that they were connected with deeper changes which you would not enter into. If this is so, that there are deeper changes than the intra-scientific changes, then it a hypothesis to call this deeper change a moral change. Nietzsche does not seriously assert moral. I mean formerly people spoke of weltanschauung, literally translated world view, but it has become a technical term in both English and German. And then they changed to life's view, lebensanschauung, and that was already due to Nietzsche, because it was not a matter of already viewing the world, but the manner in which man views himself. Morality.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: In other words, the possibility of science is not deducible from the will to power. Is this what you mean?

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: Yes, but from Nietzsche's point of view, the question would still be, what animates such things as science, as art, and whatever other activities of the mind there are. And I believe it is a bit unfair if one were to say show the will to power from modern physics.

What Nietzsche seriously asserts and primarily asserts is that science cannot altogether be understood on its own terms. There is something more fundamental, the whole man. What is he after? Morality. In this respect that is Plato too -- to say that striving for happiness, striving for good, is a necessary starting point for understanding science.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: Sure, no he does make the distinction and he has this formula for his whole work, to view science in the perspective of art and art in the perspective of life. He shows a hierarchy.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Well, could we not leave it at the time being at commonsensical fact, (inaudible . . .).

Another Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: For Nietzsche that is the same.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: Sure, sure. But what does evolving mean? If you mean that it means progressing, that is not evident. We will come to the question of historical progress, which is crucial for Nietzsche throughout and which is ultimately the reason why nature becomes problematic for him.

Let us read the next paragraph.

Reader: "O Voltaire! O humanity! O idiocy! There is something ticklish in "the truth," and in the search for the truth; and if man goes about it too humanely--"il ne cherche le vrai que pour faire le bien"--I wager he finds nothing!"

Strauss: That is, I believe, apart from the reference to altruism, after he had stated in the preceding aphorism the case for anthropocentric, Nietzsche reminds us of the danger of anthropocentric. So that is really I think the subject here.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: And you assert that what you want is an epistemological shift. That is intelligible by itself.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: But then the question is, what is it that makes it intelligible?

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: But that is not the base on which one can make this (inaudible).

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: It could be; I mean prior to any (inaudible), why not?

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: But then it is not mere chance when you speak of the nature of man.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: But then there is another difficult and unknown (inaudible)

called history. I mean if you say from a certain moment on science changed its character and after some hesitation the new science proved to be absolutely victorious and the old science (inaudible); this seems to be the fact, and of course the first question is what are the characteristic differences between the two sciences. The old science and the new science. But then still the question arises why this change, and the situation would be extremely simple if modern science were superior to the old science according to the standards of the old science. But that is perhaps not so evident as it seemed to be in the 19th century.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: The questioning of the absoluteness of modern science, that is a great event which is linked in the first place with the name of Nietzsche which today of course may be (inaudible) also.

Another Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: We all grow up in a certain interpretation which is determined by our parents, teachers, and so on, and it was never much a matter of choice. We grow into it rather than (inaudible), and then perhaps at a later date we begin to question and we see that we have accepted something which we did not have to accept, and then choice becomes possible. How to proceed in that choice and how to choose wisely is a long question, and Nietzsche has somehow an answer to this question. We must read more until we find that, that there is not mere (inaudible), you know that there are n points of view. We are confronted with these n points of view and you take your money and you make your choice. That is not ^{Huxley} so, and for Nietzsche to mention only the main point -- for Nietzsche hitherto all philosophers were interpretations, that is to say acts of the will to power, without the philosophers knowing this. This unconscious, this naiveté, condemns all earlier interpretations.

What Nietzsche seems to drive at is this: That that interpretation which is aware, is fully conscious, of the fact of interpretation, is the absolute interpretation. The will to power. That is the will to power. The philosophy of the will to power is the root of all interpretations is the final philosophy. And it includes of course also a moral teaching.

Another Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: (Inaudible . . .), but one must be aware of this, otherwise one will fall into a trap, namely saying that there is no philosophy of Nietzsche. Nietzsche questions all convictions, because convictions are (inaudible). There is nothing, no thesis, which is not questioned somewhere in Nietzsche himself, which he can prove only by disregarding completely the chronological order of Nietzsche's (inaudible). There is no passage where he questions the will to power or eternal return or the superman or oberman or

(inaudible), so there is a teaching of Nietzsche. There is a teaching of Nietzsche but the teaching is supplied by Nietzsche with question marks. As we have seen with the subjunctive and other devices of the same kind.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: But of course you must say that the will to power (inaudible), is the text, the basic text. You must say that.

* { By the way, as regarding the God is dead, that is ^{something else} ~~sometimes~~ understood that Nietzsche meant -- there are some passages in Nietzsche which support this -- this is an event say of the last hundred years, well, that it cannot be true, because the God, the biblical God, of whom Nietzsche says, is eternal and is not affected by certain epochs of ~~unbelief~~, rebellion or what have you. For Nietzsche the biblical God never lived in the sense in which he was meant to live. But in another sense, living in man and affecting man.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: He was, to put it very crudely, the product of a certain kind ~~kind~~ of the will to power. What you have to say is one of the very many objections . . .

Student: (Inaudible.)

{ Strauss: But there are varieties of interpretation. Nietzsche uses the term nihilism. There are n kinds of nihilism. And this nihilism is a phase of the Western world. And the question is only whether this nihilism is one which can overcome or one which can never lead man out of (inaudible). And Nietzsche says, this nihilistic doctrine is a self-overcoming of nihilism -- in old-fashioned language, the true doctrine.

If I am not mistaken, the time is up.

Lecture VII

Nietzsche: Beyond Good and Evil, December 1, 1971

Strauss: But this truth -- that the truth is deadly -- is not deadly. Truth is a human creation. But this truth, that truth is a human creation, is not a human creation. At any rate, there seem to be two notions of truth. This comes out most clearly in what Nietzsche says about text and interpretation. The truth is the text. The truth is the interpretation.

To take the most important example -- the will to power is a fact. The will to power is an interpretation, that is to say not text. Another aspect of the duality of truth. In Number 34 he spoke of the world of concern to us as fictitious, which means the world in itself is not fictitious. On the other hand, he says earlier in Number 21 that in real life there are only strong or weak wills, not free or unfree wills. In real life, that means it is not fictitious as in the free and unfree will. Yet Nietzsche's last word about this dualism that the true and fictitious world has been abolished with the abolition of the true world; the apparent world as apparent world also is to be abolished. There is only one world, the world of concern to us. The anthropocentric world. But can Nietzsche leave it at that? Is there not something wrong with anthropocentrism, man's being the measure of all things. There is a reference to this at the end of number 3.

Furthermore, man is surely an earthly being. The Zarathustra says remain loyal to the earth. Anthrocentrism would seem to imply geocentrism. But Copernicus . . . yet Copernicus' revolution led to Kant's Copernican revolution. As you may remember, Kant says that while prior to Copernicus, one assumes that the whole army of stars turns around the spectator, Copernicus tried to make the spectator turn around and to leave the stars at rest. The activity is on the side of the spectator, according to Copernicus and surely according to Kant.

Kant thus restores in a way anthropocentrism. According to Kant, the all-comprehensive question is the question, what is man? And yet Kant does not restore nor intend to restore geocentricity. Yet the case of Nietzsche is different, because for Nietzsche the fundamental phenomenon is human understanding or more generally the pure consciousness. And Nietzsche replaces the pure consciousness by man in his fullness. Whereas the pure consciousness is not obviously related to the earth, man in his fullness surely is.

The world of concern to us, which is the work of man in his fullness, the anthropocentric world, is nevertheless said by Nietzsche to be fictitious. The true world is different from the fictitious world. So Nietzsche did not succeed it seems in abolishing the true and apparent world. That abolition seems to be so (inaudible), to dispose of so many sham (inaudible). What is the obstacle?

What is the obstacle to that abolition? What makes it so hard to leave it at the one world, the world of concern to us?

In modern times we encounter the distinction between the primary and the secondary quality, the primary qualities which belong to moot matter as such, and the secondary quality, color, sound and so on, which is merely subjective. The primary qualities are the qualities of the object of science. The secondary qualities are the qualities of the things as sensibly perceived. So this distinction leads up to the distinction of the world of science and the world of sense perception.

Following what Nietzsche suggests regarding physics, one is easily led to say that the world of sense perception is primary and the world of physics derivative. But is the world of sense perception truly primary? What about about what we can call tertiary qualities, the value qualities, pleasant, good, noble, and the various subdivisions. Do they not belong as much to the full thing as the primary and secondary qualities? Does not the full thing, for instance the worn-out shoes of an old peasant woman, belong to the whole life history of the human being or group in question? Is it understood in its fullness if it is not seen as part of the whole world, and which is not the world of physics and not the world of sense perception.

Now the highest among the value qualities are those of the sacred. Question: is not the most important quality of a cow for a Hindu its quality of being sacred, or is not the most important quality of a pig for a Jew or Muslim its quality of being impure. So the one world revolves into a multiplicity of worlds. Of historical worlds, as people say.

There is an alternative to that. Namely, to understand the qualities of the sacred as being by virtue of nomos, convention. And hence does not belong to the thing itself. The cow is sacred to the Hindus by virtue of their law; it is not a quality inherent in the cow as cow. This understanding presupposes nature, because nomos is understood in contradistinction to (inaudible). History or (inaudible) seem to be the fundamental alternative and we must try to find out, not today, but in the course of our reading, how Nietzsche stands in regard to eternity, nature, history.

Under no circumstances is it possible to maintain one world without qualification. This much regarding the subject he discussed last time.

Now is there any point you would like to raise?

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: Yes, that is the question. Just as he said in that section which you read, that the doctrine of the will to power is also only an interpretation. This is the objection which we will

make and he says, well, all the better.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: Yes, but the same difficulty is there because the will to power is only a positive expression; the death of god, a negative expression.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: The difficulty regarding text and interpretation applies equally to all of us.

Another Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: What do you mean, what is concrete and what is abstract?

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: Have you ever seen how a cow is milked?

Student: Yes.

Strauss: Can you milk an abstract cow? That you can say only metaphorically.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: Can you say it without using these apparently leading terms?

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: As far as I know, as far as I was able to find out with discussing that with a Hindu, they don't have the will toward nature.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: Well, who tells you that the cow is the only example of something natural?

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: Well, since the discussion seems to be exhausted, we will turn to the next number, 36. Now this is a particularly important aphorism for the following reasons. It is devoted to the will to power. Nietzsche had spoken of the will to power in at least four earlier aphorisms, 9, 13, 22, 23. But there he spoke of it only by way of assertion. He asserted it dogmatically, without giving any reasons. Now he states his principle regarding

philosophic reasoning in number 5. We do not have to read all of 5, but somewhere toward the middle of that, where he says they are all advocates, do you have that? . . . who do not wish to be known as such and in most cases even tricky defenders of their prejudices which they baptize as truth. Go on.

Reader: " . . . and very far from having the conscience which bravely admits this to itself; very far from having the good taste of the courage which goes so far as to let this be understood, perhaps to warn friend or foe, or in cheerful confidence and self-ridicule."

Strauss: This is what Nietzsche must show himself if he is to be taken seriously. That courage or bravery of conscience which admits openly the problematic character of his own assertion. We must see whether Nietzsche lives up to that.

What he does in Number 36 is a specimen of his intellectual honesty, courage of conscience. Nietzsche does not know more than what he says here. His reasoning is hypothetical. The question is whether he is undogmatic in spite of his hypothetical character. So let us first read it and then explore it.

Reader: "Supposing that nothing else is "given" as real but our world of desire and passions, that we cannot sink or rise to any other "reality" but just that of our impulses--for thinking is only a relation of these impulses to one another."

Strauss: Now let us stop for one moment. The given. The given. Now what is the given? Not of course for Nietzsche something like dogs and cats and cows or tables, the sun and moon and stars, but that out of which our understanding falls. Say the mere sense state. And that was thought by many people before Nietzsche. But perceptions, if we may use that term, are derivative, or secondary, as Nietzsche indicated in his critique of Locke, at the end of Number 20. In different species, different senses have different ranges. So the perceptions depend on the needs, on the urges. So that is the starting point, but qualified by a 'suppose that.'

Reader: "--are we not permitted to make the attempt and to ask the question whether this which is "given" does . . . "

Strauss: This is stronger in German . . . and I can't translate it into English, but not to raise the question, the verb is the same root as the noun. Well, all right. So you see the very cautious form he uses -- are we not permitted?

Reader: ". . . not suffice, by means of our counterparts, for the understanding even of the so-called mechanical (or "material") world? I do not mean as an illusion, a "semblance," a "representation" (in the Berkeleyan and Schopenhauerian sense), but as possessing the same degree of reality as our emotions themselves--as a more primitive

form of the world of emotions, in which everything still lies locked in a mighty unity, which afterwards branches off and develops itself inorganic processes (naturally also, refines and debilitates)--as a kind of instinctive life in which all organic functions, including self-regulation, assimilation, nutrition, secretion, and change of matter, are still synthetically united with one another--as a primary form of life?"

Strauss: In other words, is it not possible, giving these urges, as we know them from ourselves and from other human beings, but is it not possible to understand the inanimate forms as undeveloped, animalism, so that we can understand the stones or whatever it may be only in terms of urges. It means of course ultimately the will to power.

Reader: "In the end, it is not only permitted to make this attempt, it is commanded by the conscience of logical method. Not to assume several kinds of causality, so long as the attempt to get along with a single one has not been pushed to its furthest extent (to absurdity, if I may be allowed to say so): that is a morality of method which one may not repudiate nowadays--it follows "from its definition," as mathematicians say."

Strauss: I think you see here the irony in Platonism to which you alluded before. What is sufficient for explanation is the true explanation. This is the principle to which he tacitly refers. And this is what the conscience of (inaudible) requires.

Reader: "The question is ultimately whether we really recognise the will as operating, whether we believe in the causality of the will; if we do so--and fundamentally our belief in this is just our belief in causality itself--we must make the attempt to posit hypothetically the causality of the will as the only causality. "Will" can naturally only operate on "will"--and not on "matter" (not on "nerves," for instance):"

Strauss: Do you see that he puts now will in quotation marks?

Reader: "In short, the hypothesis must be hazarded, whether will does not operate on will wherever "effects" are recognised--and whether all mechanical action, inasmuch as a power operates therein, is not just the power of will, the effect of will. Granted, finally, that we succeeded in explaining our entire instinctive life as the development and ramification of one fundamental form of will--namely, the Will to Power, as my thesis puts it; granted that all organic functions could be traced back to this Will to Power, and that the solution of the problem of generation and nutrition--it is one problem--could also be found therein: one would thus have acquired the right to define all active force unequivocally as Will to Power. The world seen from within, the world defined and designated according to its "intelligible character"--it would simply be "Will to Power," and nothing else."

Strauss: So you see Nietzsche states clearly that he does not know. Suppose one would be compelled, namely if this notion of method, (inaudible . . .) and surely there is a great difference between this kind of assertion and the assertion for which he (inaudible.)

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: But Nietzsche decides to try to prevent that. And from the other point of view, if the key to the animals, then the animals must be understood in terms of the inanimate, life in terms of mechanical or other physical things.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: You cannot understand man in terms of the sub-human. You cannot understand the living in terms of the non-living. But you can understand the animals as not yet human beings, and you have to define them. You can understand the inanimate as not yet animate. That's the opposite Nietzsche tries to prevent. Whether he succeeds is another matter, but that is the purpose. The doctrine of the will to power surely has this meaning. That the non-living must be understood in the light of the living, as a pre-form, as a pre-figuration of the living, and not the other way around.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: How does he put it at the end of this number? The world seen from within, world seen from within, is will to power.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: Especially one can say whether the difference between man and beast is sufficiently provided for. But you remember the first passage where he mentioned the will to power -- philosophy is the most spiritual will to power. Man is then characterized by something called spirituality. What generation is there between spirituality and the will to power?

Nietzsche surely doesn't wish to say the world seen from within is the spirit. That he tries to avoid. But the question is whether he can keep a sufficient account of the distinctive character of man in terms of the will to power. That is surely not on the basis of what he said hitherto.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: I can only repeat what I said before. The alternative is the mechanistic. And if that is open to great objection, you must understand inanimate in terms of the animals. Of course this harsh sentence does not suffice; that goes without saying.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: But Freud was originally a pupil of Ernst Hecker. Ernest Hecker was a very famous Darwinist and more precisely a materialist in Germany around 1900. Ernest Hecker -- he was world famous. And so that is not surprising, but that means only that Freud has the opposite intention that Nietzsche has, which also was not surprising.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: The question is ultimately whether we recognize the will as freely effective, whether we believe in the causality of will. And Nietzsche's answer is, as he says here, we must believe in the causality of will, because the belief in the causality of will is identical with our belief in causality.

Let me put it this way. There is a statement of Nietzsche's somewhere, which I do not have here, where Nietzsche says all causality rests on the assumption of ends, of (inaudible). Now there are no longer any (inaudible), and therefore the place of ends must be taken by the will. So in the causality is will. Now if this is so, then of course all other causality, so-called mechanical causality, must be understood in terms of causality of willing. It follows then that will can effect only will and not for example nerves. But he qualifies that here by using will in quotation marks, and by this indicating, this is a base on the assumption which Nietzsche has made, we must make the experiment to posit hypothetically will causality as the only causality.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: Ultimately yes; Nietzsche doesn't show how now, but that is implied.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: Nietzsche sees two alternatives; one is the mechanical solution, and then he says, the living cannot be understood in terms of the non-living. The other alternative is the spirit, and that has to do with God. And God is dead. The only way open to him is something like will, or more specifically will to power.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: That is one reason why he puts here the word in quotation marks.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: Yes, if you call it that way, but the hypocrisy would be something more. Well, ultimately of course the starting point of Nietzsche is man. And this thinking about man. And this

thinking about man leads then to the doctrine of the will to power. And then the question is, how does man stand in the whole? Does he have nothing whatever in common with other beings? Is his manner of being so totally different from everything else, that we can say man is characterized by the will to power? And other beings by something entirely different? Is man not also a natural being, to use an expression used by Nietzsche himself? In the way in which all other beings are natural. Must we therefore not find one formula comprising man and non-man?

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: But we would have to read the aphorism on the will, on the complicated character of the will. And also what we did last time, (inaudible . . .) the complete account of will. And is this perhaps not our most profound will which does not take on the form of (inaudible).

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: (Inaudible.)

(The tape is quite inaudible at this point.)

Strauss: Sure, in a very general way. A man who wrote on what was a classical scholar, who wrote on the pre-Socratics, must have read Aristotle, but how important that was for Aristotle and as Aristotle was for his philosophic reflections, that's an entirely different question. I think that he was very unimportant. No -- a very simple thing. He speaks of Plato and Epicurus very frequently. They occupied his mind. There is no trace as far as I remember of Aristotle occupying his mind.

Another Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: Still, the world points in a certain direction, and there was one passage at least where he made this clear, that will to power replaces the will to life, of which people spoke so much especially in the time of Darwinism. So what every living thing is after is not merely self-preservation or maybe the preservation of its species but also overcoming other species or other individuals of the same species. That depends. That's a minimum.

Now the other reason which Nietzsche used to assert the will to power taken from a seemingly very different world -- I believe I mentioned that, when Kant says it is the understanding which prescribes nature its laws. It is the understanding which imposes its laws on nature. Then we are on our way. It is the will to power which organizes the sense data that they form an intelligible whole. To say nothing of the moral phenomenon of self-overcoming, transcending oneself, which is of course always implied by Nietzsche. But he is concerned with a formula which is all comprehensive, not only applicable to man, because otherwise the world would disin-

tegrate to parts which have nothing in common. Man and non-man.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: Sure, but on the other hand Nietzsche's assertion is not as sweeping as we see from the many "supposing" and subjunctives.

So this is in a way the only aphorism which gives some reasoning for underlying the doctrine of the will to power. So this is of major importance. Read again the end of Number 36 and then Number 37.

Reader: "The world seen from within, the world defined and designated according to its "intelligible character"--it would simply be "Will to Power," and nothing else."

"What? Does not that mean in popular language: God is disproved, but not the devil"?--On the contrary! On the contrary, my friends! And who the devil also compels you to speak popularly!"

Strauss: It is not so simple. What he says here I believe is rather that the doctrine of the will to power is rather a vindication of God, not of the devil. Sure it is popular language. But still, the divinity of the whole is proven for Nietzsche a bind to the will to power character of the will.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: Let us wait until we come to the chapter on religion. And on Gods. Before that we cannot tell. It is here only an indication. It is not a diabolical doctrine, but rather the opposite. In other words, the truth of the will to power is edifying rather than its opposite.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: But does he not assert that Nietzsche says contradictory things about the truth? We must follow these two paths each to its end. It's a simple thing -- truth is deadly, but this truth, namely that truth is deadly, is not deadly.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: Edifying but not for say a crybaby. That would not be sufficient. But for someone who can bear the terrible character of reality.

Student: In other words, it is only edifying for a certain kind of people.

Strauss: Yes, yes. By the way, there are quite a few truths regarding eternal damnation, and that is one way an edifying doctrine

but for some people it is not edifying at all. Those who are presumably content are not edified by it, (inaudible . . .).

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: Well, I suppose you always have to ask to whom is it edifying. If you say of course men and not dogs, then you will soon find out it is not edifying to any of them. I mean if the truth demands sacrifice as it presumably does, then its edifying character depends on the willingness to bring to sacrifice.

Student: And who is getting sacrificed.

Strauss: Who's getting sacrificed?

Student: Well, this might be edifying to someone who is strong and intelligent, but . . .

Strauss: Do you mean something like what they pay to priests or other people?

Student: No, who's getting sacrificed is what I am saying.

Strauss: Well, if someone's sacrificing . . .

Student: But this wouldn't be edifying to someone who thought they were going to get sacrificed, because of self-interest or truth, and then they would drop by the wayside as a kind of a (inaudible) in the great stream of will to power. No one like that would be edified by reading that.

Strauss: We come to that later. But surely this much is clear. If something is said to be edifying, it does not necessarily mean everyone will be edified.

Now let's read the next one.

Reader: "As happened finally in all the enlightenment of modern times with the French Revolution (that terrible farce, quite superfluous when judged close at hand, into which, however, the noble and visionary spectators of all Europe have interpreted from a distance their own indignation and enthusiasm so long and passionately, until the text has disappeared under the interpretation), so a noble posterity might once more misunderstand the whole of the past, and perhaps only thereby make its aspect endurable.--Or rather, has not this already happened? Have not we ourselves been--that "noble posterity"? And, in so far as we now comprehend this, is it not--thereby already past?"

Strauss: Yes, that is said almost immediately after the aphorism of the will to power, and also on this corollary about the devil. Now what does he mean by that? You note again that he speaks here of text and interpretation. So we can safely say that the text is the will to power. But does he mean from now on there can no longer

be interpretations as distinguished from text? What did the people do in the French Revolution, according to Nietzsche?

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: They made it . . . how was it in itself? It was a gruesome and fundamentally superfluous (inaudible). And they made out of it a grand spectacle. They made it attractive. They made it brilliant.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: There is a simple word which one can use in order to indicate what Nietzsche means. They idealised the French Revolution. I think we must bring this together with what we just saw about the will to power. The idealising interpretations -- they are no longer possible.

Student: But aren't they also granting the will to power?

Strauss: Oh, there are various kinds -- there are strong and weak wills. There are healthy and diseased wills.

Student: But they are all a will to power.

Strauss: But then will to power is identical with being good, and Nietzsche never says that.

Student: Well, might not it be the case that the French Revolution, although superfluous, created waves and waves of passionate indignation, interpretation and enthusiasm, and those waves of thinking weren't superfluous.

Strauss: Well, Mr. Nietzsche may be entirely wrong with his discussion on the French Revolution, but that is not the matter. We must see what we can learn from this aphorism about Nietzsche's philosophy of the will to power. Previously in the preceding aphorism, it appeared that in a way the will to power doctrine is a vindication of God speaking popular, edifying as I venture to say. And now we learn idealising interpretations are important. So this can be maintained only if there is a radical difference in opposition between edifying and idealising. Does it make sense?

Student: If the idealising can never be edifying, then it does make sense.

Strauss: The distinction would be possible even in some cases in which the idealising (inaudible).

Student: If the idealising that followed the French Revolution was edifying, then . . .

Strauss: No, it was not edifying.

Student: But if in fact it was . . .

Strauss: Well, you suppose the opposite of what Nietzsche has said.

Student: I present the possibility that he might be wrong.

Strauss: Sure, we have to study the French Revolution.

Student: But idealising doesn't always have to be . . .

Strauss: But what is Nietzsche's point? Idealising . . . that is (inaudible). Nietzsche sometimes uses the word 'ideal' with (inaudible). That also needs a long interpretation, but does it make sense to say the truth, doctrine of the will to power, is edifying but not idealising. Nietzsche would say that the traditional views of the world are idealisations. That they did not bring out sufficiently the power of the terrible and evil (inaudible). You see there are some words which you hear everyday, words which Nietzsche uses from time to time. There is optimism. That does not mean the same as when you say that President Nixon is optimistic regarding the SALT negotiations. Optimism means this world is the best of all possible worlds. With all the misery in it that is necessary to make it the best of all possible worlds. But taken abstractly, if I may use this term, it means the world is the best possible world.

And then there came other people in the 19th century, Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, who called themselves pessimists, the world is the worst of all possible worlds. That's what Nietzsche started. Only Nietzsche gives it a much more profound explanation. Nietzsche deepens that and this leads him into what he calls nihilism. So pessimism is only a prefiguration of nihilism. But what Nietzsche comes to finally is an overcoming of nihilism. And the important part of that overcoming is the doctrine of the will to power. So all this terror of life is fully recognised as terror, all the evil as impossible to abolish.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: I do not know him enough to answer that question. So at any rate Nietzsche is concerned with a non-idealising interpretation, and from his point of view practically the whole past was idealising. But the non-idealised view of the world is rightly understood by purely understood edifying.

In Schopenhauer, that was not meant to be idealising, but it was also explicitly said to be not edifying.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: Now if one is dissatisfied and doesn't know why, but is definitely dissatisfied, rebels against the establishment, the given, how important is here the knowledge? There will be some knowledge, and Nietzsche never denies that. Is knowledge the whole

story? Overcoming?

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: That cannot be universally true because then animals other than man would not have will to power. I mean beings without this kind of selfawareness which we are in principle capable of.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: Nietzsche has spoken of that in the analysis of will in the first chapter when he states that thinking belongs essentially to it, and he meant here of course especially the human will. There is effect, there is thinking, there is feeling. They all are united in the act of will.

Student: How do you reconcile that with what you said earlier, the unconscious aspect of the will?

Strauss: Because the effect and the feeling are somewhat different from the thinking. And above all, even if all three are fully conscious, they may be driven by something of which they are unaware.

Student: But then thinking as far as it goes is superfluous to the manner of (inaudible).

Strauss: On the lower level, sure, on the sub-human level, thinking in the precise sense will be absent.

Student: But even on the human level, it is not the thinking of the person about their will to power or what they are now and how they are going to overcome -- that's irrelevant.

Strauss: Who thinks about their will to power prior to Nietzsche? Noone. So a man like Nietzsche who one could call without hesitation a man filled with the will to power, but did he know that he had a will to power?

Student: But he was a thinking man.

Strauss: Sure, . . .

Student: Although he might not have known that.

Strauss: If that is correct, then this much was seen clearly, that he is the man (inaudible), and then as matters stood, (inaudible). That he knew and therefore he had to do all manner of things in order to remain the King of Prussia. That he knew. The will to power -- he probably also knew that he was a very ambitious man.

Student: The his conscience would somehow be important.

Strauss: Sure, Nietzsche would admit that.

Student: But this is the thing where the unconscious acts are the most important.

Strauss: But the unconscious is . . .

Student: It is what we do unconsciously that is really significant.

Strauss: Yes, sure. That would even mean negation of Bismarck in this case in the things of which he was unaware. And which made him to or abstain from doing (inaudible).

Student: I see that there's a problem there, but I don't quite know . . .

Strauss: Let us wait until we come to an example that is clear. Well, the French Revolution -- as Kant has said, that the French Revolution, or rather the reaction of educated Germans or Dutchmen or Italians to the French Revolution is a proof of the basic goodness in man. Because the Dutch, Germans, Italians, did not have anything to gain from the French Revolution, but merely the aspects of other people acting so gloriously, so courageously -- this made them admire them. What does Nietzsche say? Nietzsche only says that the proof of Kant grows magnificque. Because even without Nietzsche one could know that these people, the Germans, (inaudible), knew that what happened in France was their business too. Even if there would be no direct political consequence in Germany. Is that not right?

So could there not be all kinds of things going on in Bismarck, Bismarck was never a naive man, I mean he never said such a thing (inaudible), but in other things -- I mean you take something which I regard as wholly undesirable or unsavory, but Bismarck was married and he had children and that was probably a very happy marriage. Perhaps Freud, if he had investigated Bismarck, would have found out certain things about Bismarck's political inclinations which had to do with his marriage. So that would be something of which Bismarck was unaware perhaps. I can't now find a better example.

Student: Let me ask a very sort've (inaudible) question. Do unconscious things have sometimes the character of necessity with respect to (inaudible).

I mean we talk about the action of Bismarck toward the French revolution (inaudible . . .). It happened and in some way he was called upon to react to it, and that reaction might be the most important thing. (Inaudible . . .).

Strauss: So as I said, let us wait until we come to something (inaudible), and can therefore argue. And by the way I think we must also never forget that we are reading Beyond Good and Evil, and

the purpose of this second chapter is to make clear to us what is the philosopher of the future. And these questions which we cannot take up anyway, which is touched upon occasionally and is maybe the center of discussion.

So I suggest that we go on and read the next paragraph.

Reader: "Nobody will very readily regard a doctrine as true merely because it makes people happy or virtuous--excepting, perhaps, the amiable "Idealists," who are enthusiastic about the good, true, and beautiful, and let all kinds of motley, coarse, and good-natured desirabilities swim about promiscuously in their pond. Happiness and virtue are no arguments."

Strauss: This is directed against the idealists who are also responsible for the idealized interpretations of phenomena like the French Revolution. So happiness and virtue are no arguments.

Reader: "It is willingly forgotten, however, even on the part of thoughtful minds, that to make unhappy and to make bad are just as little counter-arguments. A thing could be true, although it were in the highest degree injurious and dangerous; indeed, the fundamental constitution of existence might be such that one succumbed by a full knowledge of it--so that the strength of a mind might be measured by the amount of "truth" it could endure--or to speak more plainly, by the extent to which it required truth attenuated, veiled, sweetened, damped, and falsified."

Strauss: This is something remarkable. Happiness and virtue are no arguments, and then Nietzsche doesn't discuss the other possibilities, more generally, that the attractive character of something is no argument that it is so. The other side is discussed not here by Nietzsche, namely that the terrible character of a doctrine is also no proof of its truth. That is I think characteristic that he does not think that.

Reader: "But there is no doubt that for the discovery of certain portions of truth the wicked and unfortunate are more favourably situated and have a greater likelihood of success; not to speak of the wicked who are happy--a species about whom moralists are silent. Perhaps severity and craft are more favourable conditions for the development of strong, independent spirits and philosophers than the gentle, refined, yielding good-nature, and habit of taking things easily, which are prized, and rightly prized in a learned man. Presupposing always, to begin with, that the term "philosopher" be not confined to the philosopher who writes books, or even introduces his philosophy into books."

Strauss: That is important, for Nietzsche of course, because it is Nietzsche who is the subject of the second chapter. Nietzsche is not a philosopher who writes books or brings his philosophy into books. So what he brings into books are perhaps pointed towards philosophy, not his philosophy. I think we have mentioned this before when he spoke of masks and things of this kind.

Reader: "--Stendhal furnishes a last feature of the portrait of the free-spirited philosopher, which for the sake of German taste I will not omit to underline--for it is opposed to German taste. "Pour être bon philosophe," says this last great psychologist, "il faut être sec, clair, sans illusion. Un banquier, qui a fait fortune, a une partie du caractère requis pour faire des découvertes en philosophie, c'est-à-dire pour voir clair dans ce qui est."

Strauss: So that surely illustrates what Nietzsche means by not idealising, because a banker who has (inaudible) is not usually an idealistic person. But you never can tell. He may talk that way.

And now he continues this thing about philosophers writing books in the next one.

Reader: "Everything that is profound loves the mask: the profoundest things have a hatred even of figure and likeness. Should not the contrary only be the right . . . "

Strauss: Image and likeness -- that is a deliberate allusion to the second commandment, and that is a point where Nietzsche happens to agree with the Bible.

Reader: ". . . disguise for the shame of a God to go about in? A question worth asking!--it would be strange if some mystic has not already ventured on the same kind of thing. There are proceedings of such a delicate nature that it is well to overwhelm them with coarseness and make them unrecognisable; there are actions of love and of an extravagant magnanimity after which nothing can be wiser than to take a stick and thrash the witness soundly: one thereby obscures his recollection. Many a one is able to obscure and abuse his own memory, in order at least to have vengeance on this sole party in the secret: shame is inventive. They are not the worst things of which one is most ashamed: there is not only deceit behind a mask--there is so much goodness in craft. I could imagine that a man with something costly and fragile to conceal, would roll through life clumsily and rotundly like an old, green, heavily-hooped wine-cask: the refinement of his shame requiring it to be so. A man who has depths in his shame meets his destiny and his delicate decisions upon paths which few ever reach, and with regard to the existence of which his nearest and most intimate friends may be ignorant; his mortal danger conceals itself from their eyes, and equally so his regained security."

"Such a hidden nature which instinctively employs speech for silence and concealment, and is inexhaustible in evasion of communication, desires and insists that a mask of himself shall occupy his place in the hearts and heads of his friends; and supposing he does not desire it, his eyes will some day be opened to the fact that there is nevertheless a mask of him there--and that it is well to be so."

"Every profound spirit needs a mask; nay, more, around every profound spirit there continually grows a mask, owing to the constantly false, that is to say, superficial interpretation of every word he utters, every step he takes, every sign of life he manifests."

Strauss: As we see that continues what he said before. About why the philosopher as he understands him does not bring the philosophy into books. But it would be interesting to compare that with the Platonic or Socratic statement on that subject. Surely shame would not occur in the Platonic one. Irony, as it was understood by Socrates or Plato, had nothing to do with a sense of shame, unless we give the Socratic language already a modernising or idealising.

For Nietzsche shame plays a very great role, and not in the sense in which it was used by the ancients, i.e., reverent. When he speaks of shame, he has in mind something different from reverence surely. I believe it is connected with his doctrine of the will to power.

I couldn't find at the moment another document except a passage from the Zarathustra -- in the Kaufman translation, page 124 in the first part of the Zarathustra, the third speech.

"All beings so far have created something beyond themselves, and do you want to be the ebb of this great flood and even go back to the beasts rather than overcome man? What is the ape to man? A laughing stock? Or a playful embarrassment? A man shall be just that for the oberman, a laughing stock or a playful embarrassment. You have made your way from worm to man and much in you is still worm. Once you were apes, but now too man is more ape than (inaudible)."

Now if this is so, then shame must be a most powerful not to say a preponderant feeling. Our awareness of our pasts, that is to say of ourselves. So that if the will to power is a fundamental phenomenon, serious overcoming makes any man what he is, and this overcoming implies that what is still overcoming is still in him. Shame. I can't do better than that.

Well, I thought we would finish the reading of the second chapter today but that won't be possible. Is there anything you would like to bring up?

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: I think these are two things -- there is a deliberate mask-making, for reasons of (inaudible), but then there is also the growing of masks which is not intended but is necessary and inevitable. And that is because a profound mind will necessarily be miserable and therefore there will be a mask, a mask which he has not promoted, which he has not produced, but which grows.

Well, then we meet next time.

Lecture VIII

Nietzsche: Beyond Good and Evil, December 8, 1971

Strauss: . . . the aphorisms of the second chapter, and in particular Number 36 which conveys the reasoning of the Doctrine of the Will to Power. It leads to the conclusion that the world in itself is will to power and nothing else. In Aphorism 34, which is the central aphorism of Chapter 2, Nietzsche has spoken of the world of concern to us which is fictitious. Question: Is the world as will to power identical with the world of concern? Or is this not the root of the many difficulties which we had last time and of many other difficulties that Nietzsche tries but does not succeed in abolishing the distinction between the true and the apparent or fictitious world. So in this decisive respect we are still in the dark.

Now be this as it may, Nietzsche regards the truth as edifying, but not edifying through being an idealising interpretation. The truth is terrible and hard to bear, accessible only to strong minds and to some extent even to evil minds. Strong minds are of course beyond good and evil. Hardness and cunning supply perhaps more favorable conditions for the emerging of this strong independent mind and philosophy than the opposite qualities.

The philosopher of the future is of course not evil, is cunning, has its root not in hardness, hardheartedness, but in shame, (inaudible). Up to this point we have read last time. We now turn to Number 41.

Reader: "One must subject oneself to one's own tests that one is destined for independence and command, and do so at the right time. One must not avoid one's tests, although they constitute perhaps the most dangerous game one can play, and are in the end tests made only before ourselves and before no other judge. Not to cleave to any person, be it even the dearest--every person is a prison and also a recess. Not to cleave to a fatherland, be it even the most suffering and necessitous--it is even less difficult to detach one's heart from a victorious fatherland. Not to cleave to a sympathy, be it even for higher men, into whose peculiar torture and helplessness chance has given us an insight. Not to cleave to a science, though it tempt one with the most valuable discoveries, apparently specially reserved for us. Not to cleave to one's own liberation, to the voluptuous distance and remoteness of the bird, which always flies further aloft in order always to see more under it--the danger of the flier. Not to cleave to our own virtues, nor become as a whole a victim to any of our specialities, to our "hospitality" for instance, which is the danger of dangers for highly developed and wealthy souls, who deal prodigally, almost indifferently with themselves, and push the virtue of liberality so far that it becomes a vice. One must know how to conserve oneself--the best test of independence."

Strauss: He begins here, that is still the free mind, (inaudible) commanding, not obeying. And the last sentence, one must know how to preserve oneself, how to guard oneself, not to lose oneself to something, for this would be lost freedom, of independence, of command. He mentions in particular the fatherland. It is fairly easy not to be stuck to a victorious fatherland, as Germany was in this time and as -- that is a kind of justification for the anti-German character of the very last part and a large part of the present world.

I think the context is still clear. The free mind and the free mind is at least an ingredient of the philosophy of the future, if it is not identical.

Now he takes up the subject of the philosophy of the future explicitly in the next aphorism. We will read that please.

Reader: A new order of philosophers is appearing; I shall venture to baptize them by a name not without danger. As far as I understand them, as far as they allow themselves to be understood--for it is their nature to wish to remain something of a puzzle--these philosophers of the future might rightly, perhaps also wrongly, claim to be designated as "tempters." This name itself is after all only an attempt or, if it be preferred, a temptation."

Strauss: In German the pun is much clearer of course. The tempter is the devil. Therefore this may be somewhat misleading. But surely they are men of the attempt, of the experiment, and even if one wishes, temptation. Nietzsche is beckoning to some, some people. He speaks now for the first time explicitly of the new species of the philosopher. The old species which was in Chapter 1 did not have this character. They believed to possess the truth. There was no longer any experiment according to Nietzsche's understanding. They possessed the truth and of course they would have been insulted by the suggestions that they were tempters. That is at least implied by Nietzsche.

Let us perhaps complete our reading of this chapter before we discuss it.

Reader: "Will they be new friends of "truth," these coming philosophers? Very probably, for all philosophers hitherto have loved their truths. But assuredly they will not be dogmatists."

Strauss: Their truths. For this reason he put "truth" in quotation marks because naturally the philosophers of the future will also love their truths.

Reader: "It must be contrary to their pride, and also contrary to their taste, that their truth should still be truth for every one--that which has hitherto been the secret wish and ultimate purpose of all dogmatic efforts. "My opinion is my opinion: another person has not easily a right to it"--such a philosopher of the future will say, perhaps. One must renounce the bad taste of

wishing to agree with many people. "Good" is no longer good when one's neighbour takes it into his mouth. And how could there be a "common good"! The expression contradicts itself; that which can be common is always of small value. In the end things must be as they are and have always been--the great things remain for the great, the abysses for the profound, the delicacies and thrills for the refined, and, to sum up shortly everything rare for the rare."

Strauss: There are many things of course which remind us of Plato, but there is a very obvious difference, and not meaning here what he says about the common good, but what can be common has always little value. Someone, an Englishman I think, suggests that this is a definition of snobbism, to despise the common merely because it is common. I think there is something to that. Think of examples of air and water, especially the air which is very common and is by no means despicable. And water said a Greek poet is (inaudible) and also very common. So there is a very fine line which Nietzsche may transgress here.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: But that is also in other languages. Common can also mean that.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: There is no important difference here between English and German here from his use of the word 'gemeingut', common good. That's the point where I mean where there is this possibility of snobbism, would enter.

Nietzsche somewhere says in the (inaudible), and we may read that later on in the section on scholars, where classical scholars are the most educated and the most arrogant. So that has perhaps something to do with that.

Now the next one.

Reader: "Need I say expressly after all this that they will be free, very free spirits. . . ."

Strauss: They too -- that is to say there are also other free minds. Who are not the philosophers of the future. They too will be free, very free minds.

Reader: ". . . these philosophers of the future--as certainly also they will not be merely free spirits, but something more, higher, greater, and fundamentally different, which does not wish to be misunderstood and mistaken? But while I say this, I feel under obli-

gation almost as much to them as to ourselves (we free spirits who are their heralds and forerunners), to sweep away from ourselves altogether a stupid old prejudice and misunderstanding, which, like a fog, has too long made the conception of "free spirit" obscure. In every country of Europe, and the same in America, there is at present something which makes an abuse of this name: a very narrow, prepossessed, enchained class of spirits, who desire almost the opposite of what our intentions and instincts prompt--not to mention that in respect to the new philosophers who are appearing, they must still more be closed windows and bolted doors."

"Briefly and regrettably, they belong to the levellers, these wrongly named "free spirits"--as glib-tongued and scribe-fingered slaves of the democratic taste and its "modern ideas": all of them men without solitude, without personal solitude, blunt honest fellows to whom neither courage nor honourable conduct ought to be denied; only, they are not free, and are ludicrously superficial, especially in their innate partiality for seeing the cause of almost all human misery and failure in the old forms in which society has hitherto existed--a notion which happily inverts the truth entirely! What they would fain attain with all their strength, is the universal green-meadow happiness of the herd, together with security, safety, comfort, and alleviation of life for every one; their two most frequently chanted songs and doctrines are called "Equality of Rights" and "Sympathy with all Sufferers"--and suffering itself is looked upon by them as something which must be done away with."

"We opposite ones, however, who have opened our eye and conscience to the question how and where the plant "man" has hitherto grown most vigorously, believe that this has always taken place under the opposite conditions, that for this end the dangerousness of his situation had to be increased enormously, his inventive faculty and dissembling power (his "spirit") had to develop into subtlety and daring under long oppression and compulsion, and his Will to Life had to be increased to the unconditioned Will to Power:--we believe that severity, violence, slavery, danger in the street and in the heart, secrecy, stoicism, tempter's art and devilry of every kind,--that everything wicked, terrible, tyrannical, predatory, and serpentine in man, serves as well for the elevation of the human species as its opposite:--we do not even say enough when we only say this much; and in any case we find ourselves here, both with our speech and our silence, at the other extreme of all modern ideology and gregarious desirability, as their antipodes perhaps?"

"What wonder that we "free spirits" are not exactly the most communicative spirits? That we do not wish to betray in every respect what a spirit can free itself from, and where perhaps it will then be driven? And as to the import of the dangerous formula, "Beyond Good and Evil," with which we at least avoid confusion, we are something else than "libres-penseurs," "liberipensatori," "free-thinkers," and whatever these honest advocates

of modern ideas like to call themselves. Having been at home, or at least guests, in many realms of the spirit, having escaped again and again from the gloomy, agreeable nooks in which preferences and prejudices, youth, origin, the accident of men and books, or even the weariness of travel seemed to confine us; full of malice against the seductions of dependency which lie concealed in honours, money, positions or exaltation of the senses; grateful even for distress and the vicissitudes of illness, because they always free us from some rule, and its "prejudice," grateful to the God, devil, sheep, and worm in us; inquisitive to a fault, investigators to the point of cruelty, with unhesitating fingers for the intangible, with teeth and stomachs for the most indigestible, ready for any business, that requires sagacity and acute sense, ready for every adventure, owing to an excess of "free will"; with anterior and posterior souls, into the ultimate intentions of which it is difficult to pry, with foregrounds and backgrounds to the end of which no foot may run; hidden ones under the mantles of light, appropriators, although we resemble heirs and spendthrifts, arrangers and collectors from morning till night, misers of our wealth and our full-crammed drawers, economical in learning and forgetting, inventive in scheming."

"Sometimes proud of tables of categories, sometimes pedants, sometimes night-owls of work even in full day; yea, if necessary, even scarecrows--and it is necessary nowadays, that is to say, inasmuch as we are the born, sworn, jealous friends of solitude, of our own profoundest midnight and mid-day solitude;--such kind of men are we, we free spirits! And perhaps ye are also something of the same kind, ye coming ones? ye new philosophers?"

Strauss: What is then Nietzsche's relation to the philosophers of the future? He seems to say that he is only a hero and a precursor of the philosopher of the future.

But the end of this aphorism seems to show that the free minds are perhaps different from the philosophers of the future, perhaps because the free minds are only heroes and precursors of the philosophers of the future, or simply stated, there is the free-minded Nietzsche, and Nietzsche is not the philosopher of the future. There is perhaps a distinction here as there was between Nietzsche and Zarathustra in Zarathustra.

In this descriptably eloquent paragraph, there is one thing -- I supposed you recognized the phenomenon against which Nietzsche polemicalizes without any comment. But there is one point which I would like to touch on. Not freedom as the ordinary free thinkers say, necessity, compulsion, or to use a famous phrase, not the realm of freedom, but the realm of necessity, is the indispensable condition of human greatness, and that means of course a complete break with the modern ideas as they were and are so commonly understood.

There is another point which is not clear I believe. That is about a page before the end -- no wonder that we free minds are not the most communicative minds, that we do not wish to betray in every respect from what a mind has to emancipate itself and where he is then driven perhaps. Question: Is this reason for silence the same as the shame spoken of in Number 40? It seems to be something different.

By the way, when he translates spirit, does he not say free spirit? One can do that, but then one must consider Nietzsche's interpretation of spirit which he gives here. The power of inventing and dissembling. So it has no spiritual connotation.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: How do you come to think that this particular (inaudible)?

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: But will not necessarily a truth become a prejudice?

Student: Well would it be possible for one man to seek the judgments of another?

Strauss: Well, of course if it is a matter of giving silver spoons and similar matters of course. But these are not the most important (inaudible).

Student: But even concerning the most important moral questions, what can you say when a wise man comes and demonstrates by his example that his understanding is great, and people come and seek his example and although as a costume or a prejudice or whatever you like (inaudible . . .).

Strauss: No, but will his judgment not be transformed through that process?

Student: Only if there are intellectuals around.

Strauss: Scholars and intellectuals are two very different kinds of people. No -- well-intentioned, solid citizens, will they necessarily transform the judgment of the wise man regarding the most profound questions?

Student: Not if he doesn't give them grounds for doing that. His judgment in the most simple possible form.

Strauss: But then it is most easily transformable.

Student: But stated simply, their only real option is to obey.

Strauss: But then they need reasons for obedience, and then an

argument begins.

Student: If they are really struck by his example, that is if their reasons are really *ex hominum*, then they don't need to make arguments -- they have reasons but it is not something which has to be argued.

Strauss: The question would be whether these are reasons. Would you like to bring up another point -- after all, there are many other things which we . . .

Another Student: I'm struck by the fact that what Nietzsche says about what could be called a moral would be what people are saying now or were saying in Nietzsche's time which would be called (inaudible), in the same way these other people want to be individuals when Nietzsche says free spirit. Is he perhaps thinking of the (inaudible) as an analogue to the kind of person he's describing.

Strauss: Well, there are artists of various kinds.

Student: Well now what is called the creative artists.

Strauss: But that is so to debase a word. Every six-year-old child in the first grade is supposed to do creative writing, painting and other work. That is the trouble.

Student: I don't like the word either. But I wonder whether it isn't an accident.

Strauss: But Nietzsche makes a fundamental distinction, a distinction among artists, the healthy ones and the morally decayed ones, and so one would have to consider that distinction.

Student: But their distinction is in part of being unlike anyone else. Or refusing to share opinions. Well, the different quality of unique things that creates a composer, for example, is supposed to have, and would seem to have a good deal in common with the person described here.

Strauss: I believe it would even be true of statesmen. Don't you think so? What they call in political science 'style.' The style say of President Nixon is different from that of President Truman.

But perhaps it is so difficult because Nietzsche seems to preach 'be concerned with your individuality.' That he does not mean. What he says is be yourself.

Student: By insisting.

Strauss: Not quite, otherwise it would not be necessary to say so. Be yourself, and be not a slave of other men's opinions. Nietzsche

is confronted with the so-called modern ideas and Nietzsche was compelled perhaps to overstate; that is possible. So in other words, the true individuality will come out precisely if it is not willed. If someone wishes to have an original style, the best way I believe is never to get one.

Student: But on the other hand, if there is a kind of 19th century artist, it seems at least in one cliqued view of man always to be asserted, and it seems to me that that distinction is one ingredient.

Strauss: I do not know what you mean.

Student: I mean just the notion of the willful creative artist asserting his personality.

Strauss: That is not entirely wrong, because I believe no one did so much to make the word 'creative' so popular as Nietzsche has. But you see what happens. And this is partly an answer to what you said. Nietzsche meant something when he spoke of creativity. But then it became expected somehow to impress people. It became accepted and it came even into departments of education and then into the practice of grade schools.

You can draw up a very long list of words which originally had a very high meaning and which have become completely debased within a very short time by virtue of this inclination against which Nietzsche speaks. Personality is another. It meant formerly a man or woman of fashion, and now it means absolutely nothing. Everyone has a personality. Is this not a common term in scientific psychology?

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: That is a link with the older view.

Another Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: Sure, that's so.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: The question is what does life immortal mean?

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: There is no doubt about that. I made this quite clear at the beginning of the course when I said that there is some connection, tenuous but not negligent, between Nietzsche and the violent, passionate, anti-democratic movement. There is no doubt about that. Nietzsche did not mean it in the way people like Hitler and Mussolini meant it, but through his negations he presents it. No doubt about that.

Student: I just don't see how sympathy through suffering is contradictory to life emotions.

Strauss: You referred here to compassion for everything suffering. What was the formula coined by Albert Schweitzer -- respect for life. Reverence for life, thank you. Now try to act on it. First you must become a vegetarian, and even that will not do, because aren't plants living things? So this doesn't quite work. The world is tougher -- too tough for that. So this must be specified very much to make sense.

We come later on to Nietzsche's explicit criticism of the morality of compassion.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: By accident I found a passage in Plato's Laws in which he said that as regards the honouring of the body, most people think that this consists in getting strong and handsome and especially a healthy body. I mean this is obviously what we all seem to desire. Then he says neither these qualities nor their opposites are to be desired, but something inbetween, because if someone is very healthy or very strong or something, that leads to arrogance and this kind of thing. The other, the defects, lead to what we call humility. The true thing would be in the middle, between not only strength and weakness, but even between health and sickness. In this respect there seems to be agreement between Nietzsche and Plato. There will be an aphorism later on in which he takes issue with all the anarchist tendencies in modern times, and where he develops this theme more fully.

And one can really say Nietzsche is the opponent of Marx and the people who prepared Marx. There is no possibility or desirability (inaudible) freedom. Division of labor, which is the ground of all evil, but what does division of labor mean? Compulsion, coercion -- there are certain things which you cannot do and are not permitted to do. And not only like murder and so on, but limitations. It is essential for excellence, and not as Marx in a famous formula of the man who milked the cows in the evening and fishes in the morning . . .

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: Maybe I did wrong in imputing the notion that before the invention of electric light, they would milk the cows in the night.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: The mask conceals yourself.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: . . . other people that people are ashamed to be thankful and benefit others.

Student: Nietzsche says wait, you have to unmask Nietzsche.

Strauss: If you can.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: Man might be ashamed of his excellences or of his virtuous actions. And he would be embarrassed by praise, by gratitude.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: But look at it in practical terms. You have helped someone else, and that someone else overpowers you with gratitude. Would this not be unbearable? Would it not be better to conceal one's good deed? There is no doubt that the mask as Nietzsche says will be there and will conceal the man himself and he spoke even of ordinary human beings, but much more so in the case of ordinary human beings.

Another Student: If you do something to someone else, you in a way put them under your power, but then you realize this that you are under someone else's power and you have a will to power and can thwart it. Wouldn't you rather not want them to know that you are under their power instead of thwarting it? You wouldn't want gratitude, first because it might be overbearing, and second, because it wouldn't be good for the person (inaudible).

Strauss: And the second would be an additional reason for taking a cane and beating up that fellow, so that he doesn't become aware of the fact that he has done a good turn.

Another Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: Very frequently he calls them the beasts. That is his common usage, man is a beast. For example, the beast with red cheeks, meaning the beast who has a sense of shame. But here he wishes to avoid the word 'beast' perhaps because he speaks here of the qualities which would be regarded by kind people. That's at least my explanation.

Another Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: As far as I know, the term gross with all these implications was first used by John Dewey, that is to say after Nietzsche, if I am not mistaken. I don't believe that John Stuart Mill speaks of this in this way. It didn't strike me, but in Dewey it is a key word.

The main point which you make, that Nietzsche has something important in common with his enemies, is clear and will become clearer while we go on. That is surely true.

Now when we turn to Chapter 3, we have already spoken about the title regarding *wesen* in German and not *das wesen der religion*, the reason being that if you speak of the essence of religion, you assume that the most important thing in religion is, in a variety of religions, something common, the essence. But for Nietzsche the difference between the various religions are much more important.

This chapter has a very clear plan, and I wonder in retrospect, whether the preceding chapters also do not have such a clear plan, only I was unable to find it. Or it may be that this is a particular peculiarity of this chapter.

In the first two chapters it seems that the connection between preceding and following aphorisms was much more associative than based on a plan. The plan, to mention this first, is very simple. First, in Number 45, the introduction. Numbers 46 to 52 follow, religion hitherto, which is subdivided as follows. Numbers 46 to 48, Christianity; number 49, Greek religion; numbers 50 to 51, Christianity, and number 52, the Old Testament. And then a new section begins in 53 to 57, the religions of the future. 58 to 60, the nobility of religion; 61, 62, religion as viewed by the philosopher or religion in relation to philosophy.

Now let us first read the introductory.

Reader: "The human soul and its limits, the range of man's inner experiences hitherto attained, the heights, depths and distances of these experiences, the entire history of the soul up to the present time, and its still unexhausted possibilities: this is the preordained hunting-domain for a born psychologist and lover of a "big hunt." But how often must he say despairingly to himself: "A single individual! Alas, only a single individual! and this great forest, this virgin forest!" So he would like to have some hundreds of hunting assistants, and fine trained hounds, that he could send into the history of the human soul, to drive his game together. In vain: again and again he experiences, profoundly and bitterly, how difficult it is to find assistants and dogs for all the things that directly excite his curiosity. The evil of sending scholars into new and dangerous hunting-domains, where courage, sagacity, and subtlety in every sense are required, is that they are no longer serviceable just when the "big hunt," and also the great danger commences,--it is precisely then that they lose their keen eye and nose. In order, for instance, to divine and determine what sort of history the problem of knowledge and conscience has hitherto had in the souls of homines religiosi, a person would perhaps himself have to possess as profound, as bruised, as immense an experience as the intellectual conscience of Pascal; and then he would still require that wide-spread heaven of clear, wicked spirituality, which, from above, would be able to oversee, arrange, and effectively formulise this mass of dangerous and painful experiences."

"--But who could do me this service! And who would have time to wait for such servants!--they evidently appear too rarely, they are so improbable at all times! Eventually one must do everything oneself in order to know something; which means that one has much to do!--But a curiosity like mine is once for all the most agreeable of vices--pardon me! I mean to say that the love of truth has its reward in heaven, and already upon earth."

Strauss: Now this I believe is a perfectly reasonable and perfectly well argued condemnation of all history of religion. Intellectual history or (inaudible). How can this condition be fulfilled? To be a Pascal and to be beyond Pascal. And this would apply to other great men in whatever field.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: Because otherwise you are a religious human being. Not a student of religion.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: That is at least what Nietzsche says. Beyond good and Now you see he begins here and uses the expression 'hitherto' or however he translates it, and the history of the human soul. That is in a way the introduction to the consideration of the history of religion.

The first sentence, when he speaks of the human soul and its limits reminds of a famous saying of Heraclitus, of the limits of souls which you could not find out because it has such profound logos. Nietzsche surely thought that, but Nietzsche's thought is modified, by his notion of history. The profundity of the soul is historically variable. Yet despite all change, its potentialities seem to be stable. The history of the soul hitherto and the not yet exhausted possibility of the soul. These possibilities somehow seem to be there.

We have heard before that psychology must be recognized again as the mistress of the sciences, but only now does a chapter begin with a remark on the soul. Religion has more obviously to do with the soul than philosophy.

Why does he speak of the need and impossibility of scholarship? In the case of religion and not in the case of philosophy. Is philosophy more simple, more (inaudible), than religion, in which the variety is more obvious. He entitled the first chapter "Of the prejudices of the philosophers." The variety of religions comes from a title of a well-known work of William James. Is it impossible to farm out, of delegating tasks, in the interest of science, and this shows the necessary inferiority of scholarship. Nietzsche will devote a whole chapter later on to this question of scholarship entitled "We Scholars."

Now I must make a remark for the understanding of what follows. And in a way for the understanding of the whole work. Beyond Good

and Evil is primarily addressed to Germans; Nietzsche was not simply a German patriot as we have seen, not to remain stuck to a fatherland, not even if he suffers most and needs help most. It is less difficult to sever one's heart from a victorious fatherland, as we have seen. But Nietzsche was of course a German.

Hegel had said the philosopher is the son of his times. Nietzsche modified that by speaking of the philosopher as the stepson of his times. That is to say he is out of step with his time but belongs in this way to his time. Something similar applies also to the country. Nietzsche is a stepson of his fatherland.

Now the Germany in which lived Nietzsche most of his time, the Germany after 1866, was predominantly forest, and the view which was very common in Christianity in the Luther interpretation was the absolute religion. It prepared for the conciliation between Christianity and the world, abolition of celibacy, abolition of independent ecclesiastical power, the prince being the summus episcopus. This is in contradistinction to Catholicism which still had uncontested celibacy at that time and naturally independent ecclesiastical power.

An argument which was popularized especially by Carlyle that this difference between Catholicism and Protestantism explains the French Revolution. The Protestant countries solved people's problems by their reformation and therefore they were never in need of a revolution. But the Catholic countries did not solve it and therefore there happens this terrible outburst. But of course in the meantime we have seen several things happening in Germany in spite of the Protestant character of the country, although one could perhaps say that the chief man, Hitler, was not a Protestant and did not come from Protestant Germany. At any rate, the entire Protestant character of what follows must be understood in the light of the fact that Germany, Nietzsche's Germany, was a predominantly Protestant country.

Now will you read the next number.

Reader: "Faith, such as early Christianity desired, and not infrequently achieved in the midst of a sceptical and southernly free-spirited world, which had centuries of struggle between philosophical schools behind it and in it, counting besides the education in tolerance which the imperium Romanum gave--this faith is not that sincere, austere slave-faith by which perhaps a Luther or a Cromwell, or some other northern barbarian of the spirit remained attached to his God and Christianity; it is much rather the faith of Pascal, which resembles in a terrible manner a continuous suicide of reason--a tough, long-lived, wormlike reason, which is not to be slain at once and with a single blow. The Christian faith from the beginning is sacrifice: the sacrifice of all freedom, all pride, all self-confidence of spirit; it is at the same time subjection, self-derision, and self-mutilation."

"There is cruelty and religious Phoenicianism in this faith, which is adapted to a tender, many-sided, and very fastidious conscience; it takes for granted that the subjection of the spirit is indescribably painful, that all the past and all the habits of such a spirit resist the absurdissimum, in the form of which "faith" comes to it. Modern men, with their obtuseness as regards all Christian nomenclature, have no longer the sense for the terribly superlative conception which was implied to an antique taste by the paradox of the formula, "God on the Cross."

"Hitherto there had never and nowhere been such boldness in inversion, nor anything at once so dreadful, questioning, and questionable as this formula: it promised a transvaluation of all ancient values.--It was the Orient, the profound Orient, it was the Oriental slave who thus took revenge on Rome and its noble, light-minded toleration, on the Roman "Catholicism" of non-faith; and it was always, not the faith, but the freedom from the faith, the half-stoical and smiling indifference to the seriousness of the faith, which made the slaves indignant at their masters and revolt against them."

"'Enlightenment' causes revolt: for the slave desires the unconditioned, he understands nothing but the tyrannous, even in morals; he loves as he hates, without nuance, to the very depths, to the point of pain, to the point of sickness--his many hidden sufferings make him revolt against the noble taste which seems to deny suffering. The scepticism with regard to suffering, fundamentally only an attitude of aristocratic morality, was not the least of the causes, also, of the last great slave-insurrection which began with the French Revolution."

Strauss: The original Christian faith is not Protestant, but he avoids in this paragraph to speak of birth in the Catholicism, although this is of course present. It is rather like the fate of Pascal, sacrifice of the intellect, an ingredient of cruelty, the will to power, turning against itself. Original christianity is the transvaluation of all values of antiquity. Christianity is therefore the negative model for Nietzsche.

In one of his other writings he alludes to this thought here that the only respectable word in the New Testament's is Pilot's. What is truth.

Nietzsche feels that the will to power is opposed to faith or belief. In faith or belief you expect that the good or the desirable come about by God, and for Nietzsche that is impossible.

Let's turn to the next aphorism.

Reader: "Wherever the religious neurosis has appeared on the earth so far, we find it connected with three dangerous prescriptions as to regimen: solitude, fasting, and sexual abstinence --but without its being possible to determine with certainty which

is cause and which is effect, or if any relation at all of cause and effect exists there. This latter doubt is justified by the fact that one of the most regular symptoms among savage as well as among civilised peoples is the most sudden and excessive sensuality; which then with equal suddenness transforms into penitential paroxysms, world-renunciation, and will-renunciation: both symptoms, perhaps explainable as disguised epilepsy? But nowhere is it more obligatory to put aside explanations: around no other type has there grown such a mass of absurdity and superstition, no other type seems to have been more interesting to men and even to philosophers--perhaps it is time to become just a little indifferent here, to learn caution, or, better still, to look away, to go away.--"

"Yet in the background of the most recent philosophy, that of Schopenhauer, we find almost as the problem in itself, this terrible note of interrogation of the religious crisis and awakening. How is the negation of will possible? how is the saint possible?--that seems to have been the very question with which Schopenhauer made a start and became a philosopher. And thus it was a genuine Schopenhauerian consequence, that his most convinced adherent (perhaps also his last, as far as Germany is concerned), namely, Richard Wagner, should bring his own life-work to an end just here, and should finally put that terrible and eternal type upon the stage as Kundry, type vécu, and as it loved and lived, at the very time that the mad-doctors in almost all European countries had an opportunity to study the type close at hand, wherever the religious neurosis--or as I call it, "the religious mood"--made its latest epidemical outbreak and display as the "Salvation Army."

"--If it be a question, however, as to what has been so extremely interesting to men of all sorts in all ages, and even to philosophers, in the whole phenomenon of the saint, it is undoubtedly the appearance of the miraculous therein--namely, the immediate succession of opposites, of states of the soul regarded as morally antithetical: it was believed here to be self-evident that a "bad man" was all at once turned into a "saint," a good man."

"The hitherto existing psychology was wrecked at this point; it is not possible it may have happened principally because psychology had placed itself under the dominion of morals, because it believed in oppositions of moral values, and saw, read, and interpreted these oppositions into the text and facts of the case? What? "Miracle" only an error of interpretation? A lack of philology?"

Strauss: Nietzsche says elsewhere that there were two human pursuits where there were torchbearers of the free mind throughout the century and these were medicine and philology. And he refers obviously to certain parts of medicine and also of course to philology here.

Now the transition of course is clear. He spoke of original Christianity as distinguished from (inaudible), and therefore the

worship of saints, the fascination exercised by these saints, by the miracle of repentance, but this miracle is based on the question of an assumption, of opposition of moral values, good and evil, and Nietzsche had spoken near the beginning of the whole work of the question of the character of that assumption. That there is such an opposition. They belong together. They are inseparable.

He continues his critique of Catholicism in the next aphorism.

Reader: "It seems that the Latin races are far more deeply attached to their Catholicism than we Northerners are to Christianity generally, and that consequently unbelief in Catholic countries means something quite different from what it does among Protestants--namely, a sort of revolt against the spirit of the race, while with us it is rather a return to the spirit (or non-spirit) of the race. We Northerners undoubtedly derive our origin from barbarous races, even as regards our talents for religion--we have poor talents for it. One may make an exception in the case of the Celts, who have theretofore furnished also the best soil for Christian infection in the north: the Christian ideal blossomed forth in France as much as ever the pale sun of the north would allow it. How strangely pious for our taste are still these later French sceptics, whenever there is any Celtic blood in their origin! How Catholic, how un-German does Auguste Comte's Sociology seem to us, with the Roman logic of its instincts!"

"How Jesuitical, that amiable and shrewd cicerone of Port-Royal, Sainte-Beuve, in spite of all his hostility to Jesuits! And even Ernest Renan: how inaccessible to us Northerners does the language of such a Renan appear, in whom every instant the merest touch of religious thrill throws his refined voluptuous and comfortably couching soul off its balance! Let us repeat after him in these fine sentences--and what wickedness and haughtiness is immediately aroused by way of answer in our probably less beautiful but harder souls, that is to say, in our more German souls!--"

"Disons donc hardiment que la religion est un produit de l'homme normal, que l'homme est le plus dans le vrai quand il est le plus religieux et le plus assuré d'une destinée infinie....C'est quand il est bon qu'il veut que la vertu corresponde à un ordre éternel, c'est quand il contemple les choses d'une manière désintéressée qu'il trouve la mort révoltante et absurde. Comment ne pas supposer que c'est dans ces moments-là, que l'homme voit le mieux?"

Strauss: Did you understand it? But I suppose the translator gives the translation of (inaudible) . . .

Reader: "These sentences are so extremely antipodal to my ears and habits of thought, that in my first impulse of rage on finding them, I wrote on the margin, "la niaiserie religieuse par excellence!"--until in my later rage I even took a fancy to them,

these sentences with their truth absolutely inverted! It is so nice and such a distinction to have one's own antipodes!"

Strauss: In the preceding aphorism he had spoken before of the saint, of a phenomenon belonging to Catholicism, and now he makes this point that Catholicism belongs to the Latins as Protestantism to the Northerners. That is to say that the difference between Catholicism and Protestantism is sufficiently understood in terms of dogma:

One has also to consider what Nietzsche calls race. There was a difference between the Germans and the French. The famous oldest document, what Caesar said in the (inaudible) about the religion of the Celts and that of the Germans. It is like a premonition about the difference between Catholicism and Protestantism. There is something to that but it is clear that Nietzsche's antagonism to Catholicism is as deep as the antagonism to Protestantism. It depends on the context which of the two he criticizes most sharply.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: Oh yes, he refers to it in this form. And I think in this very chapter later on that through Christianity modern man has a link to antiquity, to paganism, and what will happen if Christianity has lost its power, so the crucial link will no longer exist. He knew that. (inaudible . . .). So I think that all these statements are consciously one-sided.

I believe we should read the next one because that throws light retroactively on what we have said.

Reader: "That which is so astonishing in the religious life of the ancient Greeks is the irrestrainable stream of gratitude which it pours forth--it is a very superior kind of man who takes such an attitude towards nature and life.--Later on, when the populace got the upper hand in Greece, fear became rampant also in religion; and Christianity was preparing itself."

Strauss: The greek gratitude, not fear, not wish. That belongs to them. The serenity of worship, and this is used here in a sense as a standard for judging Christianity. Just as a little bit later the Old Testament is used for the same function. And how the praise of the ancient Greeks and the praise of the ancient Jews can possibly be reconciled, that he doesn't say here. He has written something on this somewhere else.

By the way in Number 50 he speaks of the aristocratic qualities of Catholicism.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: When one reads Number 50 one cannot help thinking of Thomas Aquinas among other people. But when Nietzsche quotes him as he does somewhere in the Genealogy of Morals, then he

uses a passage from that part of the Summa which is not by Kant. Namely something about how the saints enjoy the pains of the damned in hell. And that is of course for Nietzsche further proof of the cruelty in the guise of law, but this passage is (inaudible). How much he knew of these matters is hard to say but he had a friend, a very close friend who was a great student of religion, Franz Overbeck, from whom he got some guidance.

I do not know what we shall do when we are through with Chapter III because Chapter IV consists of very short (inaudible), and it is much more difficult to interpret them especially (inaudible) than in the case of aphorisms. I must see how we can overcome this.

Lecture IX

Nietzsche: Beyond Good and Evil, April 19, 1972

Strauss: . . . in the final aphorism of Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche speaks of the profound difference between what he calls the written and painted stones, and so the original ones. Only the latter are genuine. That may remind us of what Plato says on the weakness of speech of lovers, on the unsayable and unwritable character of the truth as distinguished from everything said or written. The purity of mind of which Plato spoke does not necessarily establish the strength of the lovers. I mean even of the genuine lovers. So the radical opposition of Nietzsche to Plato is not (inaudible).

Now let us turn for a moment to the subtitle of Beyond Good and Evil. This is as you may remember "Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future." Beyond Good and Evil is meant to prepare the philosophy of the future, rather than a philosophy of the future. It is not meant to prepare the true philosophy, but a new kind of philosophy, of philosophizing, and is meant to do that by liberating man from the prejudices of the philosophers, meaning the philosophers of the past and of the present. But Nietzsche is not particularly interested in the latter.

By this very fact, Beyond Good and Evil is meant to be a specimen of the philosophy of the future. Chapter I is entitled "Of the Prejudices of the Philosophers." Chapter II is entitled "The Free Mind." The free mind is free from the prejudices of the philosophers, of the past. But are the free minds the same as the philosophers of the future? That's a hard question. Nietzsche says they are the precursors of the philosophy. Aphorism 44: Do the free minds belong to the epoch between the philosophy of the past and the philosophy of the future? Do they possess a freedom, an openness, not possible under the philosophy of the past? Nor under the philosophy of the future? I believe that suggestion goes to the root of what Nietzsche thinks. But we cannot answer this.

Be this as it may, philosophy is the obvious scheme of the first two chapters. Now if we turn to the whole book we see it consists of nine chapters, the third chapter being devoted to religion. The heading of Chapter IV, "Sayings and Interludes", does not indicate any subject matter, as all other chapters do. It is distinguished from all other chapters by the fact that it consists exclusively of short aphorisms of three, four, five lines at the most. Chapters V through IX can be said to be devoted to morals and politics.

So the whole book seems then to consist of two main parts which are separated by the 120 aphorisms of Chapter IV. The first of the two main parts is devoted to philosophy and religion; the second to morals and politics. (Inaudible . . .).

(A great deal of this tape is inaudible at this point.)

Strauss: . . . and the second part, Chapters V to IX, to something else.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: These people say, after Nietzsche has said in the preceding aphorism, the world is the will to power and then there are some people who hear that for the first time but does this not mean if you express it popularly, that God has (inaudible), but not the devil. If the will to power is the ultimate reality -- but Nietzsche says on the contrary, and apart from that, who (inaudible) you to speak popularly . . .

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: What would be the English equivalent to that? The devil. Kaufman is I suppose quite good if he has to give dates of birth of individuals, like Nietzsche. And the translation by the way of the Zarathustra, which is the only thing which I know, is not bad.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: That is a good point which you make. In other words, these people who didn't fully grasp Nietzsche's thoughts brought in the devil and then Nietzsche replies to them by throwing the devil out.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: But as you know, Nietzsche was not squeamish and he said all kinds of terrible things.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: (Inaudible . . .). But there is no such opposition, no such antagonism. You remember that is the way in which he began the whole book, the belief in the antagonism of values.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: Good and evil. Good and bad is another thought. Good and evil are inseparable from one another. (Inaudible . . .). He develops that most clearly in the Genealogy of Morals. Good and bad has a distinction which for Nietzsche is absolutely indispensable, but good and evil is a special interpretation.

Cesar Borgia -- you know who that was. According to Machiavelli he had virtue, which is the Italian word for virtue. (Inaudible . . .).

I mean here good and evil are inseparable. But if you speak of

good and evil, then you say of course quite rightly that Cesare Borgia was an evil man. There is no doubt about that. And Nietzsche occasionally says the same -- inhuman.

At any rate let us postpone the discussion of these two pairs, good-evil, good-bad, (inaudible . . .), and Nietzsche is thinking of the defects of the soul in the way in which we ordinarily think of defects of the body, bad, but not evil. Not that he didn't know what was meant by evil nor that he didn't loathe it. He had a special way of loathing it and we might try to discover it.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: [A great deal of this tape is inaudible here.]

One point which Nietzsche has in mind is this. Evil and sin calling for (inaudible) punishment, and Nietzsche loathed punitiveness and thought it distorts our whole moral perspective. If we are tainted by this way of looking at things. My feeling is different. I like punishment. I mean not that I'm punished but that others are punished. But I have not this feeling . . . but still that is very important for Nietzsche. And not only for him, but it plays a great role in the history of the West.

But we must continue because we should really try to make some headway.

Now we have read the first two chapters, and which make clear that the whole book is a vindication of God. (Inaudible . . .). Chapter III is explicitly devoted to religion. (Inaudible . . .). Because the essence of religion would mean what is common to all religions and this is not or should not be of any concern to us. (Inaudible . . .).

(A great deal is inaudible here.)

Strauss: There are no saints, no holy men, in the Old Testament. That is not quite literally true, but fundamentally true. What this means is made clear in an aphorism (inaudible), Number 68. I'm sorry I do not have it here. In the English translation. (Inaudible . . .).

Now what Nietzsche says in 62 is this. (inaudible . . .). And Nietzsche begins the next aphorism with a question.

Reader: "Why Atheism nowadays? "The father" in God is thoroughly refuted; equally so "the judge," "the rewarder." Also his "free will": he does not hear--and even if he did he would not know how to help. The worst is that he seems incapable of communicating himself clearly; is he uncertain?-- This is what I have made out (by questioning and listening at a variety of conversations) to be the cause of the decline of European

theism; it appears to me that though the religious instinct is in vigorous growth,--it rejects the theistic satisfaction with profound distrust."

Strauss: So if Nietzsche vindicates God, this vindication will be atheistic. What can this mean? This is not insanity. What does it mean? Now why is it (inaudible)? There mean there was a time (inaudible . . .). But in the meantime "God died." This does not merely mean that man has ceased to believe in God.

(A great deal here is inaudible.)

Yet, despite the defects of European theism, there is a powerful growth of the religious instinct of what he can call "religiosity." In contradistinction to religion. So if there is such a thing as a religious instinct, is then atheism pure and simple, atheism (inaudible) all religiosity. Does atheism belong to the free mind, and a certain kind of non-atheism belongs to the philosopher of the future? The question to that is inevitable but it is not answered. Now Nietzsche will make this clearer in the sequel.

In the next aphorism, Number 54, Nietzsche illustrates in a provisional manner of what he means by a non-atheistic religiosity. The specimen is the Hindu philosophy which every one of you knows much more than I do but it is obviously not theistic and it is I believe from what I read in the Washington Post and other places about things going on in the younger generation, (inaudible . . .).

But this illustration is entirely provisional, because Nietzsche does not want, anticipate, or wish a (inaudible) of Vedantic philosophy as a philosophy of the future. He wants something else.

And now, Number 55.

Reader: "There is a great ladder of religious cruelty, with many rounds; but three of these are the most important. Once on a time men sacrificed human beings to their God, and perhaps just those they loved the best--to this category belong the firstling sacrifices of all primitive religions, and also the sacrifice of the Emperor Tiberius in the Mithra-Grotto on the Island of Capri, that most terrible of all Roman anachronisms."

Strauss: I have read somewhere that this is probably not true.

Reader: "Then, during the moral epoch of mankind, they sacrificed to their God the strongest instincts they possessed, their "nature;"

Strauss: Nature in quotation marks.

Reader: "This festal joy shines in the cruel glances of ascetics and "anti-natural" fanatics. Finally, what still remained to be sacrificed? Was it not necessary in the end for men to sacrifice everything comforting, holy, healing, all hope, all faith in hidden harmonies, in future blessedness and justice? Was it not necessary to sacrifice God himself, and out of cruelty to themselves to worship stone, stupidity, gravity, fate, nothingness? To sacrifice God for nothingness--this paradoxical mystery of the ultimate cruelty has been reserved for the rising generation; we all know something thereof already."

Strauss: (Inaudible . . .). So what Nietzsche says here is this; the better of the contemporary atheists with whom Nietzsche is to some extent in agreement, will come to know what they are doing. They do not know it now. Now they are perfectly self-satisfied. They will come to realize that there is something infinitely more terrible, depressing and degrading than religion or theism. (Inaudible . . .). The utter senselessness, irrelevance of man (inaudible . . .).

I read to you a passage from an unpublished Bible of the very young Nietzsche. It is very strange, Nietzsche died in a young age, 44, and so many things which he might have elaborated he did not and there is one which he wrote in 1873 on "Truth and Lies in an extra-moral Sense." (Inaudible . . .), and I believe you will recognize contemporary (inaudible) in this statement. "In some remote corner of the earth (inaudible . . .) solar systems, there once was a star on which clever beasts invented knowledge. (Inaudible . . .). "

That is what an atheist is if we consider he is to be a respectable human being. The new breed of atheists, the men of the religion of the future, cannot be crossed off anymore. By the prospect of a most glorious future, the realm of freedom, (inaudible . . .), annihilation of all meaning, but which will last for a very long time, for a millennium or so. For fortunately, and this is what Engels says, we find ourselves still on the ascending branch.

The well-known freedom, destined to perish, necessarily contains within itself the seeds of its annihilation. And will therefore, even while its glory lasts, abound in so-called contradictions. I think that is one of his strongest points in his writings. We have to think about the future.'

If you don't mind we will read one more aphorism, 56. Because that is the end of a section.

Reader: "Whoever, like myself, prompted by some enigmatical desire, has long endeavoured to go to the bottom of the question of pessimism and free it from the half-Christian, half-German narrowness and stupidity in which it has finally presented itself

to this century, namely, in the form of Schopenhauer's philosophy; whoever, with an Asiatic and super-Asiatic eye, has actually looked inside, and into the most world-renouncing of all possible modes of thought--beyond good and evil, and no longer like Buddha and Schopenhauer, under the dominion and delusion of morality,--whoever has done this. has perhaps just thereby without really desiring it, opened his eyes to behold the opposite ideal: the ideal of the most world-approving, exuberant and vivacious man, who has not only learnt to compromise and arrange with that which was and is, but wishes to have it again as it was and is, for all eternity, insatiably calling out de capo, not only to himself, but to the whole piece and play; and not only the play, but actually to him who requires the play--and makes it necessary; because he always requires himself anew--and makes himself necessary.---What? And this would not be--circulus vitiosus deus?"

Strauss: Nietzsche alludes here to his doctrine, which he does not develop further, of eternal return, everything comes back. And then he says, as kind of objection to himself, that it this not a vicious circle, vicious in the sense that it is an attempt to restore God. But you see that is one of the references to Nietzsche's strange religiosity.

Nietzsche does not mean of course to sacrifice God for the sake of the (inaudible), for he aims at transforming the deadly truth of God's (inaudible . . .).

But Nietzsche says we try to think that through and liberate it from its narrowness and the narrowness is being fundamentally moralistic, meaning So beyond good and evil.

(Inaudible . . .) not of world-denying, but of saying no to the world but yes to the world. And this is the doctrine of eternal return.

Why Nietzsche does this and why does he turn to eternal return is a question which we take up next time.

Lecture X

Nietzsche: Beyond Good and Evil, April 24, 1972

Strauss: It appears that religion is in a way the most important subject. This does not mean that Nietzsche is a religious man. As for this chapter itself, it consists of three parts as we have seen. First he discusses religion hitherto, then the religion of the future, and finally he gives his appraisal of religion. We have discussed what he has to say about religion hitherto. He measures Christianity, the reigning religion, by the standards of Greek on the one hand and the Old Testament on the other. He pays the highest homage to the Old Testament, to the Jewish Old Testament as he says. This does not mean of course that he believes in the Old Testament or in divine origin, but he regards it as a document of what man once was, and according to what he says here, surpasses anything we find in Hindu and Greek religion.

And then he turns to the religion of the future. That begins in Aphorism 53. First the question why atheism today, and this is a key note. Atheism is an indispensable condition for the religion of the future. The reasons seem to verge on the frivolous but we have learned by now that beneath Nietzsche's frivolity, there are seriousnesses.

And then he elaborates this more fully in the sequel -- but one point I must not forget. In paragraph 53, theism is out, but the religious instinct is mightily growing. So atheism, but religious atheism. What that means we must see.

Some light is thrown a bit in Aphorism 55 when he speaks of the great event which is imminent of which some contemporaries are aware, the high point of religious cruelty, the sacrificing not of men to God or of man's nature to God, but the sacrificing of God to the stones. Stupidity. This is the development in Aphorism 55. Now of course Nietzsche does not mean to sacrifice God for the sake of nothing, for he aims at transforming the deadly truth of God's death into a life-inspiring one. Or rather to discover in the death of the deadly truth its opposite. As he says in the sequel, at the beginning of 56, he refers to some enigmatic desire which prompted him for a long time to think the most world-denying view possible. Thus his eyes were open for the opposite ideal, for the ideal belonging to the religion of the future to the most unbounded we have.

The eternal (inaudible) to everything that was and is -- that is . . . at the extreme diametrically opposite to the world denial, to the world-affirming, and not only to affirming part of what was, but to everything that was and is. Now by saying yes to everything that was and is, Nietzsche may seem to reveal himself as radically anti-revolutionary or conservative beyond the wise dream, of any other conservatives who all negate some of the things that were or are, as you can see from the daily papers.

Nietzsche occasionally criticizes ideal and idealists as such. This may remind us of a saying of Goethe to Ackerman, according to

Student: Man develops again and then (inaudible). But the continuity is broken you know after millions of years so it is hardly possible to say that in some way man participates in being because of this recurrence. He is part of the fabric of the cosmos. But it is difficult to understand the continuity, that which would be life-giving is in conflict with continuity, and once that is broken, (inaudible . . .).

(The tape is inaudible at this point.)

Strauss: Nietzsche doesn't wish to warm the hearts in the way in which (inaudible) warms the hearts. But man ceases to be an accident. That is the key point. (Inaudible . . .) and this situation would never rise again. Necessarily in every world there will be man. If only for a part of the life of that world. But that part of the life of this world, for the sake of which this world has any claim to being a world.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: The sub-human to the human is equal to the human to the few highest (inaudible).

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: That could be, but on the other hand, it could be true.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: This in itself was after all not an invention of Nietzsche That was held by all those philosophers in antiquity who did not believe in the eternity of the visible universe.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: (Inaudible . . .). Intelligible minds are the exception and the man who cultivates that intellect properly which meant philosophers are against the exception of the human race. So that from the point of view of quantity the highest is the (inaudible.).

Student: But that isn't the point which I am making a criticism to. (Inaudible . . .) the continuity . . .

Strauss: But the continuity is not guaranteed by the fact that this ingredient which stirred up this present world are also the ingredients of a future world.

Student: (Inaudible . . .).

Strauss: Well, let us see whether we can get a better understanding from what follows. We have now reached the end of what Nietzsche says about religion of the future and the last five aphorisms will contain this appraisal of religion in general.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: As for the argument here and the conquered nation of idealists here, what is in the offing, and that is argued in Number 55, the sacrificing of God to the nothing. That this may be categorized as cruelty is not unimportant but it is subordinate to the other considerations. The religious instinct which is no longer believed in has sacrificed or will sacrifice God to nothing. And the question is why can this be religion? And the ultimate answer is eternal return. Nietzsche's answer is given in 56.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: . . . present in all human life.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: But Nietzsche (inaudible) cruelty was always effective, and that is the meaning of the will to power. The view which Nietzsche opposes and which was very powerful before him, at least in the days of Rousseau but exists up to the present day, that the characteristically human emotion is pity or compassion. Nietzsche polemically says, no, cruelty. And the proof which he gives later on is this: think through the logic of compassion. That is the way in which, for example, Albert Schweitzer tried to do it. And see whether human life is possible on that basis. Whether you can have reverence for life unqualifiably. That is what Schweitzer and also in a way Gandhi claim. So if you admit that this is impossible, you admit that the ingredient of cruelty, if cruelty is indeed the opposite of compassion. And Nietzsche prefers (inaudible . . .) and therefore he speaks of cruelty. And he would say that cruelty is present, and there is an indication of this in 55, in all religions, and not only in religion but in everything. There is cruelty in art, cruelty of the artist towards himself, towards his public, towards his predecessors, and so on.

One could make the objection to Nietzsche that cruelty is only a mirror image of compassion.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: But Nietzsche premised his defeatist tactic as a human life fully compassionate, is the good life. And if this is impossible; if human life must have another ingredient, then in

reply you isolate that (inaudible) which limits compassion. And you call it cruelty, because compassion is a wish to inflict good things upon fellow men, and cruelty is the wish to inflict bad things. And probably both things are ingredients of man. At least for man as we know him, in all ages for which we have empirical knowledge.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: Now let us first return to the last five aphorisms of the chapter.

Another Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: All right, say we are atheists, as many contemporaries of Nietzsche would have said, and we have replaced the other worldly (inaudible) by one popularly called progress. So we have to face God by progress. But if you look at progress critically, then you see it is not progress.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: Nietzsche is speaking here of what, and therefore I exaggerated when I said empirical fact, Nietzsche is speaking here of what is about to come in the next generation. What was not yet there in 1886 or so. And that is the realization that what modern man has done was to replace God by nothing. And the first reaction to that or the feeling that accompanied that was liberation. How fine will human life be if we are rid of these awful delusions? And then Nietzsche was one of the first, who without becoming a theist, said you are very great fools. What you get is not liberation, not bliss, but absolute everything, and you can call that nothing.

Of course there is also an allusion to other phenomena which we know. When he used his first example of the stone, where the stone can stand for the inanimate in general, and everything (inaudible . . .) as sacrificing God through the stone. But in addition, and I think I mentioned that another time, that was Anaxagoras' thesis. A stone, only a stone, nothing but a stone. That is a short step from stone to nothing.

So now if I have my way, we turn to the next five aphorisms because I think we should try to finish our reading in the present academic year. And we have only a few more meetings because we are already at the end of April.

Now in the next aphorism, he speaks first about religion being incompatible with an ethics of work, of labor, because that is contrary to what people say nowadays following Max Weber's statements about (inaudible). And Nietzsche develops this and shows in particular how more people become infatuated with the ethos of work, labor, so that they are unable to understand the leisure

which is absolutely essential for a religious life, and his particular striking example is the one which was particularly interesting to him but probably also to us -- the scholar. The modern scholars who become evermore men of labor and call it research and their complete incomprehension of religion.

It is too long to read, but let us read only toward the end of religion when it begins . . .

Reader: "Every age has its own divine type of naivete, for the discovery of which other ages may envy it; and how much naivete--adorable, childlike, and boundlessly foolish naivete is involved in this belief of the scholar in his superiority, in the good conscience of his tolerance, in the unsuspecting, simple certainty with which his instinct treats the religious man as a lower and less valuable type, beyond, before, and above which he himself has developed--he, the little arrogant dwarf and mob-man, the sedulously alert, head-and-hand drudge of "ideas," of "modern ideas!"

Strauss: Each age has its own divine kind of naivete. And that is particularly true here of the modern scholar which Nietzsche is characterizing. That is I think connected with what we have read before. They yet do everything that is and was means of course the same as to every historical period. This would not be reasonable if every historical period did not possess within itself something of life. For instance, even the contemptible feeling of superiority of religion and the incomprehension of it, so characteristic of the contemporary scholars, is the divine, venerable kind of naivete, so there is some connection with what went before. But the main point in the whole argument is the so-called superiority of the modern ideas to religion and this is the first point which Nietzsche makes.

And then you see he develops his theme more fully in Number 59 and he grants something, that the religious man, homine religiose, more than any other artist has falsified life, but by doing this, by giving a truly uncomfortable image of life, but in doing this they have (inaudible) the image of life in order to make life bearable. Perhaps the (inaudible) hitherto know stronger means for beautifying man himself than piety. So although men like Nietzsche have to abandon piety, he cannot but be very grateful to what he owes to piety.

He develops his thoughts more fully, more clearly, more simply, in 60 which we shall read.

Reader: "To love mankind for God's sake--this has so far been the noblest and remotest sentiment to which mankind has attained. That love to mankind, without any redeeming intention in the background, is only an additional folly and brutishness, that the inclination to this love has first to get its proportion, its delicacy, its grain of salt and sprinkling of ambergris from a higher inclination--whoever first perceived and "experienced" this,

however his tongue may have stammered as it attempted to express such a delicate matter, let him for all time be holy and respected, as the man who has so far flown highest and gone astray in the finest fashion!"

Strauss: In other words, the peak of mankind up to now was religion and religious man. The example which Nietzsche gives is the love of mankind for the sake of, love of man for the sake of is an absurdity. It is as reasonable as love of dogs or cats or birds, as the Greeks would use the word philanthropia, love of human beings, more or less as people love dogs. Men may love human beings but there are also reasons for not loving them. There must be something (inaudible) and this more powerful formula for that is to love man for the sake of God. But as Nietzsche says here again in the preceding aphorism, it was hitherto the highest. It was an erroneous thought. But hitherto the highest.

We better say a few words on the last two aphorisms.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: What Nietzsche would say is clear, but then what would you mean by your loving man and somehow God enters that.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: God is to be an ingredient, but not the dominating ingredient in that love of man; that is the point. But if it is an ingredient, then it can only be understood as a dominating ingredient. And not merely one among many.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: Would not God be the end and (inaudible . . .)?

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: All right, but would then not the love of man not receive its valuability from the relation to God?

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: That is of course what Nietzsche simply rejects, as he makes clear. That would not be in itself any more respectable than . . .

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: Oh, Nietzsche is not resigned to it, but that is not the point. That man loves man under certain conditions is perhaps understandable from the fact that they belong to the same species.

They have crudely the same enemies, crocodiles, and other things of this kind. (Inaudible . . .), but that is not what he calls loving human beings, and there must be something which cannot be justified by man as we know him. The traditional (inaudible) is for the sake of God. Nietzsche says for the sake of this superman. For man who transcends that.

Now let us first finish this chapter. Now Nietzsche looks at the other sides of the picture, not for what we have to be grateful to religion but for the other things. For the true philosopher, all religion -- that is to say of the past or of the future -- can only be a mean for his work of breeding and educating. In particular, ascetism and puritanism, and puritanism cannot be understood solely as the phenomenon historically of the 17th century, are almost indispensable means for educating and ennobling the race which wishes to become master over its origin from the (inaudible) and gutter. And he gives a long list of the immensely useful and high purposes used by religion, and only then in the last paragraph does he speak of the legacy.

Why religion has many sanitary effects if it is in the hands of the philosopher (inaudible). Sovereign religion as he calls it belongs to the chief Gods which kept the (inaudible) man from the highest light of which he is capable, and in particular, degenerated the European (inaudible). And here he has of course in mind especially Christianity.

But the key point is the distinction between material religion and sovereign religion. Material religion is administered by the right kind of people. The distinction which Nietzsche makes here reminds us of the distinction implied in Plato's critique of poetry. Poetry is of course not objectionable if (inaudible) of philosophy. What Plato directs his criticism against is (inaudible).

Then we should at least devote some time to the fourth chapter which is very hard to discuss in class -- there are many, how many -- simple arithmetic, 123 or 122 short aphorisms, all very short. And there does not seem to be any order, or any reason. He divides the whole book of Beyond Good and Evil into two parts, Chapters 1-3, and Chapters 5-9. That is clear, but it is of course not a sufficient explanation of these aphorisms or he does not give us anything as to the order. Let us read the beginning one.

Reader: "He who is a thorough teacher takes things seriously-- and even himself--only in relation to his pupils."

Strauss: So that has a certain implication, I believe, at least that it assumes that Nietzsche thinks one should not take oneself seriously, but only with a view to other people in general.

So being oneself, being for oneself, or to use an expression he used earlier in Number 41, preserving oneself, (inaudible . . .), Now if you turn to 64, you see that this thought is continued.

Reader: "Knowledge for its own sake"--that is the last snare laid by morality: we are thereby completely entangled in morals once more."

Strauss: There occur in the chapter altogether nine references to God, and only one of them points to Nietzsche's own theology. We might take this up first, because it is (inaudible) Number 150.

Reader: "Around the hero everything becomes a tragedy; around the demigod everything becomes a satyr-play; and around God everything becomes--what? perhaps a "world"?"

Strauss: A thought to which I referred before. (Inaudible . . .).
Number 67.

Reader: "Love to one only is a barbarity, for it is exercised at the expense of all others. Love to God also!"

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: But that means loving man.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: But according to the Bible, love God with all their heart and their might and soul.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: One can love them, but then without any justification, and what Nietzsche opposed, at least in Number 67, is a love to God which does not leave room for love of human beings.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: There could be an order of rank without denying the indispensability of the Number 1. (Inaudible . . .). Since I counted the references to God, let us see whether there are any references to man, and there is only a single one. But instead we have nine references dealing with woman and man, and that is a way of talking about nature.

(Inaudible . . .) reference to nature, of the natural order of rank among human beings, because Nietzsche did not believe (inaudible . . .), so you might be surprised by that.

Going to the rest of the argument which is possible, look at 71.

Reader: "The Sage as Astronomer.--So long as thou feelest the stars as an "above thee," thou lackest the eye of the discerning one."

Strauss: So the lower which Nietzsche has in mind has not like Kant the stark element above himself. One could say the moral law within himself. But precisely because he is lower, he has a very exacting morality, a morality indeed beyond good and evil.

Number 74.

Reader: "A man of genius is unbearable, unless he possess at least two things besides: gratitude and purity."

Strauss: Yes?

Student: There's a little bit of (inaudible) -- I mean the elements that he considers to be (inaudible). . . . cleanliness.

Strauss: (Inaudible . . .), and what Nietzsche is trying to point out here is that the two things are not identical with knowledge and (inaudible), but there is a kinship between them. And he uses these two examples. Numerous examples, if we do not have these two things, gratitude and cleanliness. I hope you don't understand by cleanliness bad smell -- you don't mean that of course.

Student: Well, I took the most simple word.

Strauss: Yes, well, if you don't think of perfumes or so, that's another matter. But it has nothing to do with cleanliness.

Student: I guess I don't go so far as to think about deodorants.

Strauss: And that can also be understood in a slightly more subtle sense.

Student: As decency.

Strauss: Yes, and not imposing one's inner dirt on others, and not talking about it.

Student: A kind of refinement and a lack of vulgarity.

Strauss: Yes, something of this type. All right. Perhaps such things as plagiarism can also be called lack of cleanliness.

Student: Maybe that would be lack of gratitude.

Strauss: All right, but that would only conserve it. Now let us see . . .

Another Student: (Inaudible.)

Reader: Number 119. "Our loathing of dirt may be so great as to prevent our cleaning ourselves--"justifying" ourselves."

Strauss: No, that is something different, a different aspect of that. Where cleanliness is so great that people do not remove the dirt, because they don't have anything to do with the dirt.

Now the next one, which I think is today trivial and taught in second grade, Number 75.

Reader: "The degree and nature of a man's sensuality extends to the highest altitudes of his spirit."

Strauss: One couldn't say this more briefly, could one? And infinite consequences can follow it, and there are people who are obliged of course especially to Nietzsche. There is a whole literature on Nietzsche's sex life by a man called (inaudible) who wrote about that and who found out everything and that is a sad story.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: Of Kant, of course.

Student: But in 74 it seems he is becoming a little bit unbearable.

Strauss: But is it not more simple to assume that Nietzsche wants to make it perfectly clear -- a very demanding morality, but not ascetism, not puritanism. One must take together Numbers 75 and 76 which you will be so good to read.

Reader: "Under peaceful conditions the militant man attacks himself."

Strauss: So just as one cannot reject sex, one cannot reject war. An ingredient of (inaudible) which is possible and desirable. There is one which Nietzsche explains later on in a different context but which we will nevertheless read. There is one point, and I do not know whether this comes out in the translation -- if we turn to Number 83, which is the first aphorism which has a italicized heading. The instinct, a word which will play a very great role in the next chapter.

Reader: "Instinct.--When the house is on fire one forgets even the dinner.-- Yes, but one recovers it from amongst the ashes."

Strauss: Then there are a few aphorisms about men and women, which also came up later on. Will you not read that because it might be construed as unfriendly, to the fair sex.

Number 87.

Reader: "Fettered Heart, Free Spirit.--When one firmly fetters one's heart and keeps it prisoner, one can allow one's spirit

many liberties: I said this once before. But people do not believe it when I say so, unless they know it already."

Strauss: I believe this is absolutely crucial and it is a subject which Nietzsche takes up again and again. Now this also as you see has an italicized heading. There are four for some reason altogether in this chapter. A bound heart, free mind. I would have said it by mind, not by spirit. There are people, and today they are particularly noticeable and noisy, who think a free heart and a free mind go together. He rejects this, but he wants this free mind, otherwise he would be an obscurity, and the price would be too great for that and that is a bound heart.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: (Inaudible . . .) but it goes somehow in connection with Number 107.

Reader: "A sign of strong character, when once the resolution has been taken, to shut the ear even to the best counter-arguments. Occasionally, therefore, a will to stupidity."

Strauss: As a bound heart (inaudible). (Inaudible . . .).

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: All right, in contradistinction to thinking. Sentiment reminds us of the Latin 'sentire' which may remind us precisely of thinking. One can (inaudible . . .) and perhaps not altogether alien to Nietzsche. I mean this is the way when I still was a teacher said to my children that the first rule is to be a good boy, meaning do your homework and all the other things, and if you have been a good boy for a long time, then you acquire gradually also the right to be a naughty boy, which implies of course that what one wants to be is to be naughty. You desire that somehow but you have nonatural right to that. The right must be acquired.

The freedom of the mind -- we have no right to that by nature. That must be acquired, and it is acquired by the opposite -- unfreedom, by obedience. Read 188 which we cannot read now -- a long very important aphorism.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: This is not a mathematical book. (Inaudible) on many methods of a great variety of phenomenon.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: But that does not necessarily mean that the one is inferior to the other. (Inaudible) a value judgment as we call it, in 88 for example, when he says "One begins to distrust very clever persons when they become embarrassed."

Student: What does that mean?

Strauss: Because you expect them always to be a malice, because they have to keep their cool. (Inaudible . . .) , as intelligent as before. Can you trust them?

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: But that is not implied in the German word 'cruelty.' It means prudent. Prudent would probably be the best translation.

Another Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: There is something to that but you present yourself as inferior to him, don't you?

Student: Yes, but for a reason.

Strauss: But I believe it amounts to the same thing. If that is so, then the rule of prudence to present yourself as embarrassed. And you will no longer appear to be so clever to the other. But there is one point regarding what you have mentioned which is very important -- Number 87 -- freedom of mind is not possible without a dash of stupidity. One can put it this way, and then of course we have read Number 8 near the beginning, at the bottom of every philosophy, the conviction of the philosopher. (Inaudible . . .). That is the beginning of this whole thought.

Then there is a point which comes up in the rest of this chapter. Self-knowledge is not only very difficult, but impossible to achieve if you take it (inaudible) in life. Man could not live with perfect self-knowledge.

Number 80.

Reader: "A thing that is explained ceases to concern us.--What did the God mean who gave the advice, "Know thyself!" Did it perhaps imply: "Cease to be concerned about thyself! become objective!"--And Socrates?--And the "scientific man"?"

Strauss: So there seems to be a question whether know thyself is unqualifiably a valid rule, but perhaps it is in the nature of things that it can never be fully practiced.

Student: Even if it were impossible to attain self-knowledge, that still would mean that the argument to that would be based on this premise, namely (inaudible . . .).

Strauss: Well there is another point, look at Number 73.

Reader: "He who attains his ideal, precisely thereby surpasses it."

Strauss: Is this not pertinent to what he says here? (Inaudible . . .) that everything has become clear not only theoretically but practically, but are they not by this very fact beyond the ideal, since by this very fact it ceases to be the ideal? Has it not ceased to be of any concern to us.

The next one, 81, has also to do with this same question.

Reader: "It is terrible to die of thirst at sea. Is it necessary that you should so salt your truth that it will no longer--quench thirst?"

Strauss: That is to say the degree of self-knowledge in which man could no longer live. I believe that is the meaning of this.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: Sure, but there are limits.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: Two aphorisms later -- let me see if I can find them. Number 249, a very short one.

Reader: "Every nation has its own 'Tartuffery,' and calls that its virtue.--One does not know--cannot know, the best that is in one."

Strauss: Now look at Number 231.

Reader: "Learning alters us, it does what all nourishment does that does not merely "conserve"--as the physiologist knows. But at the bottom of our souls, quite "down below," there is certainly something unteachable, a granite of spiritual fate, of predetermined decision and answer to predetermined, chosen questions. In each cardinal problem there speaks an unchangeable "I am this"; a thinker cannot learn anew about man and woman, for instance, but can only learn fully--he can only follow to the end what is "fixed" about them in himself. Occasionally we find certain solutions of problems which make strong beliefs for us; perhaps they are henceforth called "convictions." Later on--one sees in them only footsteps to self-knowledge, guide-posts to the problem which we ourselves are--or more correctly to the great stupidity which we embody, our spiritual fate, the unteachable in us, quite "down below.""

Strauss: So that is our fundamental stupidity. Our peculiar limitation without which we wouldn't be what we are and without which we would not be able to understand.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: No, but the emphasis on Nietzsche is the limitation, or as he says, the stupidity.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: Well, that is not quite true, because Nietzsche knew and spoke frequently of the (inaudible) people who are disloyal to themselves, so it is not necessary to have such a maxim like you become who you are.

Student: I thought when that maxim was given, that you become at least who you are.

Strauss: I do not know (inaudible) enough to interpret that.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: Read the last part of 231.

Reader: "In view of this liberal compliment which I have just paid myself . . . "

Strauss: His own fundamental stupidity.

Reader: ". . . permission will perhaps be more readily allowed me to utter some truths about "woman as she is," provided that it is known at the outset how literally they are merely -- my truths."

Strauss: It seems that this is a little bit too clumsy for Nietzsche, yes? This kind of excusado . . . at any rate there follows a section in the rest of this chapter on men and women. But in the context of the whole work, there is the question of nature. Is there a hierarchy in nature or is there not? And the lines were clearly drawn fundamentally as they are now. Between the egalitarian, radical egalitarian, if only with the prospect of future (inaudible), and the Greek anti-egalitarianism. And Nietzsche is (inaudible) of the latter.

Student: You said that this paragraph here, this excusado, was a little bit inappropriate.

Strauss: A bit clumsy.

Student: But he's always been willing to be totally (inaudible) before.

Strauss: Exactly, and that's the reason . . .

Student: (Inaudible . . .) because his symptoms concerning women are so offensive.

Another Student: Amusing.

Student: Well, it depends on how seriously one is taking Nietzsche.

Strauss: (Inaudible . . .).

Student: An example of that inoffensiveness is that one, but it seems that he is beginning to have a justified fear that the rational men who are reading his works may really be apart from him when he becomes offensive in that way.

Strauss: No, no, not at that time. That was the age -- how did Max Weber call it? -- of the men you know with the beard and the tobacco smell, Weber had a beautiful description of that, and he found it on one of his American trips when he saw with the civilized people in this country how the men treated their wives, and contrasted that with the way this was being done in Germany. And he liked it much better here than in Germany. But he had a beautiful expression for this kind of (inaudible), which had nothing to do with political parties, but that old-fashioned . . . He speaks of the patriarchal (inaudible).

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: You know when the sun rises in the morning.

Student: The dew on the grass.

Strauss: Yes, something like that. (Inaudible . . .) although not quite, because when you look around with a few exceptions like India, this is still a man's world.

Student: India?

Strauss: Indira Gandhi rules.

Student: You say it's a man's world -- Indira Gandhi?

Strauss: (Inaudible . . .), and what did Muskie say that was so resented, that a black man would not be electable?

Student: As vice-president. You couldn't put a black man on the ticket.

Strauss: A woman he didn't even say.

Student: Shirley Chisholm doesn't feel that way.

Strauss: So now the next time I hope we can discuss Number 5, and I believe it is of some help for the understanding of Chapter 5 if you look at the heading of this chapter. It is called "The Natural History of Morals," and is the only place where the word

nature occurs in a heading. And I wonder whether this is rather (inaudible) to Chapter 5 and the whole rest. Nature had been mentioned naturally but it had not been (inaudible) in any way in the preceding chapters. And it occurred only a single time in this fourth chapter, and that was not a very revealing (inaudible).

(End of this lecture.)

Lecture XI

Nietzsche: Beyond Good and Evil, May 4, 1972

Strauss: . . . he develops that more fully perhaps in two aphorisms of the Dawn of Morning, Number 318 and Number 454. It's very hard for me to translate this beautiful German into a decent English. And I suppose we don't have translations of the Dawn of Morning here. Mr. (Inaudible), however useleshe may be from other points of view, gives at least an approximation of the German, better than I can. For example, in 318, there are (inaudible) of the systematicians. Why they tried to fill a system and to make the horizon around it round, they must try to present their weaker qualities in the style of their stronger ones -- they wish to present complete and homogeneous strong natures.

Now what he has in mind is for example this. If someone writes a part of the system of philosophy, 19th century style was of course esthetics. And the aesthetician had to deal with all arts. If he didn't have any sense for music, still it was his duty as the orderer of the system of aesthetics, to write a chapter or chapters on it, and there was a certain swindling, and the same could apply to other things which the systematician had to do.

And in 454 in the same writing, he says a book like this is not for reading through and reading aloud, but to open it especially when one takes a walk and when one is on a journey. One must put one's head into it and must take it out, and never find anything usual, anything customary, around one. An ordinary book, you enter the book, stay in it and you may lose all contact. And here the contact must be constantly restored. And yet the radical difference between the world around us and the thoughts presented in the book, must be agreeing.

Yet in spite of the aphoristic character of Nietzsche's presentation, especially in Beyond Good and Evil, we have seen in a number of cases how aphorisms have an elusive order which reveals itself. They seem to be disconnected and desultory but this character is more pretended than real.

Perhaps the best example of this was aphorism 35 -- I don't know whether you remember it -- which begins "O Voltaire."

Reader: "O Voltaire! O humanity! O idiocy! There is something ticklish in "the truth," and in the search for the truth; and if man goes about it too humanely -- 'il ne cherche le vrai que pour faire le bien" -- I wager he finds nothing."

Strauss: This seems to have been just inserted. I don't know why. For no reason. But if one understands the preceding aphorism, in which Nietzsche speaks of the world which is of any concern to us in contradistinction to the world in itself. And the world of concern to us is a fiction, and it means the world of concern to us is tropocentric, but it needs a qualification. A warning, and that warning is given by Aphorism 35. The anthropocentrism must not be moralist Voltarian. So that shows how

lucid the order is, and I think the same is true in all other cases though I can't claim to have discerned it in all cases.

Now we turn toward Chapter 5, "Toward a Natural History of Morality." This is the central chapter of the book and the only one whose heading refers to nature. Question: Could nature be the theme of this chapter or even of the whole rest of the book? The term nature, to say nothing of physiology, physics, had been mentioned more than once in the first four chapters. Let us consider briefly the more striking or more important of these mentions of nature. In Aphorism 9, Nietzsche discusses the Stoic imperative, to live according to nature, and in that context he makes a distinction between nature and life. The same he does in Aphorism 49, an aphorism devoted to Greek religion -- the Greeks stood in gratitude before nature and life.

On another occasion, in 22, he makes a distinction between nature and us. The opposite of life is of course death which is or which may be no less natural than life. The opposite of the natural is the unnatural, and that may be the artificial, the domesticated, misbegotten, the anti-natural, of which he speaks on a few occasions. In other words, the unnatural may very well be alive.

Now in the introductory aphorism, Number 186, Nietzsche speaks of the desideratum of the natural history of morality. And he does this in a manner which reminds us of what he said in the introductory aphorism of the chapter on religion in number 45. But in the case of the chapter on religion, he led us to expect that the true science of religion, that is to say the empirical psychology, is for all practical purposes impossible. For the psychologist would have to be familiar with the religious experience of the most profound religious man, *hominus religiosus*, and at the same time be able to look down from above on the experience. Yet when stating the case for an empirical study, description, of the various moralities as he does here, he states the case against the possibility of a philosophic (inaudible), a science of moralists which teaches the only true morality. And he doesn't leave any doubt in our minds that an empirical study of the various moralities is possible. It could seem that Nietzsche makes higher demands on the student of religion than on the student of morality. And that would not be absurd on the face of it. Perhaps the reason why he did not entitle the third chapter "The Natural History of Religion", a title with which he surely was familiar because of a very famous (inaudible) of David Hume is entitled "The Natural History of Religion," (inaudible).

Now the philosopher's science of morals with which he takes issue here claimed to have discovered the foundations of morals and Nietzsche denies that. He gives here a simple example in this chapter and that is that of Schopenhauer, who said to teach morality is easy because we all know what Morality is, but to find its foundation is the difficulty. What is that Morality of which there is no problem?

It is one which says hurt no one, but on the contrary, help all whom you can possibly help. And Nietzsche thinks that this is a preposterous morality in a world whose essence is the will to power. And one can really construct Nietzsche's thought very simply because assuming for a moment that this is a possible morality, a human morality, we have also to consider the other living beings in the way in which Gandhi and Albert Schweitzer and such people did it, and then one sees it doesn't work out. And the question remains, is it even feasible among human beings? That is a very touchy question, the discussion of which we will perhaps postpone until we have more material.

(Inaudible . . .), regardless of whether the categorical imperative exists or does not exist (inaudible . . .). What does it mean when a philosopher sets forth such a moral teaching? That can have moral motivations and it can have amoral motivations and it can have immoral motivations, and characteristically Nietzsche rejects it.

The main point however which Nietzsche makes here is this, and it becomes clear in the next aphorism. The philosophers have found the foundations of morality in two sources, either in nature or in reason. Both attempt (inaudible), and that is developed in Aphorism 188, one of the most important aphorisms, I believe, of the book.

Reader: "In contrast to *laissez-aller*, every system of morals is a sort of tyranny against "nature" and also against "reason"; that is, however, no objection unless one should again decree by some system of morals, that all kinds of tyranny and unreasonableness are unlawful."

Strauss: It is a gratuitous assumption if one says that morality must or can be natural or counter to nature or irrational. Morality is, according to Nietzsche, a kind of tyranny against nature and also against reason.

Reader: "What is essential and invaluable in every system of morals, is that it is a long constraint. In order to understand Stoicism, or Port-Royal, or Puritanism, one should remember the constraint under which every language has attained to strength and freedom--the metrical constraint, the tyranny of rhyme and rhythm."

"How much trouble have the poets and orators of every nation of today given themselves!--"not excepting some of the prose writers of to-day, in whose ear dwells an inexorable conscientiousness--"for the sake of a folly," as utilitarian bunglers say, and thereby deem themselves wise--"from submission to arbitrary laws," as the anarchists say, and thereby fancy themselves "free," even free-spirited."

Strauss: Now this is not in quotation marks you see.

Reader: "The singular fact remains, however, that everything of the nature of freedom, elegance, boldness, dance, and masterly certainty, which exists or has existed, whether it be in thought itself, or in administration, or in speaking and persuading, in art just as in conduct, has only developed by means of the tyranny of such arbitrary law."

Strauss: Arbitrary laws.

Reader: "In all seriousness, it is not at all improbable that precisely this is "nature" and "natural"--and not *laissez-aller*! Every artist knows how different from the state of letting himself go, is his "most natural" condition, the free arranging, locating, disposing, and constructing in the moments of "inspiration"--and how strictly and delicately he then obeys a thousand laws, which, by their very rigidity and precision, defy all formulation by means of ideas (even the most stable idea has, in comparison therewith, something floating, manifold, and ambiguous in it)."

"The essential thing "in heaven and in earth" is, apparently (to repeat it once more, that there should be long obedience in the same direction; there thereby results, and has always resulted in the long run, something which has made life worth living; for instance, virtue, art, music, dancing, reason, spirituality--anything whatever that is transfiguring, refined, foolish or divine."

"The long bondage of the spirit, the distrustful constraint in the communicability of ideas, the discipline which the thinker imposed on himself to think in accordance with the rules of a church or a court, or conformable to Aristotelian premises, the persistent spiritual will to interpret everything that happened according to a Christian scheme, and in every occurrence to rediscover and justify the Christian God:--all this violence, arbitrariness, severity, dreadfulness, and unreasonableness, has proved itself the disciplinary means whereby the European spirit has attained its strength, its remorseless curiosity and subtle mobility; granted also that much irrecoverable strength and spirit had to be stifled, suffocated, and spoilt in the process (for here, as everywhere, "nature" shows herself as she is, in all her extravagant and indifferent magnificence, which is shocking, but nevertheless noble)."

"That for centuries European thinkers only thought in order to prove something --nowadays, on the contrary, we are suspicious of every thinker who "wishes to prove something"--that it was always settled beforehand what was to be the result of their strictest thinking, as it was perhaps in the Asiatic astrology of former times, or as it is still at the present day in the innocent, Christian-moral explanation of immediate personal events "for the glory of God," or "for the good of the soul":--this tyranny . . ."

Strauss: (Inaudible.)

Reader: "... this arbitrariness, this severe and magnificent stupidity, has educated the spirit; slavery, both in the coarser and the finer sense, is apparently an indispensable means even of spiritual education and discipline. One may look at every system of morals in this light: it is "nature" therein which teaches to hate the *laissez-aller*, the too great freedom, and implants the need for limited horizons, for immediate duties --it teaches the narrowing of perspectives, and thus, in a certain sense, that stupidity is a condition of life and development."

"Thou must obey some one, and for a long time; otherwise thou wilt come to grief, and lose all respect for thyself"--this seems to me to be the moral imperative of nature, which is certainly neither "categorical," as old Kant wished (consequently the "otherwise"), nor does it address itself to the individual (what does nature care for the individual!), but to nations, races, ages, and ranks, above all, however, to the animal "man" generally, to mankind."

Strauss: So this can also be read as a commentary on the aphorism in Chapter 4 on a bound heart, free mind. Read this again -- 87, I think.

Reader: "Fettered Heart, Free Spirit.--When one firmly fetters one's heart and keeps it prisoner, one can allow one's spirit many liberties; I said this once before. But people do not believe it when I say so, unless they know it already."

Strauss: Now this is here developed at much greater length, and especially in connection with the concept of nature. The opponent, the man who Nietzsche opposes, especially the anarchists who oppose every subjection to arbitrary laws, and all laws are arbitrary, even those which were traditionally regarded as the most sacred. I believe in our age we don't have to illustrate it because we live everyday of new freedom given by the high or the low court and which are of course all conceived in this spirit of freedom. Everything of value, every freedom, arises from a compulsion of long duration that was exerted by arbitrary, unreasonable laws.

A simple example available in the 19th century and probably for some people today is the three unities in tragedy, understood by French classicists but compared with the freedom of Shakespeare. Foolish limitation of the (inaudible). And yet Nietzsche has said precisely its the title of glory, of men like (inaudible).

That compulsion has educated the mind to freedom, always against the ruinous permissiveness of anarchists. Nietzsche says that precisely long obedience to unnatural and unreasonable *nomoi*, if I may use the Greek word, is the "moral imperative of nature." (Inaudible) calls for *nomoi* while preserving the distinction made in opposition of (inaudible) and *nomos*. That is the paradox.

Throughout this aphorism, Nietzsche speaks of nature only in quotation marks except in one case, in the final mention of nature, when he speaks of the moral imperative of nature. Nature, and not only nature as the anarchists understand it, has become a problem for Nietzsche. Therefore, the quotation marks, and yet he cannot do without it. And therefore the omission of the quotation marks.

This much about the natural morality. The natural morality, if we may say so, is precisely unnatural. Arbitrary and compulsion. What about rational morality? After all, in the days of Kant, nature ceased to supply the standard of morality. You know nature we can say was the standard of morality before. And then Kant found that this was incompatible with moral freedom. Man must not stick to the apron strings of nature, if you want to be free. He must set his ends himself and not merely follow the ends imposed on him by nature and there is a very plausible reason for this Kantian decision, because the traditional view presupposes that nature is good. How do we know that? If the goodness of nature must be justified, and therefore not nature but something else, and as matters stand, that something else can only be reason, that can supply the foundation of morality.

Now what is the characteristic of the rationalistic morality? You see Nietzsche begins here again in Aphorism 189 with some apparently desultory remarks about the English language, and about what this did to the English. In Greek, they are love of the Greek days, because of (inaudible . . .). It is a kind of fasting, and that brings in other phenomena of this kind, for example, the Stoic morality in the time of antiquity is a fasting, the aphoristic character of Hellenistic culture, and another example, what happened to love in the Christian ages? That is only a further illustration of what he said in Number 181. About the need of compulsion.

And then he turns to rationalistic morality, and let us read 190.

Reader: "There is something in the morality of Plato which does not really belong to Plato, but which only appears in his philosophy, one might say, in spite of him: namely, Socratism, for which he himself was too noble." "No one desires to injure himself, hence all evil is done unwittingly. The evil man inflicts injury on himself; he would not do so, however, if he knew that evil is evil. The evil man, therefore, is only evil through error; if one free him from error one will necessarily make him good."

--This mode of reasoning savours of the populace, who perceive only the unpleasant consequences of evil-doing, and practically judge that "it is stupid to do wrong"; while they accept "good" as identical with "useful and pleasant," without further thought."

"As regards every system of utilitarianism, one may at once assume that it has the same origin, and follow the scent: one will seldom err.--Plato did all he could to interpret something refined and noble into the tenets of his teacher, and above all to interpret himself into them--he, the most daring of all interpreters, who lifted the entire Socrates out of the street, as a popular theme and song, to exhibit him in endless and impossible modifications--namely, in all his own disguises and multiplicities. In jest, and in Homeric language as well, what is the Platonic Socrates, if not--

πρόσθεν Πλάτων ὀπισθέν τε Πλάτων μέση τε Χίμαιρα

Strauss: (Inaudible . . .), the herd instinct of obedience is transmitted by inheritance. As they explain, (inaudible . . .) of the art of commanding. Now why does (inaudible) who was very powerful throughout history, it has become simply predominant in contemporary Europe and where it destroys at least the good conscience of those who command and are independent, and where it successfully claims to be the only true morality.

More precisely, there was in its earlier, healthier form, -- the earth morality implied already that the sole standard of goodness is a utility for the good earth, that is to say for the common good. Independence, superiority, inequality. They are esteemed and recognized to the extent to which they were thought to be subservient to the common good or indispensable for it. And not for their own sake. The common good was understood of course as the good of a particular society or tribe, and it demanded therefore hostility to the tribes external and internal enemies. And in particular to criminals. This was part of the original (inaudible) morality.

But this has completely changed in contemporary Europe. But the (inaudible) morality draws its ultimate consequences -- it takes the sides of the very criminals and becomes afraid of inflicting punishment. It is satisfied with making the criminal harmless. Which is something very different from disarming the criminal, something very different from inflicting punishment, and it is satisfied with making the criminal harmless. Now by abolishing the fear, even the fear of the criminal, this is all justified by this identification of goodness with compassion.

(The rest of this lecture is unrecorded.)

Lecture XII

Nietzsche: Beyond Good and Evil, May 11, 1972

Strauss: . . . which is of interest to the class, and I read to you. According to Aphorism 201, under certain conditions the word instinct is able to draw its conclusion, that is to say, develop into slave morality, but the Jews however do not seem to have acquired or have these conditions in order to initiate the slave revolt in morality. This draws our attention to the stress in Chapter 5 on morality as timidity and to its almost complete silence concerning the spirit of revenge.

Why does Nietzsche apparently give less prominence here than in some of his other analogies of the history of morality? That's the question, and I think a very sensible question. What's the answer? You don't have the answer; I know that, but how to go about in telling the answer. What is the book about?

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: That all his books in a way do, at least the later books. But it's very simple -- the subtitles.

Student: Political philosophy.

Strauss: Political philosophy. So the book deals with philosophy. And therefore there is a natural limitation that what does not fall directly under the heading of philosophy is reasonably excluded. Now if we want to have a full account of morality, we would have to take into account a phenomenon which has nothing to do with philosophy such as Judaism and Christianity. And therefore in the Genealogy of Morals, they occupy a very large role.

And here Nietzsche limits himself in this book to other phenomena. Now he has indicated right at the beginning in the preface that Christianity is Platonism for the people. Platonism and everything that the name implies. That is the critical target here. Not Platonism for the people.

Student: Why would timidity be philosophical then?

Strauss: Because the philosophers as philosophers have frequently been under the spell of it. To take his example, Spinoza's so-called vivisections of the effects of Aristotle's morality of the mean, mediocrity, are also forms of moral timidity. In a speech of Zarathustra near the beginning of the chairs of virtue -- did you ever read that? Here he speaks obviously of philosophers. And not of theologians. And they have one big goal. Namely, to give men a pleasant sleep, meaning a quiet impression. That is characteristic of the philosopher -- he means of course the famous philosophic schools of antiquity in the first place, but to some extent I believe also Socrates.

So in other words, I would in trying to answer your question start from the fact that Beyond Good and Evil is not meant to give coherent and in principle complete analysis of morality, but a critique of philosophy and the moral teaching of the philosopher. The in principle complete analysis of philosophy is given in the Genealogy of Morals. But it leads accidentally to the consequence that Beyond Good and Evil is a more beautiful book, I think, than the Genealogy of Morals, which he calls a polemical book. Beyond Good and Evil is not in the same way polemical.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: The very important strands of Nietzsche's analysis of morality, what he says about the spirit of revenge and such things, is practically absent from Beyond Good and Evil. And I think it has to be understood in the light of the whole purpose of Beyond Good and Evil. I can't say more at the moment.

Now last time we discussed Chapter 5, to the natural history of morality. Now let us remind ourselves of a general point of which we spoke last time. Namely the aphoristic character of Beyond Good and Evil. Aphoristic -- written in aphorisms -- and these aphorisms are apparently disconnected, and Nietzsche's thought seems to be desultory, but if one reads him carefully I think one sees the hidden connection and a hidden lucid order.

I gave as an example -- I don't know whether I did this last time -- Aphorisms 34 and 35, which is to me at least the most telling example. Someone said, since Nietzsche admittedly is not a systematic thinker, but on the other hand these are not simply maxims and reflections -- someone suggested that it is a system in aphorisms. Can one say this? I believe one should not say that. Because one should respect Nietzsche's disclaimer of having a system. He himself uses the term experiment -- Aphorism 42. And the German word, versuch, versuchung, experiment, temptation.

That is what Nietzsche does -- a profound ambiguity. The greatest example is that atheism is religious. But we must always remember that what he calls his religious instincts is a God-forming instinct. Not an instinct to worship a God pre-existing.

Now this theme is alluded to in Beyond Good and Evil, but not discussed there. The ambiguity is articulated in what Nietzsche says there on nature. Now this seems to be the difficulty. We have seen last time what Nietzsche demands or expects of the philosophers of the future is the subjugation of the rule of nonsense and chance, and replace it by the rule of reason. Subjection of chance -- that reminds us of Machiavelli's notion of conquering chance in Chapter 25 of the Prince. Chance must be subjugated and it can be subjugated because it is a woman. And therefore according to the sexist notion which Machiavelli felt as most people felt in former times (inaudible), and I don't have to apologize for it, because that is antiquated.

What is beyond this formula of Machiavelli is this: the book as a whole presents the art of ruling of the prince, but every technique has its limits in chance. Chance cannot be controlled. Occasionally it controls, (inaudible), and so on. The technique knows how to do it. But its outer limits are surrounded by chance. Now men in their irrationality had of course always tried to get a technique for controlling chance.

If I may use a simple example taken from one of the classical writers, there is an art of finding a mate, a spouse, and you know today there is marriage counselling, and today it is much more of an art than it was in former times. But still this art cannot guarantee success. And therefore all wise men, in addition to marriage counselling, go to an expert who have control of chance in this subject, and that means practically soothsaying. So soothsaying is the art of controlling chance. And now the great question is whether that is a genuine art or a pseudo-art.

At any rate for Machiavelli this problem has disappeared. Chance itself can be controlled. That is at least the suggestion of the Prince. Nietzsche surely goes much beyond Machiavelli and demands that an end should be put once and for all to the rule of chance and nonsense. But as becomes clear from parallels, this subjugation of chance is at the same time the subjugation of nature. The conquest of nature had been the goal for many people prior to Nietzsche as you know.

But the difficulty is this, the peculiarly Nietzschean difficulty is this: the subjugation of nature can be achieved or even expected only from men of a certain nature, so complete subjugation of nature cannot be expected. You need men of a certain nature to subjugate nature. We have come across this ambiguity of nature before, especially in Aphorism 188 -- you remember where nature is always used in quotation marks except at the last mention where the quotation marks are dropped and which I take to mean that nature is problematic but one cannot do without it. And we must see what this implies.

But first we must follow Nietzsche's own argument, and that means we must turn to Chapter VI -- "We Scholars." Now the German word scholars has a broader meaning than the English word because it includes also scientists.

Now why does Nietzsche turn to "us scholars?" After Chapter 5? By the way it is the only case where we occurs in a chapter heading. Now the previous chapter had culminated in the desideratum for new philosophers. Thus Nietzsche is naturally led to a critique of the contemporary philosophers, who are to put it bluntly, according to Nietzsche, a contemptible lot. They are not philosophers in the serious sense of the word. But professors of philosophers, and one can rightly say it is absurd to expect that a professor of philosophy is a philosopher, as a professor of art should be an artist. These are entirely different things.

Nietzsche says philosophic laborers or as they came to call themselves long after Nietzsche's death, men who do philosophy. Like an admission that they are not philosophers. They are in the best case, Nietzsche asserts, scholars or scientists. In the best cases that means only in rare cases. Competent and respectable specialists. And that is not sufficient.

The emancipation of the scholar or scientist from philosophy is understood by Nietzsche as part of the democratic movement, of which he had said quite a bit in the preceding chapter. Namely of the emancipation of the low from subordination to the high.

Now if we read this chapter almost 100 years after it was written, we must say that it is helpful for understanding the present situation in the world, in universities especially, whether of faculty or students, it doesn't make such a great difference. Nietzsche's diagnosis has been confirmed, I think, by what we have witnessed. I mentioned two points which Nietzsche did not know. Under the influence of Nietzsche but partly against Nietzsche the sciences of man, the social sciences, were proclaimed to be value-free. And that meant of course, although it is not admitted, that before the tribunal of reason all values are equal. That is an extreme form of democracy. Much more extreme than when you speak of the equality of men, which was always understood from reasonable qualifications.

Another point -- the greatest and most passionate attempt to restore philosophy to its rightful place and to its commanding position was made in our century by Husserl, but Husserl claimed and that is unique, that by restoring philosophy to its rightful place and to its commanding position, he would actualize for the first time the character of philosophy as rigorous science, and he thought of Plato when he wrote these sentences. Yet Husserl had to admit that for the foreseeable future, in principle for all future, philosophy as a rigorous science which establishes the standards of knowledge and of action has to live in an uneasy companionship with what he called philosophy as weltanschauung. World view, which is admittedly unscientific. The hybrid, consisting of philosophy as rigorous science and philosophy as world view, could not possibly give the human race that unitary and unifying guidance which Nietzsche expects from the new philosophers.

I suppose you all know other examples. To me these two are the most striking. But nothing has fundamentally changed, and if something was wrong in that emancipation of the scholars and scientists from philosophy it has surely not been remedied after Nietzsche.

Nietzsche gives in Aphorism 204 a number of reasons, of forms, which this emancipation from philosophy or the revolt against philosophy takes. He says there among other things -- he speaks of the naivetes of arrogance which he has heard on the part of young

natural scientists and old physicians, about philosophy and philosophers, not to speak of the most educated and most conceited of all scholars, philologists and schoolmen, who are both -- the most educated and the most conceited -- by virtue of their profession. Naturally a teacher has to be educated and has to be conceited. He means of course high school teachers. Well, the background of this is the German educational system, the high schools being gymnasias, classical high schools and the men who control them being classical scholars. They are representatives of the sciences, and of modern languages they are marginal men.

Now these two things, natural scientists and physicians, and classical philologists and schoolmen there -- that is what they call today the two cultures. But the names which Nietzsche uses remind us of the two organizations which had yearly conventions, one of natural scientists and physicians, and the other the classical scholars and schoolpeople. So he has this in mind.

In the next aphorism, Number 205, Nietzsche speaks of another cause of the emancipation of science from philosophy, which is to be found in modern science itself. That is to say, in contradistinction to the democratic movement. Simply the enormous extent of this power, in which no single individual can find his way anymore. Therefore it is impossible to subordinate this to philosophy in any practical way.

Here there is a point which we might read, a very short point, near the beginning, the third sentence.

Reader: "It is perhaps just the refinement of his intellectual conscience that makes him hesitate and linger on the way; he dreads the temptation to become a dilettante, a millepede, a milleantenna; he knows too well that as a discernor, one who has lost his self-respect no longer commands, no longer leads; unless he should aspire to become a great play-actor a philosophical Cagliostro and spiritual rat-catcher--in short, a misleader. This is in the last instance a question of taste, if it has not really been a question of conscience."

Strauss: So self-respect -- the German word is somewhat stronger, reverence for oneself. Now this reverence for oneself is an important point for Nietzsche as you will find later. Crucial even. The question is since ultimately every phenomenon has to be understood in the light of the will to power, what does reverence for oneself have to do with the will to power? To say nothing of that tropical man of whom Nietzsche spoke in the last chapter.

Well, the will to power surely would have something to do with pride, pride as distinguished from vanity. And the connection between pride and reverence for oneself is perhaps not too difficult to establish. To have reverence for oneself is inseparable from

pride. Lack of such reverence for oneself is not characteristic of the scholar or scientist, but of the charlatan scholar.

Nietzsche makes here also a distinction in this passage between taste and conscience. Both lead in this case to the same result. To be a swindler is a sign of bad taste and it is also against conscience. But the point of view is different -- whether you look at it from the point of view of taste or whether you look at it from the point of view of conscience. I have been told they are making a distinction between shame and guilt culture. I think that has something to do with what Nietzsche means. People who omit certain actions because it is shameful to do them, and others who omit them because if they were to do it, they would feel guilty. It's a different approach, a different point of view.

Student: Doesn't he examine why, for lack of a better word, objective standards (inaudible . . .)? What is the basis of good taste?

Strauss: A very necessary question to raise. But do we not in practical terms observe the distinction in many cases between an individual who has taste and people who lack this, who knows what can be done in these circumstances and those who do not sense it. In other words, someone does something when you (inaudible). You have had that example? That is against the taste. There are other cases where one becomes indignant -- that is something different. Could one not say the distinction between taste and conscience corresponds to that between who wins and becoming indignant?

Student: In some way both would raise the same question . . . (inaudible . . .).

Strauss: But why must one always raise questions of principle? Especially in practical matters? There is an old, I think Arabic proverb, one does not speak of a rope in the house of a man who hangs himself. Now if someone speaks of a rope under such conditions, (inaudible) . . . and what is behind it are certain considerations like the sensitivity of other people, and why we are concerned with the sensitivity to other people leads to a great question. Nietzsche would say we only know a negative answer -- don't come to altruism as an ultimate explanation. It has something to do with a refined egoism -- that would be Nietzsche's very general answer. How this refinement of the egoism takes place is a long question, but Nietzsche surely speaks to people who thanks to fortunate circumstances have this refined egoism. For Nietzsche what you seek is the highest principle. The ultimate justification is in the future. Not in the past. That is where the philosophers of the future come in.

Now we turn to Number 206, and here he speaks of the character of the scholar or scientist -- Perhaps we should read that. (Inaudible . . .) the verdict on the scholar's charlatanism to scholars as such. Scholars as such lack that reverence for themselves because of their inner dependence, their inner distrust.

Their lack of self-sufficiency. Their awareness of their insufficiency. This can of course be compensated easily by glibness or brashness, but the compensation proves the existence of the primary phenomenon. And this is what Nietzsche calls the lack of nobility. We always have to use this English translation, and the German adjective I would translate by patrician or aristocratic rather than noble. We spoke of that last time. He feels the inferiority of his nature as he says somewhat later on. That isn't necessarily so, according to Nietzsche, and is a proof of the necessity of philosophy that the scholar or scientist points without knowing it to the philosopher. There he admits his subservience to the philosopher. He may very well dislike it, but that is so.

And now Nietzsche goes over to a more comprehensive theme, a more fundamental theme. This lack of reverence for oneself is due to a lack of self, to self-forgetting. The scholar is to be selfless. The term for that is objective. The pride of the scholar or scientist is objectivity. The next subject for Nietzsche is the critique of objectivity.

In the meantime this has had terrific success in what they call existentialism, an elaboration of this theme, but we are not concerned with existentialism but with Nietzsche.

Now let us read Aphorism 207.

Reader: "However gratefully one may welcome the objective spirit --and who has not been sick to death of all subjectivity and its confounded ipsisimosity!"

Strauss: That comes from the Latin -- ipsis, self, and that is superlative. How should we translate this in English? Just ipsissimosity. If we know what ipsis is, it shouldn't be that difficult.

Reader: "--in the end, however, one must learn caution even with regard to one's gratitude, and put a stop to the exaggeration with which the unselfing and depersonalising of the spirit has recently been celebrated, as if it were the goal in itself, as if it were the salvation and glorification--as is especially accustomed to happen in the pessimist school, which has also in its turn good reasons for paying the highest honours to "disinterested knowledge." The objective man, who no longer curses and scolds like the pessimist"

Strauss: Why does he say personal? This term from (inaudible). Nietzsche says the objective man or the objective human being.

Reader: ". . . the ideal man of learning in whom the scientific instinct blossoms forth fully after a thousand complete and partial failures, is assuredly one of the most costly instruments that exist, but his place is in the hand of one who is more powerful. He is only an instrument; we may say, he is a mirror--he is no "purpose in

himself." The objective man is in truth a mirror: accustomed to prostration before everything that wants to be known, with such desires only as knowing or "reflecting" imply--he waits until something comes, and then expands himself sensitively, so that even the light footsteps and gliding past of spiritual beings may not be lost on his surface and film."

"Whatever "personality" he still possesses seems to him accidental, arbitrary, or still oftener, disturbing; so much has he come to regard himself as the passage and reflection of outside forms and events. He calls up the recollection of "himself" with an effort, and not infrequently wrongly; he readily confounds himself with other persons, he makes mistakes with regard to his own needs, and here only is he unrefined and negligent."

"Perhaps he is troubled about the health, or the pettiness and confined atmosphere of wife and friend, or the lack of companions and society--indeed, he sets himself to reflect on his suffering, but in vain! His thoughts already rove away to the more general case . . . "

Strauss: Because that is not interesting. Even he himself is not interested.

Reader: ". . . and to-morrow he knows as little as he knew yesterday how to help himself. He does not now take himself seriously and devote time to himself: he is serene, not from lack of trouble, but from lack of capacity for grasping and dealing with his trouble. The habitual complaisance with respect to all objects and experiences, the radiant and impartial hospitality with which he receives everything that comes his way, his habit of inconsiderate good-nature, of dangerous indifference as to Yea and Nay: alas! there are enough of cases in which he has to atone for these virtues of his!"

Strauss: For these virtues of his.

Reader: "--and as man generally, he becomes far too easily the caput mortuum of such virtues. Should one wish love or hatred from him--I mean love and hatred as God, woman, and animal understand them--he will do what he can, and furnish what he can."

"But one must not be surprised if it should not be much--if he should show himself just at this point to be false, fragile, questionable, and deteriorated. His love is constrained, his hatred is artificial, and rather un tour de force, a slight ostentation and exaggeration. He is only genuine so far as he can be objective; only in his serene totality is he still "nature" and "natural." His mirroring and eternally self-polishing soul no longer knows how to affirm, no longer how to deny; he does not command; neither does he destroy. "Je ne meprise presque rien"--he says, with Leibnitz: let us not overlook nor undervalue the presque! Neither is he a model man . . . "

Strauss: Because that's the presque. (Inaudible . . .), but knowing his unabilities, he says presque.

Reader: ". . . he does not go in advance of any one, nor after either; he places himself generally too far off to have any reason for espousing the cause of either good or evil. If he has been so long confounded with the philosopher, with the Caesarian trainer and dictator of civilisation, he has had far too much honour, and what is more essential in him has been overlooked--he is an instrument, something of a slave, though certainly the sublimest sort of slave, but nothing in himself--presque rien! The objective man is an instrument, a costly, easily injured, easily tarnished, measuring instrument and mirroring apparatus, which is to be taken care of and respected; but he is no goal, no outgoing nor upgoing, no complementary man in whom the rest of existence justifies itself, no termination--and still less a commencement, an engendering, or primary cause, nothing hardy, powerful, self-centred, that wants to be master; but rather only a soft, inflated, delicate, movable potter's-form, that must wait for some kind of content and frame to "shape" itself thereto--for the most part a man without frame and content, a "selfless" man. Consequently, also, nothing for women, in parenthesi."

Strauss: . . . when Plato describes the theoretical man. Well, Plato's of course was the old example, of the man who fell in the ditch because he looked at the stars. He was not concerned with himself, but with the stars. And when Socrates describes the life that this man leads, he mentions among other things that he doesn't even know who his neighbour is and he doesn't even know what kind of a being he is. A human being or some other animal, because let us say he is concerned with the eternal. That's the man of objectivity; that's the theoretical man.

Now Socrates was used by Kierkegaard independently of Nietzsche, before Nietzsche, as a (inaudible) against Nietzsche. Objectivity. Socrates' objective thinker against Hegel as an incarnation of objectivity. But Socrates is a man who uses this praise of the objective man, to use this language, in the passage to which I referred. What can one say -- how can one explain that -- I mean Socrates' praise of the objective man who doesn't even know whether his neighbour is a human being. And Socrates as the representative of objective philosophizing. One must ask, did Socrates not know what kind of being his neighbour was. Do not the Platonic dialogues show among other things that Socrates knew so to speak all the gossip of Athens about everyone. So this can hardly be the last word on Socrates, of the Platonic Socrates. So this phenomenon which Nietzsche has in mind is surely not Socrates. This we can safely say, although Socrates was aware of it and regarded it as an essential ingredient of a larger whole.

Here in this passage when he speaks of the serene totalism, of the scientific or scholarly man, who is open to everything.

Who says not yes nor no to anything. He is a mirror of everything. He says he is genuine, or authentic as I believe they say now, only so far as he can be objective, only in his serene totalism is he still "nature." And not "unnatural." So strictly speaking he is not natural anymore, because of his objectivity, but he still is genuine. So these are two different considerations. Naturalness and genuineness. A man may be genuine without being natural.

With some exaggeration one may perhaps say that originally natural and genuine meant the same. I mean to be genuine means not fictitious. For example, if someone plays something, pretends to be something which he is not, that is (inaudible). But what he is and does not merely pretend to be is natural. What seems to have happened in the last few generations is that genuine and its opposites have taken the place of the natural, for these deeper reasons which are behind the whole erosion of nature.

If I am not mistaken, Mr. _____ in that enigmatic conclusion of his lecture on the concept of nature referred to this phenomenon.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: Now here he mentioned a little bit in the passage we read, a little bit toward the end of the thing, of the philosopher as the complementary man, in whom the rest of existence justifies itself. That is something which he had not said before. He had developed in the preceding chapter a very grand picture of what the philosopher is, and we can easily see that he can be the complementary man, complementary for men, and what is incomplete in all other men is complete in him.

And now we learn that he is the complementary man in whom the rest of existence, that is to say also the non-human, justifies itself. The philosopher of the future as the justification of everything that is. And we must keep in mind, one way or another, that Nietzsche must bring out this subject.

We can say the philosopher of the future, or the philosopher, is the peak where no overcoming or transcending is necessary or possible.

In an earlier chapter he had spoken of the dangerous indifference of the scholar to yes and no, because he is open to everything, and this leads naturally to the next chapter, Aphorism 208, skepticism. The scholar or scientist is a skeptic, and this theme of skepticism is developed at great length in the next aphorism which is too long to read.

He speaks of the contemporary function of skepticism, to counteract the real denial of life, the denial of life by deed. Skepticism in a word is weakness of the will, paralysis of the will, the consequence of the sudden mixture of races or classes. This is a universal principle which has happened in other places, too.

But it is also found in our Europe today, where however the mixture of classes and hence of races was senseless and sudden. Now this disease of the will stems from that mixture and is not equally pronounced in all European countries. The two extreme poles are France and Russia. France where the paralysis of the will is the greatest and Russia where it is non-existent. And then he speaks of the danger which Russia constitutes to Europe because of the tremendous will which it is and therefore the consequence for Europe, if it wants to preserve itself, Europe must be unified. And Nietzsche is the proclaimer of the unified Europe more than anyone else.

There is a convergence or kinship of what the philosopher concerned with human excellence calls for and of what good Europeanism is concerned with, namely the preservation of the future of Europe. For some reasons not explained here, these two demands, the philosopher of the future and the unity of Europe, belong together. The philosophers of the future are, as it were, the invisible, spiritual rulers of a unified Europe, but in such a way that they must of course never be the servants of Europe. Because that would run counter to the principles stated earlier, that it is a misunderstanding of the philosophers to understand them as servants of the common good.

At any rate, Nietzsche's philosophy is in a strict sense consciously historical, belonging to a certain time -- the disintegration of Europe. And a certain place -- Europe. The question is whether this historical character of the philosophy is not a consequence of the erosion of nature, that history as it were takes the place formerly taken by nature.

Now in the subsequent aphorism, Nietzsche continues the discussion of skepticism and speaks of another kind of skepticism, which he finds as it were represented in Frederick the Great, who also was a skeptic, but not a skeptic who suffered from paralysis of the will, as everyone who knows a bit of his history would admit. Nietzsche thinks, and that is not merely a claim because we have solid evidence for that in Goethe that Frederick the Great had a decisive influence on the German mind and against the influence of the Western and especially French thought.

Now where does Nietzsche find this influence? This we should, I believe, read. In Aphorism 209. He speaks of his father first, William I, a famous martinet who made his son's life absolutely miserable, and the terrible things he did. McCauley has written a beautiful, un-Nietzschean characterization of these two kings, and I believe the main sentence is this, that the father of Frederick the Great beat up everyone, whereas Frederick the Great demanded something like reason in addition to profanity.

But if you have this passage where he says, but in the meantime in his son, that more dangerous and harder, new kind of skepticism grew up.

Reader: "Meanwhile, however, there grew up in his son that new kind of harder and more dangerous scepticism--who knows to what extent it was encouraged just by his father's hatred and the icy melancholy of a will condemned to solitude?--the skepticism of daring manliness, which is closely related to the genius for war and conquest, and made its first entrance into Germany in the person of the great Frederick. This skepticism despises and nevertheless grasps; it undermines and takes possession; it does not believe, but it does not thereby lose itself."

Strauss: You must compare it always with the soft skepticism of which he had spoken in the preceding paragraph. The former does not despise, as Nietzsche says. This one despises.

Reader: "It gives the spirit a dangerous liberty, but it keeps strict guard over the heart."

Strauss: Remember Aphorism 87 -- you must keep your heart imprisoned. And then you can give your mind dangerous freedom.

Reader: "It is the German form of scepticism, which, as a continued Fredericianism, risen to the highest spirituality, has kept Europe for a considerable time under the dominion of the German spirit and its critical and historical distrust. Owing to the insuperably strong and tough masculine character of the great German philologists and historical critics (who, rightly estimated, were also all of them artists of destruction and dissolution), a new conception of the German spirit gradually established itself--in spite of all Romanticism in music and philosophy--in which the leaning towards masculine scepticism was decidedly prominent: whether, for instance, as fearlessness of gaze; as courage and sternness of the dissecting hand, or as resolute will to dangerous voyages of discovery, to spiritualised North Pole expeditions under barren and dangerous skies."

"There may be good grounds for it when warm-blooded and superficial humanitarians cross themselves before this spirit, cet esprit fataliste, ironique, mephistophelique, as Michelet calls it, not without a shudder."

Strauss: Let us stop here. I think this is all we need for our present purposes. It is unfortunate that Nietzsche doesn't give a single example of the great German philologists and critics of history who lived up to this standard, because they all seem to be tinged with romanticism at least in retrospect and I think also from Nietzsche's own point of view. I would have been grateful if there had been a single name mentioned.

Be this as it may, this is the higher possibility, and it is interesting that these are the philologists and historical critics and not the natural scientists, and that has to do with the fact that Nietzsche is much closer to philology and historical criticism than to natural science.

In the next aphorism he discusses the other human possibility which we find among us scholars but which distinguishes us from the philosophers. That he calls critics in contradistinction to skeptics. Now the philosopher must probably be a skeptic in the aphorism 209 and he must also be a critic, but he must be more than both than either.

Now a critic in contradistinction to a skeptic is a judge who judges according to certain firm standards. The skeptic as skeptic does not judge according to firm standards. But even the critic is not a philosopher. This is directed especially as it appears from the end of Aphorism 210 against Kant. He defines criticism negatively as opposed to a spirit of conciliation, insisting on the differences and on the irreconcilabilities of things such as people who try to reconcile Christian sentiments with ancient tastes and perhaps even with modern parliamentarianism. This is incompatible with a critical discipline of which he speaks here.

The critic is a man of the either/or, of cleanliness, and severity in matters of the mind.

Now in Aphorism 211 he summarizes what has preceded. By making a distinction between the philosophic laborers and the scientific men on the one hand and the philosopher on the other. The former are of course only the servants of the latter. Let us read 211. No, I think in 210. What is characteristic I think of philosophic laborers according to the noble model of Kant and Hegel -- they too are not philosophers in the highest sense as Nietzsche understands it, and why? What is characteristic of the philosopher in the higher sense? As he says in the middle of 211, that he creates values, whereas men like Kant and Hegel merely formulated, articulated, justified values created by others.

Do you have that -- in the middle of 211.

Reader: "The philosophical workers, after the excellent pattern of Kant and Hegel, have to fix and formalise some great existing body of valuations . . ."

Strauss: No he has here the political (the moral). So these two things are inseparable, and as he said earlier at the beginning of Aphorism 6 in order to understand a philosopher, one should first find out what morality does he aim at. That would give us the key to the innermost thoughts which, according to this explanation here, replace moral by political. These are only different sides of the same thing.

So let us keep this in mind. The true philosophers are commanders and legislators, not merely interpreters. What is the word of Marx in his Communist manifesto? Hitherto the philosophers had tried to interpret the world, but what has to be done is to change it. Nietzsche goes even beyond that, one could say. That is one of the many agreements between Nietzsche and Marx.

Nietzsche is the antagonist of Marx, although he had never read Marx apparently. I am not aware that he ever mentions him. The socialists whom he mentions are all different from Marx, and people who played no role in the further history of Marxism.

Now let us turn to 211. (Inaudible . . .), if we have time, and the examples which he gives as he interprets them of Socrates and the others shows the philosopher, as Hegel put it, is the son of his time. Nietzsche makes only a very important correction of this. He says the stepson of his time, meaning he does not simply belong to it, and in a way the whole relation between Nietzsche and Hegel is concentrated on this difference.

Now of course the view which Nietzsche suggests here is known under the name of historicism, which is the view that philosophy is a function of the time and in particular virtue is a function of the time. Different virtues, different times. There are no eternal standards. The term which people ordinarily use is relativism. This Nietzsche accepts, but tries to overcome. We must see in which way he does this.

You see the way in which he distinguishes the ideal of a philosopher today as distinguished from the ideal of a philosopher in the 16th century, and on the other hand the ideal which Socrates follows.

But still we must consider for one moment the end of the preceding aphorism. After he had described the philosopher in the true sense, the philosopher who creates values, and does not merely formulate or articulate values created by others.

And when he says at the very end of Aphorism 211, yes?

Reader: "Are there at present such philosophers? Have there ever been such philosophers? Must there not be such philosophers some day?..."

Strauss: Have there ever been such philosophers -- an important question. Now Nietzsche makes a great distinction between the professors of philosophy and men like Kant and Hegel. But there is another type whom Nietzsche admires still more and whom he had mentioned I think in Aphorism 204, where he spoke of Heraclitus, Plato, and Empiricus. Now were they philosophers in the highest sense. Where they ever such philosophers? To indicate that for Nietzsche is by no means certain that they were men who created values. The philosopher in the strict and highest sense seems to be altogether a phenomenon of the future, and Nietzsche as it were is, at least the author of Beyond Good and Evil, is the John the Baptist of the future philosopher.

I think then we should also have a look at the last paragraph. Aphorism 213.

Reader: "It is difficult to learn what a philosopher is, because it cannot be taught: one must "know" it by experience--or one should have the pride not to know it. The fact that at present

"Many generations must have prepared the way for the coming of the philosopher; each of his virtues must have been separately acquired, nurtured, transmitted, and embodied; not only the bold, easy, delicate course and current of his thoughts, but above all the readiness for great responsibilities, the majesty of ruling glance and contemning look, the feeling of separation from the multitude with their duties and virtues, the kindly patronage and defence of whatever is misunderstood and calumniated, be it God or devil, the delight and practice of supreme justice, the art of commanding, the amplitude of will, the lingering eye which rarely admires, rarely looks up, rarely loves..."

Strauss: I would like to point out only one thing which is important for the general argument of this book, especially this part of the book, and that has to do with the question of nature. In a way Nietzsche only restates the old view that philosophizing presupposes a certain nature. You have read this all in Plato's Republic, especially in Books VI and VII, or V and VI, where lists are given of the nature.

But Nietzsche does not say exactly the same. He makes an important change. For this high world one must be born. To express it more clearly, one must have been bred for it. Now bred in German means of course also what you use for beasts, breed cattle or horses or dogs or whatever you have, and he does not refer to the breeding one receives as a young human being. Now what is behind that?

One must be bred for this -- that means one must have the right kind of origin of ancestors, of "blood." But the change which Nietzsche makes from classical philosophy is this: the nature to which Plato and Aristotle referred is acquired by former generations. It is not simply given. Plato and Aristotle do not go beyond that. Some people are born for this activity and others are not. And that is the genesis of this physics. And this is of no interest to them. The human race produces men of various kinds and that has not too much to do with inheritance because we know that sometimes very stupid parents have very bright children, and vice versa.

But at any rate, this required that these desired natures are given. How they are produced is of no interest. There is a passage in Nietzsche's Dawn of Morning which I believe is helpful for understanding that, and that is Aphorism 540. Michelangelo saw in Raphael the study, in himself the nature. There, in the case of Raphael, the learning; in himself, the gift. But this is a pettatism which as I say with all reverence this great pettant, namely Michelangelo. What then is giftedness but a name for an older kind of learning, experiencing, training, appropriating, incorporating, be it on the stage of our father or still earlier.

So the old gifts are acquired, not strictly speaking given. And that ultimately, if I understand this correctly, all -- everything that is, must be understood in terms of its genesis and this genesis must be ultimately understood in terms of production.

And to use the extreme formula which we find in Locke, nature furnishes only the almost worthless materials. Everything which is of any value acquires that value through human activity with human acquisition. I believe that is the ultimate reason for this change of orientation.

I brought quite a few books with me today but there was so much to read -- I would like to read you only one passage which might be of interest, and that is from Hierigaard in his introduction to metaphysics about physics. The being as such on the whole is called (inaudible), and only in passing may it be mentioned that already in Greek philosophy a narrowing down of the meaning of the word soon began, but this narrowing down of (inaudible) in the direction of physical did not take place in the way we see it today. We oppose to the physical, the psychical, the soul-like, the livid, all these things belong to the Greek even later still to (inaudible) as distinguished from it, appears as what the Greeks call (inaudible), positing or rule in the sense of the . . .

(The rest of this lecture remained unrecorded.)

Lecture XIII

Nietzsche: Beyond Good and Evil, May 17, 1972

This lecture was on the beginning of Chapter 7, but it was unrecorded.

Lecture XIV

Nietzsche: Beyond Good and Evil, May 24, 1972

Strauss: We will not be able to finish our reading of Beyond Good and Evil. But instead of the free-for-all which I had envisaged for the seventh of June, we will have to study Chapter 9. We have to bow to the dictates of fate.

Now we read last time the larger part of Chapter VIII, but we still have to discuss two passages. May I remind you of the context? We saw that from Chapter V to the end of the work the subject is somehow "nature." Chapter 5 was entitled the "Natural History of Morality." And the discussion led up to the call for the complementary man in whom the rest of existence is justified. Aphorism 207. That is supposedly the philosopher of the future. In order to make clear what the philosopher of the future is, Nietzsche contrasts him in Chapter VI with the class of beings who may be mistaken for philosophers, the scholars or scientists, so it is called "We Scholars."

Chapter VII, entitled "Our Virtues," deals with the virtues not of philosophers and the philosopher of the future but with the virtues of the free mind who as we know are only the precursors of the philosophers of the future and does not belong to that class himself. This great virtue of the free mind is the historical sense, as we have heard, and this is at the same time its great vice. Or at any rate, it is an expression of his fundamental defects. Namely his dissatisfaction with himself and with his age. And therefore the search to escape into the alien, and the past, because he is as they say alienated.

Another description of "Our Virtues" is given in the expression "We Moralists," and the only aphorism which has an italicized title here, namely 226, has the title "We Immoralists." And it appears from that aphorism that immoralism is the reverse side of probity, of intellectual probity. That is a famous theme of Nietzsche to show that morality, if it takes itself seriously, leads to the destruction of morality. And morality taken in the terms here means intellectual probity, not behaving immorally towards the principles of morality, but by simply accepting them and trusting them.

The contemporary moral teaching which Nietzsche singles out for special criticism thereafter is English utilitarianism, which he regards as particularly boring and stupid, and narrow. Utilitarianism accepts egoism as the basis of morality and that is all right with Nietzsche. It asserts at the same time that egoism rightly understood leads to the espousal of the common welfare. In other words, from Nietzsche's point of view utilitarians are men who wish to eat the cake and have it, which is always a sign of lacking intellectual probity.

While recognizing many fundamental theories, utilitarians do not

realize the fact egoism is will to power and not merely will to live comfortably, and hence, since egoism is will to power, it includes cruelty, for which there is no place in utilitarianism, especially of John Stuart Mill. And I always forget the name of this lady, Henrietta Taylor?, (inaudible . . .), well, after he had escaped from the clutches of his father, the puritan utilitarianism, James Mill, he fell into the arms of I think Henrietta Taylor and he regarded her as a god. At any rate there is no place for cruelty here.

Cruelty is that, Nietzsche makes it here in passing, if turned against oneself, is effective in intellectual probity. In the cruelty in the intellectual conscience, as he calls it here. Now it is necessary to recognise that cruelty is indispensable if the basic eternal text, homo natura, is again to be recognised. We did read that passage toward the end of Number 230, but we should read it again.

Reader: "But we anchorites and marmots have long ago persuaded ourselves in all the secrecy of an anchorite's conscience, that this worthy parade of verbiage also belongs to the old false adornment, frippery, and gold-dust of unconscious human vanity, and that even under such flattering colour and repainting, the terrible original text homo natura must again be recognised."

Strauss: Terrible text. The terrible fundamental text.

Reader: "In effect, to translate man back again into nature; to master the many vain and visionary interpretations and subordinate meanings which have hitherto been scratched and daubed over the eternal original text, homo natura; to bring it about that man shall henceforth stand before man as he now, hardened by the discipline of science, stands before the other forms of nature, with fearless Oedipus-eyes, and stopped Ulysses-ears, deaf to the enticements of old metaphysical bird-catchers, who have piped to him far too long: "Thou art more! thou art higher! thou hast a different origin!"--this may be a strange and foolish task, but that it is a task, who can deny! Why did we choose it, this foolish task? Or, to put the question differently: "Why knowledge at all?" Everyone will ask us about this. And thus pressed, we, who have asked ourselves the question a hundred times, have not found, and cannot find any better answer...."

Strauss: The answer is given in a way in the next aphorism. But we will first consider this passage which we just read. The basic eternal text, homo natura, is again to be recognised. Man must be retranslated into nature. One must get rid of the many vain and elusive interpretations which hitherto have concealed that basic text. Now from this passage it is not quite clear whether the retranslation of man into nature has been achieved now and then in the past or whether it is altogether a task for the future. But I think from other passages in Nietzsche one can say it has never been achieved in the past.

Even with will to power, Number 101, there was never yet a natural humanity. Hitherto humanity, we can say in the language which Nietzsche does not use, was only deflected from naturalness by nomos. By arbitrary and unreasonable laws without which man would never have been able finally to see that basic text, but still he was not natural hitherto.

In today's science, aphorism 109, Nietzsche speaks of the tasks to naturalize man, but the German word is somewhat more, too. And in a way, to deflect man from what he always was. To do that together with the pure, newly found, newly redeemed, nature.

Now in this work, Beyond Good and Evil, Aphorism 62, man is not yet a fixed brute, not yet established brute. That fixation I believe is the same as what he calls elsewhere making men natural. A very good reason, and which we do not yet know whether it is a reason which Nietzsche would recognise, is that the nature of a being is its end. Its completion; its completed state. Its peak. That is what Aristotle dared. And we have of course no right to assume that Nietzsche meant the same.

We have this book here, this passage here, on page 552, in Number 48 -- read the beginning of this.

Reader: "(Inaudible . . .).

Strauss: So it is not a return to nature. Nature is arrived at for the first time. Man reaches his peak through and in the philosopher of the future, as a truly complementary man in whom not only man but the rest of the species is justified. Aphorism 207. This complementary man is the first man who consciously creates values on the basis of his understanding of the will to power as the fundamental phenomenon. This action completes the highest form of the most spiritual power, and that means the highest form of the will to power pure and simple.

By this action he puts an end to the rule of nonsense and chance which was hitherto history, Aphorism 203. Now as the act of the highest form of man's will to power, this natural (inaudible) is at the same time the peak of the anthromortization of non-human nature. For the most spiritual will to power consists in prescribing to nature what or how it ought to be, as we have seen in Aphorism 9. It is in this way that Nietzsche abolishes the distinction between the world of appearance or fiction or the interpretations on the one hand and the true world, the text, on the other. The world of appearance and the true world coincide eventually, owing to that final interpretation, the true interpretation.

Now it was the history of man hitherto, that is to say, the rule of nonsense and chance, which was the necessary condition for the subjugation of nonsense and chance. And I believe that is more or less the accepted opinion today. Generally speaking. Evolution, or however you call it, this is not a guide to action at any rate,

but it so happens that the outcome of it is a being which eventually reasonably use nonsense or chance.

This means, if we apply this to Nietzsche's case, Nietzsche's understanding, the naturalization of man presupposes and brings to its completion the whole historical process, and this completion, which according to Nietzsche of course is by no means necessary but requires a new creative act, still in this way history, the complete historical process, can be said to be integrated into nature. because it culminates in the (inaudible) of man. Man therefore cannot say yes to the philosophers of the future without saying yes to the past. Because that past made possible the (inaudible) of the philosophers of the future. Yet there is a great difference between this yes to the past and the unbounded yes to everything that was and is. That is to say, the affirmation of eternal return.

Why then the eternal return? And if we had only Beyond Good and Evil, I believe we would be driven to the following explanation. Instead of explaining why it is necessary to explain eternal return, Nietzsche indicates that the highest achievement as all earlier higher achievements is in the last analysis not the work of reason, but of nature. In the last analysis, all thought depends on something unteachable. Deep down, as he says in the following aphorism, 231, on a fundamental stupidity, as he does not hesitate to call it.

The nature of this individual, the individual nature, not evident and universally valid (inaudible), it seems, is the ground of all worthwhile understanding or knowledge. So that seems to be the pure case. Yet there is an order of rank of the natures, and at the top of this hierarchy is the complementary man. His supremacy is shown by the fact that he solves the highest and the most difficult problems. And we must identify that problem if we want to see Nietzsche's way out of the case, of the intellectual case.

Now that problem which is solved is posed by the conquest of nature, a conquest which has no assignable limits, and therefore man can dream as they began to dream in the 17th century of the abolition of suffering, including perhaps the abolition of death. And more particularly, the abolition of inequality.

All men could become equal, supermen, in Nietzsche's sense of the term. That would be the true realm of freedom. But that is exclusive because the highest development of man requires suffering, requires inequality. Now when Nietzsche takes up the question of eternal return, for the first time in the Zarathustra, in the section on redemption, he gives some explanation. Perhaps you read it on page 250.

Reader: "Zarathustra has spoken thus to the hunchback and to those whose mouthpiece and advocate the hunchback was. He turned to his disciples in profound dismay and said: Verily, my friends, I walk among men as the (inaudible . . .). This is what is terrible for my eyes, and I find man scattered as over a battlefield. (Inaudible . . .)"

Strauss: And also let us see on the next page, second paragraph from the top.

Reader: "And you too have often asked yourselves who is Zarathustra to us? What shall we call him? (Inaudible . . .)."

Strauss: Now what does it mean? Men are hitherto defective. Incomplete. And therefore suffering and inequality. But these defects and these inequalities are the prerequisites of human greatness. Therefore the transformation of the human race into a race of supermen, would be fatal to human greatness. Hitherto these defects and inequalities were taken for granted, as given or imposed. Now due to man's conquest of nature, they are in danger of being abolished, and therefore they can no longer be taken for granted. They must be willed. Nature owes henceforth its being to human will, to human postulation. Something of this kind had been said by (inaudible), at the end of the 18th century but in (inaudible) of course the willing was the pure ego and therefore that was perfectly outside.

But in Nietzsche's case that's the difficulty. The willing being is the whole individual Friedrich Nietzsche. The whole man; the individual nature. So I believe then that the primary motive of the most intelligible men of the doctrine of eternal return is in Nietzsche to make intelligible nature as humanly willed and not given. And the whole difficulty in Nietzsche's philosophy is I believe concentrated in this point.

Student: (Inaudible . . .).

Strauss: No, if nomos is understood in contradistinction to nature, then the nomos must be abandoned.

Student: Yes, that's the way I see it, but then the next thing that he talked about preserving the higher, the distinction between those who are higher and those who are lower, and it seems to me that (inaudible . . .) the hierarchy will be preserved.

Strauss: (Inaudible . . .).

Student: When I was thinking about this, it seems to me that the nomos did not represent another sub-culture, but an anti-nomos.

Strauss: They are not such awe-inspiring people that we have to accept their own view of things, that they are authoritative, and it is widely accepted that they replace the widely-prevailing nomos by another nomos. (Inaudible . . .). . . . and in practice there is an amazing conformity. But think the Europeans, if they could (inaudible), would see the younger generation of Americans, the sub-culture, they would say they are exactly their children of their parents.

They have a new conformism.

Student: I think what I am trying to say is that to use conformity seems to mean equality (inaudible . . .). It seems to me though that possibly Nietzsche is mistaken about this. How could the removal of the nomos not provide for a real hierarchy but provide only for the possibility of complete equality and uniformity.

Strauss: That Nietzsche was not (inaudible) becomes more clear from the speech on the last man. There is no hierarchy anymore, no striving, no longing, anymore. You have read that?

Student: Yes I have.

Strauss: That is the point surely. But there should be minor changes. Because these people say, if I remember well, if someone thinks differently, (inaudible . . .). Nevertheless, I think it is the nomos, because the very exhortation, the intended exhortation of the natural anarchies, differences, is an attack on nature. And therefore an act of the nomos.

There was a criticism written a millennia ago, and that is in Aristophanes where they tried to establish a fully egalitarian society. (Inaudible . . .). All right, then we have two different situations. All are equal, and the women are the mothers who feed their children. And of course a part of the feeding is (inaudible), and here the differences comes between women who are attractive and women who are not attractive. A natural inequality. Therefore the legislator has to make a special law in order to equalize that inequality. So if I may use a crude, but since Aristophanes has done it before me I have some (inaudible), a young man cannot sleep with a young girl before he has slept with an ugly one, so you see there is a privilege given to the inferior, to equalize (inaudible). Apart from the solution today, only to replace the somewhat unseemingly Aristophelian example by a more elevated one, then you have (inaudible).

Student: I have a question. I can understand why as a teacher one might have to say yes to everything that has happened and everything that will happen, but doesn't the doctrine of eternal return say something even more that I don't understand. Mainly, that (inaudible) that will become. (Inaudible . . .).

Strauss: I think the point is if you make the experiment, and say I will, you cannot leave it by merely willing but you must assert it, you must wish it.

Student: But to wish it is not simply to wish it, but its eternal return.

Strauss: Yes, yes. I mean if this hierarchy of Nietzsche is natural, and if man is not merely to be an accident, and millions and billions of years before, and millions and billions of years

afterwards, there must be (inaudible) to human nature. In the literal sense it is impossible because Nietzsche "knew" that the visible universe will perish, (inaudible).

Student: I thought he described some mathematical notion that (inaudible . . .).

Strauss: Yes, that is the consequence, but he knew that what was possible was only what we may call in historical terms the Lucretian (inaudible). This visible universe to which we belong will perish. But another visible universe will come again, and may already be there, in a place where we have no contact, astronauts or otherwise.

So I think there is only the Aristotelian and Lucretian way out. If you want to preserve the eternity of the human race. Either a strict return, or continued return -- Aristotle; or a discontinuous one -- Lucretius.

Student: (Inaudible . . .).

Strauss: Yes, that is one of the arguments which he uses to support it. But the fundamental thesis is not bound up with this. Eternal return could mean eternal return of the human race in general. It could also mean eternal return of you, each individual, with this particular (inaudible), and Nietzsche selected the latter on grounds which have nothing to do with what I said today. Namely, as we quoted it, a substitute for the belief in the (inaudible) of the soul, and gives the individual the highest sense of responsibility for his action, that a man must say to himself whatever I do now I will have to repeat infinitely over. That is true, but it is not brought up here and perhaps this is one of the reasons why Beyond Good and Evil is a more attractive premise than some other ones.

Another Student: (Inaudible . . .).

Strauss: Yes, because . . . let us take a crucial example, the order of rank, the hierarchy, which was always regarded as a fact, and well, you know it from the discussions in the daily papers -- higher and lower IQ's, and today we hear that it is all nonsense, because these IQ's are of conventional origin. By nature all men would have the same IQ. But some have poor home backgrounds and others have a better home background, and if you extend it to the genes, well, the genes can also be influenced. The rule of nonsense and unreason hitherto -- that is not natural in any awe-inspiring thing. So that is indeed superficially given, but radically questioned. But if for one reason or another, even for reasons of mere prejudice, one wants to preserve the natural inequality he must have first willed nature; it is not simply given. The conquest of nature, whether technologically or theoretic-

tically, has made this appeal to nature the tradition, an appeal to nature of which we ourselves constitute. Nietzsche's very problematical way out is to make a postulation of the will. I do not know whether I have made it somewhat clearer to you.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: No, no, immortality is out. (Inaudible . . .).

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: All right, that is a formula which Nietzsche accepts. No, he would say becoming, but there is the highest approximation of coming to being is exactly eternal return, namely their becoming, change, is eternal.

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: But then one doesn't understand it as Nietzsche understood it. (Inaudible . . .) you know that you will always return, and then you act on that. Here the knowledge follows the (inaudible).

Student: (Inaudible.)

Strauss: (Inaudible.)

Student: But that means that it has to be understood as a kind of poetry, a kind of lyric poetry, and and it has a certain inspiration where the will to power is the highest force and from that there generates all kinds of things which would be good consequences, that would be consistent with the will to power, no matter how ridiculous they are. Even the idea that an individual's life is going to be eternally (inaudible), . . .

Strauss: Let me say only one more thing on this subject. You apparently have either forgotten completely or been completely unimpressed by what Nietzsche says about the problem of science, where he talks about a serious investigation of that and contrasts it with poetry. All right, but the very notion of serious investigation which you use has been questioned by Nietzsche especially in the first chapter.

Student: Sure.

Strauss: Yes, yes. And in the 19th century they used the expression, especially in Germany but in other countries I believe also, presuppositionless science. Have you ever heard that expression?

Student: I've always (inaudible).

Strauss: Presuppositionless science. (Inaudible . . .) and I think by Nietzsche a special vigor. And if science is as much based on questioning "poetic assumptions," then one cannot well

acquire (inaudible).

But let us next read Aphorism 231.

Reader: "Learning alters us, it does what all nourishment does that does not merely "conserve"--as the physiologist knows. But at the bottom of our souls, quite "down below," there is certainly something unteachable, a granite of spiritual fate, of predetermined decision and answer to predetermined, chosen questions."

"In each cardinal problem there speaks an unchangeable "I am this," a thinker cannot learn anew about man and woman, for instance, but can only learn fully--he can only follow to the end what is "fixed" about them in himself. Occasionally we find certain solutions of problems which make strong beliefs for us; perhaps they are henceforth called "convictions." Later on -- one sees in them only footsteps to self-knowledge, guide-posts to the problem which we ourselves are -- or more correctly to the great stupidity which we embody, our spiritual fate, the unteachable in us; which I have just paid myself, permiss will be more readily allowed me to utter some truths about "woman as she is," provided that it is known at the outset how literally they are merely -- my truths."

Strauss: Deep-down -- you remember that is a reference to what we read in the first chapter, the beautiful, strong donkey, which is at the bottom of every philosophy and of course also for non-philosophies.

Regarding the last sentence -- that is for Nietzsche a rather clumsy transition, to a discussion of men and women, but this transition fulfills a function. That is not merely a flattery, a gesture of conciliation towards the friends of women's emancipation, although it would seem to be no more than that.

It is interesting that Nietzsche is about to continue the theme of nature, that is to say the natural hierarchy, in full awareness of the problematic concept of nature. Man-woman is an outstanding example about which everyone I believe has some experiential knowledge, which gives him some inkling of what is meant by nature.

Now we can of course not read it, and not only for reasons of gallantry, what Nietzsche says about this subject. He even makes some (inaudible) I assume in Number . . .

Student: (Inaudible . . .).

Strauss: (Inaudible.)

(The tape is quite inaudible at this point.)

(The lecture ends at this point.)